Kazakh law enforcement recently claimed to have broken up a “terror group” in a Kazakh town. While jihadist terrorism has been a part of the Central Asian political landscape for a long time, these events deserve special attention. This is not only because several similar events have recently taken place in Kazakhstan, but also due to the country’s special conditions where jihadism has previously been a most marginal occurrence. The emergence of jihadism in Kazakhstan therefore indicates that the ideology has begun to spread in areas of the former USSR where it has not previously been present.

BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan has been one of the most, if not the most, stable and secular states in Central Asia, where the authorities have made significant efforts to ensure interethnic and social peace. In the beginning of the post-Soviet era, the ideology of Eurasianism, originating in Russia, became a popular semi-official creed of the post-Soviet space. The proponents of Eurasianism stated that Russia is not a Slavic state but a peculiar civilization in its own right where Slavic and Turkic minorities live in the condition of a healthy “symbiosis.” The theory fit well with the ethnic composition of Kazakhstan, with a considerable population of Russian-speakers and ethnic Russians. Eurasianism was especially popular within considerable segments of the Kazakh elite in the early 1990s. Later, Eurasianism increasingly became replaced by Kazakh nationalism, albeit in moderate form, and Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan in general displayed an image of prosperity and social peace in stark contrast to many other Central Asian states. Still, the sense of stability and prosperity increasingly looks like a façade and jihadists have started to take advantage of the country’s social problems.

The economy seems to be booming, due to the country’s rich deposits of gas and oil. Still, the economic growth benefits only a few. Workers’ conditions are harsh, leading to bitter and even violent strikes. Unemployment is rampant, especially among the youth. Consequently, the ideology of Kazakh nationalism is seen by increasing numbers of disenfranchised Kazakh youth as an alien force. In these conditions, Islam has started to fill the vacuum. A witness informed about growing attendance at the mosques, even by the young, and the increasing popularity of Islamic garb including long beards for men. This can be seen not just in the countryside and small cities but even in the former capital, Almaty.

Some of those who have discovered Islamic identity have turned to jihadism. Kazakh jihadists initially travelled abroad to fight, including to Afghanistan and the Northern Caucasus. There was a even rumor that a training camp for future fighters in Afghanistan had emerged in Kazakhstan, accusations that Astana denied vehemently. Later, when terrorist activities began to emerge in Kazakhstan proper, the authorities blamed nearby Central Asian republics where the jihadist underground has much deeper roots. Kazakh authorities proclaimed that jihadists from these countries infiltrated Kazakhstan whose people are absolutely foreign to this malady, and that the remedy was simply to tighten the border controls.

IMPLICATIONS: However, with the rise of terrorist activities inside the country, Kazakh authorities finally acknowledged the existence of jihadism as an internal problem and a serious one. Indeed, approximately since 2005/2006, Kazakhstan has become a scene of violent jihadist attacks and other related violence. According to some reports, policemen have become one of the major targets of jihadists, and increasing numbers of attacks against policemen have been recorded in 2007-2010. The perpetrators have primarily aimed at seizing weapons and have also targeted other sources of arms. The authorities have denied the claims that the attacks had anything to do with jihadism, instead claiming that the attackers were plain criminals. While this theory cannot be discarded, it is quite likely that at least some of the attacks were the work of the jihadist underground. In some of the cases, jihadists were evidently behind the attacks. While the sources available make it hard to pinpoint the exact location of all attacks, some were definitely perpetrated in the north of the country near Aktiubinsk. Northern Kazakhstan has a considerable Russian-speaking population, is economically developed and usually considered a secularized region. Still, the terrorist attacks here indicate that jihadism is widespread across the country and that it cannot be explained only through the influence of Kazakhstan’s southern neighbors, such as Uzbekistan.

As time has progressed, the terrorist attacks have become increasingly brazen and show little fear of the police. In April 2011, law enforcement in Almaty decided to arrest a group of jihadists in one of the city’s buildings and attacked the building on April 4. The Jihadists put up fierce resistance and eleven members of the police detachment were seriously wounded. The activities of Kazakh jihadist terrorists in their own country are apparently not separated from the universal jihad. Consequently, members of Kazakhstan’s jihadist underground have continued to take part in terrorist acts in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia. Some believe that one of the reasons for the proliferation of Kazakh jihadism is the considerable number of jihadist sympathizers among members of Kazakhstan’s elite, even among law enforcement officials. There are also indications that recruitment takes place among the increasingly disenchanted Russian minority, judging from the published names of arrested jihadists.

It should be underlined that the spread of jihadism in Kazakhstan does not approach the levels of jihadist activity in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Still, the problem is becoming serious, a fact that Astana has finally acknowledged. However, Kazakhstan’s government ignores the deep socio-economic roots of the phenomenon and still considers a harmful foreign influence to be the major reason for the spread of jihadism and increasing state control over religious practices as the antidote to the spread of jihadism. Some Kazakh citizens even praise such practices and point to nearby Uzbekistan with its harsh, repressive policies as an example to follow. While Kazakhstan has not resorted to Uzbekistan’s brutal practices, Astana has sought to respond to the increasing fear of the jihadist underground through laws providing increased power for the authorities to supervise the religious activities of Kazakh citizens. According to the new law, those religious groups which are not registered with the state are not allowed to practice their religion. 

While the rise of jihadism in is troubling to Kazakhstan, the international community should share its concern. This is especially the case considering the region’s geography and the interests of its main political players, especially the U.S. and Russia. Kazakhstan is close to Afghanistan, where the U.S. is planning to withdraw its troops by 2014. There is no guarantee that the Kabul government will be able to hold on to power, and the Taliban and other Islamic extremists could well spill over into the Central Asian republics. It is also questionable how the regimes of this region would be able to withstand the trials brought about by reinforced jihadist activities.

CONCLUSIONS: Russia continues to maintain a military presence in some areas of Central Asia, not least in Tajikistan where Moscow recently extended its military basing agreement. Russia also maintains military agreements with most Central Asian states through the CSTO recently held large military maneuvers within this framework. However, tensions exist between Russia and its Central Asian partners as well as between the regional states themselves and their abilities to deal with a major crisis are questionable. In fact, Russia has been unable to quell its own, now mostly jihadist, rebellion in the Northern Caucasus for almost a generation. Post-Soviet Kazakhstan has often been described as an island of stability among the Central Asian states. However, the increasing number of terrorist attacks and related violence indicate that is no longer the case. The government’s attempts to ignore the socio-economic roots of the problem and increased control over the country’s religious life will hardly resolve the situation in the long run.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of history at Indiana University at South Bend.