Conversion to Islam and the related spread of Islamism has a long history in Russia; however the North Caucasus and jihadists from this region are playing an increasingly important role in this process. While small in number, converts are important assets for jihadists as they provide a cadre of dedicated terrorists who are difficult to detect. Converts hence increasingly provide a pool of recruitment for North Caucasian jihadists. In late July 2012, several women engaging in terrorist activities in the North Caucasus were killed by law enforcement, one of whom was ethnic Russian. The authorities believed that she and the other women were preparing for a suicidal terrorist attack.

BACKGROUND: Conversion to Islam among ethnic Russians started after the collapse of the USSR and continued throughout the Putin era. As late as April 2012, one observer noted that “In recent years, there are increasing numbers of ethnic Russians who want to be Muslims.” Conversion has not always been considered a problem in the Kremlin. While converts are not necessarily prone to commit terrorism, developments in the North Caucasus after 2007 when the previously largely nationalistic Chechen resistance was transformed into a jihadist Caucasian Emirate placed the issue of Russian converts on the security agenda.

One important trait of North Caucasian Islamism, aside from its regard of violence as the only way of dealing with whom they regard as infidels and their stooges, is its “internationalism” following Soviet parlance – a total discard of ethnic background. This internationalism stems not only from the active participation in the North Caucasian resistance of people of all North Caucasian ethnicities who were historically Muslim but also by the active interaction of fighters from a much broader community. Indeed, post-Soviet jihadism has undergone its own peculiar globalization where the Russian language has continued to play an important role in communication and even religious discourse. This has logically led to the acceptance of ethnic Russians as bona fide members of the resistance after conversion, in turn providing for an increasing flow of converts to the jihadist resistance.

This has several implications. First, it has increased the pool for recruitment of members to the resistance and an increasing role of Russian converts among the fighters. Secondly, it has complicated law enforcement’s work to identify the potential terrorists due to the impossibility of applying the principles of ethnic profiling. Third, it has provided a potential bridge to other groups who confront the authorities, ranging from common criminals to Russian nationalists.

IMPLICATIONS: During their early involvement in jihadism, Russian converts were incorporated into groups of mostly non-Russian participants and their numbers and expertise rose over time. Approximately by the end of Medvedev’s presidency, converts increasingly started to play an independent and visible role in the resistance. It is possible that Russian converts have created groups where ethnic Russian converts are the majority or possibly the only members. For example, groups of Russian Islamists have engaged in terrorist attacks in Volgograd against the MVD Academy and similar institutions, after which the leader of the group Umar, Andrei Autonov, was killed.

The existence of groups formed by predominantly Russian jihadists is not an isolated occurrence and the groups are directly related with the North Caucasian resistance. On March 3, 2012, eleven “mostly Russian Muslims” were arrested in Novosibirsk. They were accused of planning terrorist activities and/or connections with the North Caucasian resistance. According to other reports, half of the members in these groups were ethnic Russians converted in prison where they were influenced by Islamists from the North Caucasus.

The North Caucasian connection of these groups was quite clear. In March 2010, Russian law enforcement arrested Bashir Pliev (Emir Bashkirsky). His right hand was ethnic Russian Vladimir Turaev, who was the leader of the organization’s military branch and was able to escape. Aleksandra Iashin, also a Russian convert and a member of the group, resisted arrest and was wounded. The groups were engaged in robberies aimed to raise funds for North Caucasian jihadists.

While the existence of converts has increased the recruitment base for jihadists, the emergence of the criminal underworld as a potential pool of recruits is especially important. Criminal converts have experience in avoiding detection, know how to handle weapons and have stamina and endurance. They can also provide experience and networks in the criminal world along with developed and practically tested techniques for hiding in urban areas under constant police and military surveillance. They are therefore valuable assets for jihadists, especially for those who operate in urban centers. It should be recalled that the lack of experience in living and acting underground in urban areas is an important factor in detecting and thwarting terrorist attempts in the U.S., especially when launched by home-grown and, in most cases, inexperienced terrorists.

These aspects of jihadism have been discussed and condoned by some of the best known and most sophisticated jihadist ideologists and North Caucasian jihadists are keen to take note of the dictums of foreign experts. The website of the North Caucasian resistance, Kavkaz Center, for example published several years ago a compendium of Al-Suri’s work, one of the most sophisticated internationally known theorists of jihadis. Al-Suri noted that victory in jihad is the most important undertaking and that members of the resistance shall evaluate their leaders in this perspective alone. Hence, some of the successful commanders could behave in a way completely incompatible with Islam, for example abusing drugs. However, if he is a successful commander and dedicated to jihad, he shall be a leader of the mujahideen and not be replaced by a pious but incapable man. Following Al-Suri’s advice, one of the contributors to a jihadist publication from the North Caucasus stated that a good cover is absolutely essential for the success of terrorist operations. Thus, those who engage in jihad could behave as non-Muslims – shave bare and drink – if this is essential for blending with the crowd and avoiding law enforcement. This kind of “secularization” of jihadism could well be encouraged by blending with criminals.

Indeed, it is unlikely that most of criminals, even after formal conversion, could avoid drinking and change their habits; most of them would unlikely be circumcised. Their presence among Muslim jihadists could well speed up a flexibility or even peculiar “secularization” of the movement where formal adherence to Islam would just be a symbol of resistance to the Kremlin. This secularization could well help jihadists including those from the North Caucasus blend in with the general population and help them in undertaking terrorist activities. Moreover, it could provide a bridge between North Caucasian jihadists and some segments of Russian protestors whose hatred of the Putin regime is stronger than their dislike of North Caucasian jihadists. In such case jihadists, especially those who are ethnic Russians, could certainly broaden the violent resistance to the regime.

CONCLUSIONS: The conversion of ethnic Russians to Islam and their active participation in jihadism has a long history but became increasingly visible by at the end of Medvedev’s presidency, and has had direct implications for the North Caucasian resistance. The acceptance of converts has not only increased the pool of jihadists but also provided a link between jihadists and other groups which confront the regime. If this process develops further, it could transform jihadists into the nucleus or at least an important wing of the broader terrorist / revolutionary network.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.