While Kyrgyzstan has expressed a desire to join Russia’s Eurasian Union in the future, a close analysis of Kyrgyz foreign policy indicates that it, similar to other Central Asian states who have expressed an interest in the project, regards increased integration with Russia as just one among many possibilities. They could easily change the direction of their geopolitical orientations if they do not receive the benefits expected from Moscow. In the case in Kyrgyzstan, Turkey is increasingly emerging as a leading geopolitical patron whose rapprochement with Bishkek demonstrates Ankara’s increasing geopolitical ambition.

BACKGROUND: Kyrgyzstan is one of the most unstable republics of the former USSR and has been the most unstable among the Central Asian states over the last decade. The relatively frequent regime changes in Bishkek have also presumably been intimately connected to Bishkek’s relationship with global powers who vie for influence in this part of the globe. Kyrgyzstan’s leaders have been in permanent search of the best geopolitical patrons from which they could get the most benefits. The new Kyrgyz President, Almazbek Atambaev, is no exception. Even before his ascent to power, he sent several signals in different directions. Moscow was one of them and could, as Kremlin pundits believed, indeed emerge as Bishkek’s geopolitical patron. One such positive signal was Atambaev’s promise to close the U.S. military base in Manas.

However, Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with Moscow has soured and Atambaev’s visits to Russia have been fiascos. Moscow increasingly perceives Atambaev as unreliable and has decided not to provide loans and grants and even declared it will not pay in cash for some of its military bases in republic. The Kremlin has plainly ignored Atambaev’s threat to close the bases and some Russian observers note that Bishkek does not possess any means of leverage to close them, including by force.

These and other statements as well as a general disappointment with Moscow have led Atambaev to abandon his previous praise of Russia and historical ties between Russians and Kyrgyz, as he has accused Russia and Kazakhstan of meddling in the country’s affairs. While clearly discarding Moscow as his major geopolitical prop, Atambaev is skeptical regarding the U.S. As was the case with his predecessor Roza Otunbaeva, Atambaev is well aware of the U.S. economic predicament, he seriously doubts the capability of the U.S. to provide Kyrgyzstan much-needed cash, let alone security guarantees. Consequently, Atambaev is in search of alternatives, with Turkey emerging as one of the most important. Ankara has greatly appreciated Bishkek’s overtures toward Turkey, which speak to the latter’s increasing geopolitical ambitions.

IMPLICATIONS: One of the major reasons for Bishkek’s rapprochement with Ankara is the latter’s economic attraction. According to Asia Times, Bishkek expects almost US$ 450 million of Turkish investment and bilateral trade is predicted to reach US$ 1 billion by 2015. Bishkek is undoubtedly aware of Turkey’s general economic power. In Turkmenistan, for example, 90 percent of construction works are carried out by Turkish firms, which were worth US$ 3.2 billion in 2011. Yet, Turkey’s economic clout is not the only reason for Bishkek’s overtures.

Bishkek is seriously worried by geopolitical and security developments in its surroundings. This includes officially voiced fears of terrorism, but also the question of Uzbekistan and its claims to regional dominance. Tashkent’s bullying of weaker states such as Tajikistan and the fact that it was clearly pondering the possibility of a military intervention during the 2010 violence in Osh when hundreds, if not thousands, of Uzbeks were killed presents a clear geopolitical predicament for Bishkek. This is compounded by Tashkent’s positive relations with Beijing and recent improvements in its relationship with the U.S. as indicated by State Secretary Clinton’s recent visit.

It is in this context of significantly reduced prospects for assistance from either the U.S. or Russia that Kyrgyzstan places its hopes on Turkey, which is emerging as a strong regional power with an independent foreign policy. For example, it refused to stop purchasing oil and gas from Iran despite the European and American embargo. Ankara also has a rather tense relationship with Tashkent, which Bishkek is certainly taking into account.

Atambaev engaged in forging close ties with Ankara long before his inauguration as president. He speaks Turkish fluently, has visited Turkey many times and has business interests in the country. The relationship has deepened after his ascent to the presidency. He has insinuated that Turkey might obtain stocks in Dastan, a military enterprise which produces weapon parts for the Russian army and navy. Atambaev has also stated that he would like to increase the number of Kyrgyz students in Turkish universities, and Kyrgyzstan has provided land for the establishment of a Turkish university in Bishkek. In April 2011, Atambaev visited Turkey where he elaborated on several projects of geopolitical and economic cooperation between Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, where Kyrgyzstan would play a crucial role. In one of proposed projects, Kyrgyzstan will become a major transportation hub connecting Istanbul with Shanghai. Another project foreshadowed Putin’s later initiative by proposing the creation of a Custom Union including Russia, Turkey and Kyrgyzstan, however with Bishkek as a center. Moscow is part of some of these arrangements, while it is completely excluded in others. 

Ankara has clear incentives to increase its presence in Central Asia. Turkey was long strictly Western oriented and regarded EU membership as a key geopolitical goal. Yet, this direction of Ankara’s foreign increasingly became unrealistic as the EU demonstrated no intention to accept Turkey, while the economic predicament of the EU and the West in general and Turkey’s own economic success made EU integration less attractive as an option. The emerging “neo Ottomanism” mixed with residual pan-Turkism proclaim Ankara as a global center in its own right and justifies Turkey’s expansion in various parts of the world, including Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan.

On April 26, 2011, Erdogan and Atambaev created a Supreme Council of Strategic Cooperation. Atambaev proclaimed that Ankara was indeed Bishkek’s strategic ally and that a closer relationship with Turkey shall be established. This new alliance looked very similar to the Eurasian Union, but in this case Bishkek and Ankara will be key players in the new organization. In January 2012, the Turkish president visited Kyrgyzstan and upgraded the relationship between the two countries, which also agreed to support each other in the UN and the Council of Europe. Agreements were made to increase the number of Kyrgyz students in Turkish diplomatic and military academies, while Ankara has decided to build a military academy in Kyrgyzstan to help Bishkek develop its defense industry. None of these arrangements envision any role for Russia, the U.S. or China.

CONCLUSIONS: Like several other Central Asian states, Kyrgyzstan has expressed an interest in the Russia-sponsored Eurasian Union. However, in Kyrgyzstan and elsewhere, Moscow is not regarded as the only option, neither are Washington or Beijing. Instead, Turkey is increasingly emerging as player in Central Asian international politics as an alternative to all three major actors in the region. This not only points to the increasing economic and geopolitical clout of regional powers such as Turkey, but also to the limits of great power influence in Central Asia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.