Abkhazia and South Ossetia are both highly dependent on Russian economic, political, and military support, and it would be natural for Russia to introduce its own system of governance by “siloviki,” the officers of power ministries, in these regions. However, most high officials in Abkhazia and South Ossetia represent only one power ministry: the FSB. Officers from other power ministries, such as the Army or police, are very rare on high governmental positions. Yet, the FSB rule over these regions has taken slightly different forms.

BACKGROUND: The FSB is an heir of the Soviet KGB. Other successor organizations include the SVR (Foreign Intelligence Service), the Federal Guard Service (presidential guards) and several other secret institutions whose names are not even known.

The KGB was split up in the early 1990s, but its dismantling was not completed and the organization retained its integrity. Today’s KGB may be likened to the U.S. Intelligence Community. However, the U.S. Intelligence Community is a union of mostly civilian organizations, while the KGB successors are strictly military. All Russian power ministries are controlled and infiltrated by the FSB, blurring the dividing lines between the FSB and other agencies. It is therefore inaccurate to consider the FSB, which manages counterintelligence, an incarnation of the KGB, which filled a much broader range of functions.

In Abkhazia, the “siloviki” President Alexander Ankvab was elected in August, 2011, in competition with Sergey Shamba. The latter is a civilian and a professional historian, whose Soviet biography has no KGB trace, and it is unclear whether he has Russian citizenship. The FSB does not trust such people. Ankvab, on the other hand, is a fellow “siloviki” officer with shoulder stripes and a genuine background in the Soviet nomenclature.

The Kremlin has been less successful in South Ossetia where its promotion of the “siloviki” presidential candidate Anatoly Bibilov failed to grant him a victory in the elections. Instead, he was defeated by former Minister of Education Alla Jioeva. The FSB could only eliminate her forcibly through a police assault on her headquarters one day before inauguration in February 2012, sending Jioeva to hospital after allegedly being beaten by police.

Abkhazian President Alexander Ankvab meets both of the two main criteria of an ideal leader in today’s Russia through his connection to “siloviki” and his background in Soviet institutions. Ankvab made a brilliant career in the Soviet Union, starting as the First Secretary of the Komsomol (“Communist Union of Youth”) in the Abkhaz city of Gudauta late 1970s. This position made him a member of the “Nomenklatura” – the privileged stratum of Communist Party officials who could not be demoted or fired but only promoted.

The young Komsomol leaders frequently used their positions as foundations for moving to leading posts in the power ministries with high military salaries, primarily the KGB and the Ministry of Interior. The Ministry of Defense was less attractive due to its tough work conditions. Ankvab became head of the Gudauta Department of the Ministry of Interior and in 1983, at the age of 30, became Colonel in the militia (police). In 1981-83, Ankvab worked at the Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in Tbilisi. His last position there was Deputy Head of the Department of Administrative Organs, which supervised the Georgian KGB and other power ministries.

The unsuccessful South Ossetian “siloviki” candidate, Anatoly Bibilov, does not share Ankvab’s impressive record, but is a plain military officer. He graduated from the Russian Ryazan Airborne School in 1992. In 2008, he was fighting in the peacekeeping battalion of North Ossetia on the South Ossetian side and was later appointed Minister of Extraordinary Situations, which is a power ministry. According to reports from the Russian agency “New Region-Moscow,” senior officials in South Ossetia’s leadership have expressed surprise that Moscow opted for Bibiliov, who is considered a very weak successor to former president Eduard Kokoity.

IMPLICATIONS: The FSB combines two kinds of methods for influencing society in the two regions. The first consists of secret collaborators, the second of display of power and military force. Agents and secret collaborators are effective in a stable society like Abkhazia. However, in an unstable situation the agents loose channels of influence, and the FSB compensates for the work of quiet agents by demonstrative power methods. Accordingly, the unstable situation in South Ossetia underlined the need to forcibly eliminate Jioeva from the presidential race. Also, the FSB seems to lack knowledge and experience regarding South Ossetia. This is unsurprising as this republic was important for the Soviet KGB, and explains the problem to find a suitable presidential candidate for South Ossetia.

In Abkhazia, the FSB’s presence has increased under Ankvab. A new base of the FSB Border Guards was opened in the town of Gantiadi in October, 2011. The Russian 7th military base operates in Gudauta since 2009. Every Russian military base has a presence of military counter-intelligence, managed by the FSB, and recruits agents both among the military and the civilian population. In addition, the foreign intelligence detachment is in Abkhazia tasked with recruiting people in Georgia on behalf of the FSB. The base also conducts military intelligence, managed by the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of Russian Army (GRU), which conducts strategic and combatant intelligence against Georgia. However, the GRU’s main target is the American presence across the region, not only in Georgia.

Known as a tough leader, Ankvab is expected to resolve the increasing problem of theft from Russian economic allocations, which is characteristic also for South Ossetia and the entire North Caucasus. Significant amounts of funds delivered to the Caucasus never reach the budgets of local governments, and are instead stolen by ruling clans and their supervisors in Moscow. According to Russian Caucasus expert Vadim Mukhanov, “Ankvab ... will be engaged in an uncompromising struggle with severe manifestations in Abkhazian society – in particular, during the election campaign he said he would fight corruption and ‘dark deeds,’ the shadow side of Abkhazian life.”

In South Ossetia, FSB activities have been more aggressive, as masked South Ossetian police stormed Jioeva’s headquarters in Tskhinvali on February 9. Shortly after the raid, one of Jioeva’s supporters was arrested and Jioeva was taken to a local hospital with a stroke. According to a witness, Russian journalist Joseph Galperin, “nobody is allowed to visit her in the hospital, guarded by armed people in camouflage under supervision of their counselors from the Russian FSB. In Moscow, FSB investigators are interrogating her supporters.” This is an indication that the FSB has a weaker position on South Ossetia, forcing it to use harsher measures to retain control.

Also, the FSB seems to be trying to increase its influence in South Ossetia especially through its Border Guards. In October, 2011, their local Directorate has installed a phone hotline to which South Ossetians may report illegal border crossings to the FSB. The Border Guards in South Ossetia are thus trying to interfere deeper into the local society on behalf of the FSB. This is a means for recruiting secret informants as the Border Guards combine the functions of the army and secret service. The FSB also opened a new eighth Border Guards base in August, 2011, whose soldiers can reconcile social unrest.

In general, FSB activities in South Ossetia are mostly uniformed, while in Abkhazia they rely on secret collaborators. The Abkhazian society was been infiltrated by the KGB for decades due to its location on the Soviet state border, while there was no need for corresponding penetration in South Ossetia.

CONCLUSIONS: Abkhazia seems to be ideal for installing Russian FSB rule. Abkhazian culture envisages a great amount of respect for warriors, and all Russian “siloviki” have military backgrounds. South Ossetia is also suitable for such leadership, but the FSB has seemingly been unable to find a suitable leader in the region. This problem could potentially be resolved by merging South Ossetia with the Russian Federation. Also, Georgian Communists, who are supporting Russia, might appreciate Ankvab’s genuine Communist past. Many of Ankvab’s former colleagues in the Central Committee of Soviet Georgia’s Communist Party are still alive and Ankvab’s ascent as the new Abkhazian President could provide inroads for Russian influence in Georgia. The future of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia depend heavily on Putin’s return to power. It is highly likely that he will renew his policy of returning Georgia to the Russian orbit.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Konstantin Preobrazhensky served in the KGB from 1976 to 1991, when he resigned and began to work as an intelligence expert and columnist for the Moscow Times. He now lives in the U.S. His latest book is KGB/FSB’s New Trojan Horse: Americans of Russian Descent.