The presidential elections in Kyrgyzstan on October 30 marked the first peaceful and voluntary handover of power from one leader to another in the history of post-Soviet Central Asia. Despite some shortcomings reported by external observers, the elections took place in an environment of freedom and impartiality. Kyrgyzstan’s task now is to sustain its development towards consolidated democratic practices. The president-elect, Almazbek Atambayev, has promised that from now on Kyrgyzstan will not see another revolution. However, he faces serious challenges. 

BACKGROUND: Following a turbulent 2010 marked by ethnic violence, regime change, a constitutional referendum, and parliamentary elections, Kyrgyzstan spent 2011 learning how to function as a parliamentary state. The interim government that came to power after ousting President Kurmanbek Bakiyev’s regime sought to avoid excessive state control over public life and to make the political process more transparent. By changing the constitution, interim president Roza Otunbayeva pledged that it will become difficult for future leaders to concentrate too much power in their own hands. She also promised to leave her post in less than two years, opening the possibility for Kyrgyzstan to have the first peaceful transfer of power in Central Asia.

The reforms initiated by the interim government in 2011 culminated with the presidential election held on October 30. With a turnout of 61 percent and 16 candidates running, Prime Minister Atambayev won the presidency with 63 percent of the vote. His strongest opponents, leader of Butun Kyrgyzstan Adakhan Madumarov and leader of Ata-Jurt Kamchybek Tashiyev gained 14.7 percent and 14.3 percent respectively. According to the new constitution the president is elected for six years and for a maximum of two consecutive terms.

Although the exact outcome of the presidential election was largely unpredictable, several months before the vote Atambayev emerged as the clear front-runner. Initially, 86 candidates registered to run for the presidency, but 70 dropped out before the official campaign period began. Most of them were either unable to collect the necessary amount of signatures, submit the 100,000 soms registration fee to the CEC or pass the Kyrgyz language proficiency exam. A few candidates, including Omurbek Tekebayev, leader of Ata-Meken party, and Nariman Tuleev decided not to run. As a result, 16 candidates appeared on the final ballot.

Although at times clumsy, the electoral campaign was conducted in a freer environment than any of Kyrgyzstan’s previous presidential elections. For the first time, all competing candidates had the opportunity to participate in televised debates while citizens, especially those using the Internet, could send their questions directly to the candidates during the debates. During televised debates candidates talked about pressing economic and political issues, their involvement in corruption and ties to organized crime. Most candidates insisted on strengthening the rule of law in the country and uniting the society regardless of north-south divisions and ethnic origin. The candidates also focused on distancing themselves from corruption and professing their ardent hopes to keep the country united. In the end the voters were to decide which of the candidates did the best job at representing their interests.

During the election campaign period Atambayev’s opponents and various NGO leaders accused him of using his position as Prime Minister to gain an unfair advantage over other candidates. In response to growing criticism, Atambayev agreed to delegate his prime ministerial responsibilities to his deputy, Omurbek Babanov. Dinara Oshurahunova, leader of the NGO Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, has said that civil society observers did not uncover any cases of using administrative resources in favor of specific candidates.

IMPLICATIONS: The presidential elections marked the first time in post-Soviet Central Asia’s history that there is a peaceful and voluntary handover of power from one leader to another. Similar to the parliamentary elections in 2010, the 2011 presidential election was fairly transparent and monitored by international observers. Over 300 OSCE observers and 1,000 observers from the NGO Coalition monitored the elections. The OSCE praised the peaceful and orderly manner in which the elections were conducted, but pointed to a number of shortcomings that must be overcome for Kyrgyzstan to consolidate its democratic practices. The candidate registration was inclusive, while the campaign was open and respecting fundamental freedoms.

This was, however, overshadowed by flaws in the voter lists and tabulation process, according to the OSCE. Hundreds of voters were not able to cast their votes because of incomplete lists. Furthermore, a few attempts by Madumarov’s supporters to buy votes were reported. Finally, the Central Election Commission’s work was “adequate, but sometimes lacked transparency,” the OSCE concluded. Some in Kyrgyzstan doubt that Atambayev could really earn such significant support in the first round without falsifying at least a portion of the election results. Although many of his supporters voted for Atambayev to avoid a second round that would highlight the north-south divide, few expected that he would win by such a wide margin. According to most international observers, however, these shortcomings were not significant enough to affect the outcome of the election.

These elections were challenging because old players had to compete for the presidency in a free and transparent environment. Predictably, candidates who had been ousted from power as a result of the April 2010 regime change tended to criticize the current system of governance. Madumarov and Tashiyev accused Atambayev of using “administrative support” and thus refused to recognize the outcome of the election. Both have already mobilized crowds in Osh and Jalal-Abad to protest the election result and request a new round of voting. Atambayev is currently leading negotiations with both politicians to ensure that the situation does not spiral out of control. Unless all three leaders agree on a deal, the situation will remain tense in the southern parts of the country.

Most voters voted according to their regional identity – Atambayev scored high in the northern part of the country, while the southern regions were Madumarov’s and Tashiyev’s strongholds. In Bishkek, Tashiyev has a reputation of being a nationalist who wants a return to a presidential system, while Atambayev was usually viewed as the presumptive winner. Tashiyev has been trying to deflect his image as a nationalist, but he still warns voters that the north-south divide could destabilize the country. In contrast, Atambayev positions himself as a leader who recognizes the need to bridge this divide and unite the country. “Kyrgyzstan is for all,” was Atambayev’s main campaign slogan, arguing that despite social diversity the country must stand united. His pre-election decision to raise salaries for teachers and his promises to boost economic growth over the next few years were largely viewed as campaign strategies.

CONCLUSIONS: The last year and a half have been critical for Kyrgyzstan’s political development. Against all odds the country has set a precedent for a peaceful transfer of power. Kyrgyzstan has not become a more democratic country merely by holding acceptable elections, but like during the parliamentary elections last year, the country avoided violent confrontation between various competing political groups. This alone should be considered a positive example in Central Asia’s reality where state institutions are hollow and leaders are corrupt. Kyrgyzstan’s stability will depend on how the competing factions led by Madumarov and Tashiyev will choose to work with the new head of state. In the meantime, Atambayev will need to live up to his promises and eschew the temptation to concentrate political power in his hands, thus avoiding repeating the mistakes of his predecessors.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.