Wednesday, 19 October 2011

KYRGYZSTAN’S PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: NEW GAME WITH OLD PLAYERS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Erica Marat (10/19/2011 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Kyrgyzstan is about to hold presidential elections that will potentially mark the first peaceful and lawful transfer of power in the country and in the region. Most in Kyrgyzstan expect Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev to win the elections. The question, however, remains whether the elections will proceed without major violations and move Kyrgyzstan one step further in political development, or cause a deeper divide within the country into north and south.

Kyrgyzstan is about to hold presidential elections that will potentially mark the first peaceful and lawful transfer of power in the country and in the region. Most in Kyrgyzstan expect Prime Minister Almazbek Atambayev to win the elections. The question, however, remains whether the elections will proceed without major violations and move Kyrgyzstan one step further in political development, or cause a deeper divide within the country into north and south. The process has so far been rather peaceful and well organized.

BACKGROUND: In 2010, Kyrgyzstan’s President Roza Otunbayeva promised to step down after a presidency lasting less than two years to set a precedent for a smooth and lawful power transition. However, although Kyrgyzstan has moved to establish a parliamentary system of governance, the presidential post still remains the most coveted in the country. According to the new constitution adopted in June 2010, the president can be elected for a maximum of six years over two terms. It is widely expected in Kyrgyzstan that the next president will seek to centralize power in his own hands.

Initially, 83 candidates had registered to run for the country’s highest post. Of those 50 dropped out before the official campaigning began in late September. Most of them were ether unable to collect the necessary amount of signatures, submit 100,000 soms (over US$ 2,200) to the Central Election Commission, or pass the state language exam. A few candidates, including the leaders of the Ata-Meken party Omurbek Tekebayev and the April 7 Youth Movement Nariman Tuleev, have decided not to run.  As a result, 21 candidates remain in the race. Three of them – Atambayev, Adakhan Madumarov (Butun Kyrgyzstan), and Kamchybek Tashiyev (Ata-Jurt) – have the most realistic chances of making it to the second round. While Atambayev is popular in the northern parts of the country, Madumarov and Tashiyev are popular in the southern Osh and Jalalabad provinces. The major divide, therefore, unravels between a candidate typically considered to be from the north and two rivals from southern Kyrgyzstan.

All three candidates have been investing large amounts of funding into their campaigns. Atambayev has so far been the biggest spender and has reportedly invested 22 million soms (roughly US$ 490,000). Madumarov comes second at 20 million soms while Tashiyev has spent slightly over 9 million soms. The real amounts spent on campaigning are likely to be much higher; none of the candidates reveal the sources of their campaign financing. Despite the fact that Atambayev temporarily stepped down from the Prime Minister post, he nevertheless took advantage of his position to boost his presence in the media by traveling to Moscow to meet with his counterpart Vladimir Putin, erect yet another statue of Kyrgyz epic hero Manas in central Bishkek, and raise the salaries of public employees.

In the meantime, Tashiyev and Madumarov have sought to publicly position themselves as leaders ready to take on the challenges facing the country. Both are extremely popular among the ethnic Kyrgyz population in the ethnically diverse Osh and Jalalabad. Although often subjected to accusations of promoting ethnic nationalism, both are careful to avoid public appeals to the ethnic identities of core voters. Instead, their message is latent: in his campaign ads Madumarov says “My Kyrgyzstan,” while Tashiyev (along with other candidates) promises to bring order by appearing in his police uniform on most campaign posters. Earlier, however, Madumarov has declared that the Kyrgyz are the owners of Kyrgyzstan and that “the rest are tenants,” while Tashiyev has argued that the Kyrgyz are the titular ethnic group and must enjoy special rights. Yet, despite Atambayev’s revival of the ethno-centric Manas ideology to appeal to ethnic Kyrgyz, he has also chosen to appeal to civic identities in his campaign. His posters feature slogans like “Kyrgyzstan is for all,” echoing former president Askar Akayev’s ideology declaring that “Kyrgyzstan is our common home.” 

IMPLICATIONS: Most polls suggest that Atambayev will not be able to win in the first round. Yet, he is also the only candidate to enjoy some support across the country. Tashiyev and Madumarov, on the other hand, lack popularity in northern Kyrgyzstan. Some Bishkek residents say they will vote for Atambayev to make sure the “southern” candidates do not win. The situation is somewhat similar in Osh in Jalalabad. For many residents of southern Kyrgyzstan, Atamabyev is a politician who exclusively promotes the interests of Bishkek elites. Importantly, should there be a second round of voting, the competition will highlight the contentious north-south divide. Competition along these lines will help candidates to mobilize crowds of locals as part of their political campaigning.

Essentially, the elections feature old players competing for a presidential seat but according to new rules. Each of them held top political positions during different periods in the past two decades, but never previously competed in a free and transparent environment. Naturally, they all have a tendency to use old methods to prevail over competitors. Such methods include mudslinging, efforts to control mass media, as well as resorting to the help of criminal leaders. There have been reports of campaign posters being set on fire both in the country’s north and south. Candidates who were ousted as a result of the April 2010 regime change tend to criticize the current system of governance. Furthermore, according to representatives of the Interior Ministry and Ministry of Defense, who spoke on the conditions of anonymity, all major candidates have resorted to the help of criminal leaders. Criminals, who often enjoy local support and exercise informal political power on an oblast level, are encouraged to persuade the population to vote for specific candidates.

None of the candidates, including the frontrunner, present viable solutions for economic and political development. Rather, they are busy proving their own distance from corruption and their zeal to keep the country united. During the first round of debates the candidates, including Madumarov, mostly talked about their religious beliefs and their scorn for the current political situation in the country. Importantly, none of the candidates dare to talk about interethnic reconciliation and the widespread violations of the rights of ethnic minorities in southern Kyrgyzstan.

Overall, however, Kyrgyzstan has been moving towards greater political openness since the April 2010 regime change. The upcoming elections are set to be more transparent than any previous plebiscites. For the first time all competing candidates have the opportunity to participate in televised debates while citizens, especially those using the internet, can send their questions directly to the candidates. Transparency is further enhanced by the creation of special Public Observer Councils that oversee the work of all ministries. The parliament’s work is broadcast live in public TV and radio channels. Finally, the work of the Central Election Commission now has more independence from political forces. The scrutiny of the competing candidates’ observers may result in each vote actually mattering.

CONCLUSIONS: The upcoming presidential elections will be the first elections in Central Asia where the frontrunner will not be able to secure a landslide victory. Although clumsy at times, the electoral campaign is conducted in a freer environment compared to any previous presidential elections. The winner might seek to centralize power in his own hands, while none of the candidates are capable of presenting a viable strategy for the country’s economic and political development. But if elections eventually turn out to be free and fair, they will significantly contribute to Kyrgyzstan’s political stability, reducing the possibility of another violent regime change.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center.
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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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