On August 1, 2012, Chechnya’s President Ramzan Kadyrov announced that troops of the Chechen MVD and the Chechen administrative FSB had carried out a special operation in the neighboring republic of Ingushetia on July 29. Chechen troops killed two and wounded one member of the North Caucasian insurgency, suspected of conducting an attack on Tsentoroy, the center of the Kadyrov clan. Ingush president Yunus-Bek Yevkurov dismissed Kadyrov’s version and proclaimed that the casualties were caused by an accidental explosion in the village of Galashki near Chechnya’s border, in effect accusing Kadyrov of lying and exacerbating the already severe animosity between the two leaders.

BACKGROUND: Chechens and Ingush are two cognate nations belonging to the supraethnic family of Vaynakhs. Occasional disputes have usually been short in duration and only rarely politicized. Chechens and Ingush have similar traditions, culture, habits and language. They shared one administrative unit during the Soviet era and both became victims of Stalin’s repression and deportations.

However, political differences exist, caused particularly by long-term demographic and socioeconomic factors but also by developments after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Ingushetia’s strategy towards Moscow was far more careful in the early 1990s, which saved the republic from a destructive war. Ingushetia consequently accepted a large number of Chechen refugees and the then administration of President Ruslan Aushev succeeded in dealing with the situation in spite of an extremely tense political and humanitarian context. The Chechen (Ichkerian) separatists under Aslan Maskhadov’s leadership pragmatically avoided any disputes with Nazran, ignoring pressure from the Salafi wing of Ichkerians as well as the existing territorial questions between the two republics. Akhmat Kadyrov, the father of Chechnya’s current president, also had good relations with Aushev as well as with his successor, Murat Zyazikov.

However, conflict between the two leaderships appeared after Kadyrov became Chechnya’s president and Yevkurov replaced the conformist Zyazikov as his Ingushetian counterpart in 2008. The relationship soon turned into open hatred, forcing the Kremlin to mediate between the two leaders. The first major problem appeared after an attempt on Yevkurov’s life in June 2009. Yevkurov survived the bomb attack – most probably organized by Said Buryatsky, a leader of the North Caucasian Salafis – but was hospitalized for a long time. In the meantime, Kadyrov strengthened his influence and declared himself the one and only real fighter against terrorism, taking on the task of retaliating on Yevkurov’s behalf.

At this time, their different strategies for fighting radical Salafism and terror became increasingly apparent. While Yevkurov pressed for preventive operations and negotiations, Kadyrov promoted nonselective harsh power. A real clash appeared in January 2011, when Yevkurov accused Chechen refugees of bringing crime, prostitution and alcoholism into Ingushetia. Yevkurov’s ill-considered and offensive statement engendered great exasperation among the Chechen population. The Kremlin also publicly admonished Yevkurov for the statement. The situation calmed after an intervention by Ingushetian businessmen whose dealings were threatened by the problem becoming politicized along ethnic lines. Yevkurov then undertook several reconciliatory acts, including the opening of an alley named after Akhmat Kadyrov in Ingushetia’s capital Magas and visits to several Friday prayers in Grozny. Yet, Kadyrov has never fully accepted these gestures and has not forgotten Yevkurov’s statements.

The dispute fundamentally stems from a complicated personal relationship between the two politicians. Yevkurov holds the title of Hero of the Russian Federation, a paratrooper and general who was in command of the famous capture of Kosovo airport in Pristina, and considers Kadyrov to be an FSB puppet and a grandiloquent tyrant, but not a real warrior. In return, Kadyrov considers Yevkurov’s Hero title for activities “during the establishment of constitutional order in the North Caucasus” to be synonymous with “murdering Chechen civilians.” At that time Kadyrov and his father fully sided with the separatists and fought against the federal forces.

IMPLICATIONS: The animosity includes a broader institutional underpinning. Due to his military career, Yevkurov is considered the GRU’s man in the region whereas Kadyrov is supported by the FSB, with closer ties to President Putin. Disputes are further fueled by Kadyrov’s ambitions to become the leader of the whole North Caucasus and to assert his power in the neighboring republics.

Both leaders have suggested to the Kremlin that their counterpart should be replaced. Yevkurov has proposed the reinstallation of Alu Alkhanov as head of the Chechen Republic while Kadyrov has pushed for replacing parts of the Ingush leadership.

The current clash between Chechnya’s and Ingushetia’s presidents can be considered the most severe to date for several reasons. Firstly, it is an openly public conflict with mutual harsh accusations exchanged through media. Secondly, Kadyrov overreacted to Yevkurov’s initial statement. He accused Yevkurov of being unable to establish order on his own territory and poignantly offered his services in doing so. Kadyrov recalled that the Chechen side has repeatedly warned of the existing Salafi bases in the area and suggested joint counter-terrorist operations that would prevent insurgents from conducting raids into Chechnya.

Another aspect of the dispute concerns the different views on counterterrorism on part of the two leaders. Kadyrov’s approach can be labeled as hard and Yevkurov’s as soft. Yevkurov prefers dialogue with representatives of the Islamist underground and often terms the radicals young lost souls. Even according to several Chechen observers, such an approach has seemed more successful than the use of brute force.

Kadyrov refuses to employ a soft strategy and instead subjects the families of Islamist radicals to repression according to the principle of collective guilt. While Yevkurov strikes hard against real terrorists, Kadyrov frequently prosecutes only alleged terrorists, e.g. peaceful followers of less frequent forms of Islam. Moreover, Kadyrov has accused Yevkurov of inadequate support for the Ingushetian clergy that speaks against the Salafis. Ironically, during the “August dispute” between the Chechen and Ingushetian leaders, terrorist attacks occurred in both regions. Two suicide bombers killed 4 soldiers in Grozny on August 6 and Kadyrov blamed Muslim and Khuseyn Gakaev for organizing the terrorist attack – the same perpetrators allegedly responsible for the attack at Tsentoroy. In Ingushetia, a suicide bomber killed 8 police at a funeral on August 19. Evidently, both republics experience problems in suppressing terrorism, but Yevkurov’s strategy is arguably more likely to bring results in the long run.

Another point of disagreement concerns the fight against corruption where Kadyrov perceives his solution to be more effective: officers are forced to return bribes taken; otherwise all their possessions are confiscated. Kadyrov is indisputably more successful in the reconstruction of his republic. Local observers think this is mostly due to the better financial advisors of the Kadyrov’s administration who master the federal budget legislation, allowing the administration to use the federal budget to their benefit. In addition, the effectiveness of Kadyrov’s regime in these areas frequently contradicts Russian law and paradoxically also Chechen norms and traditions. 

The most dangerous aspect of the verbal conflict between the two leaders is that it raises the question of revising mutual borders in the context of joint actions against local militants. Such statements can easily spill over from the personal and political level into the interethnic and consequently ethnopolitical level with possible escalation into a broader conflict. Kadyrov has raised claims on Sunzha and parts of the Malgobek rayons which together form almost half of Ingushetia.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent conflict between Yevkurov and Kadyrov can be considered the most severe so far and has the potential of assuming an interethnic dimension, especially considering Kadyrov’s requests for the revision of mutual borders at Ingushetia’s expense. Thus, the territorial sovereignty of the federal subjects – which can only be violated by federal forces – is also at stake. Kadyrov’s statements about establishing order come close to a threat of armed operations on Ingushetian territory. Kadyrov’s ambitions to rule the entire North Caucasus have already brought about several attempts to become a more crucial player in Ingushetia and Dagestan. The threats risk angering Ingushetians beyond the republic’s leadership and could significantly worsen the historically good relations between Chechens and Ingush. The key to the solution lies, as usual, in Moscow.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Tomáš Šmíd is assistant professor at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic. He was a Fulbright Fellow at CACI in 2010/2011. te Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.