Admiral Mullen’s recent statement that the Haqqani network is a strategic arm of Pakistan has given rise to a new crisis in relations between Islamabad and Washington. Many in the U.S. are demanding that Pakistan no longer be treated as an ally. While Afghanistan might be important in the short run, Pakistan is pivotal. It is important for both parties to work together for peace and security. It is high time that both Washington and Islamabad take joint steps to repair and improve the mutual relationship.

BACKGROUND: A decade after Washington launched its war against terror by attacking Afghanistan, it is nowhere near what could be defined as a victory. Now that it has declared that it would withdraw and put the Afghans in charge, whether the situation in Afghanistan is any better or any promises of stability in the country have been fulfilled is anybody’s guess. Analysts have continuously raised questions regarding the aim of this war and what Washington is aiming to achieve through it.

If the objective was to topple the Taliban regime and install a friendly government in Kabul, or dismantling Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and killing Osama bin Laden, then these goals have been achieved. If the objective was making Afghanistan a viable, secure and stable country, Washington is nowhere near achieving this. It has failed to provide a model of stability and economic activity to the Afghan masses. The total reliance on military might has failed to provide any dividends, and most of the aid is wasted. It is quite clear that the emerging picture of a post-2014 Afghanistan is not what Washington wanted it to be. As for the outcomes of the ongoing negotiations for a settlement in Afghanistan, who has the upper hand is highly unclear.

It was under these circumstances that Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, accused Pakistan of supporting the Haqqani network during the Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on September 22. He described it as a veritable or strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). He also stated that the Haqqani network was behind the September 13 attack against the U.S. embassy in Kabul and the attack on the U.S. base in Wardak province and because they were supported by the ISI, he accused Pakistan of having a hand in these attacks. In one of his statements, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said that unless Islamabad takes necessary steps against the Haqqani network, the U.S. might have to take operational steps. He did not elaborate on what exactly he meant by operational steps. The agreement to admiral Mullen’s statement which was expressed by all concerned departments in Washington is an indication that this is a consensus among the policy community in Washington. The statement has resulted in a series of statements and counter-statements from both sides and while Admiral Mullen has started enjoying the leisure of retired life, a new crisis is brewing between Islamabad and Washington. This crisis needs to be resolved as quickly as possible as it might have implications for the whole region.

IMPLICATIONS: Perhaps the most important question to be asked at the moment is why Admiral Mullen made these statements and why at this time, what exactly Washington wanted to achieve by pointing fingers at Islamabad so openly, and what Washington expects Islamabad to do in response. If it was a bluff, then the Pakistanis may have called it: it is reported that no action will be taken anywhere in Pakistan unless it is in accordance with the country’s threat perception.

The views of Pakistan in Washington seem not to understand the nature of Pakistan and its people. Pakistan might be facing a number of serious problems of governance and rule of law, but Pakistan is in this war not because it is fighting the U.S.’s war but due to its own legitimate concerns: Afghanistan is important for Pakistan’s national security.

The Durand Line issue remains an important issue which needs to be resolved. Kabul refuses to accept the Durand Line as a border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and provides sanctuary for Baloch insurgents. Islamabad believes that New Delhi and Kabul have been acting in partnership against it in the past. For this reason, Pakistan has always sought a friendly government in Kabul that would deny New Delhi access. The Northern Alliance’s capture of Kabul and the 2001 Bonn conference were generally understood as having adverse effects on Pakistan, as these developments brought back the fear of a pro-Indian Afghanistan. Pakistan army spokesman General Athar Abbas during a recent interview gave voice to these concerns, asking rhetorically what if the “American trainers are replaced by Indian trainers? The leadership in Afghanistan is completely dominated by an India-friendly Northern Alliance. The Northern Alliance’s affiliation with India makes us very uncomfortable because we see in it a future two-front war scenario.”

By participating in the war against terrorism, Pakistan has become a victim of terrorism. Rohan Gunaratna, a Singapore-based leading authority on terrorism, states that “contrary to common belief, Pakistan has demonstrated a determination beyond its capacity to eradicate the menace of terrorism. For the first time in the known history of FATA, armed forces made inroads in the region and challenged the militants. Furthermore, state institutions and all other main streamed political partners have come together to present an unprecedented unified stance against militancy and extremism.” In most of the discussions on Pakistan’s role in the war against terror, an important point is often ignored: while participating in the war against terror, Pakistan suffered from a number of other crises and problems as well: the insurgency in Baluchistan is one. The country suffered from political instability, economic problems, the A.Q. Khan Proliferation scandal, two crises with India (the 2002 standoff and the Mumbai terror attacks), increasing sectarian conflict, the 2005 earthquake and above all the floods which the UN general secretary described as the biggest natural disaster in UN history.

At the same time, Washington should also consider what exactly it wants: a negotiated settlement resulting in a stable Afghanistan or continued fighting. If it wants peace through dialogue and the recent developments are a case in point, perhaps the best course would be to start a dialogue with all concerned parties including the Haqqanis. Sirajuddin Haqqani has already expressed his willingness to join the dialogue process.

CONCLUSIONS: Where will Washington and Islamabad go from here? Washington could cut all aid to Pakistan using the Kerry-Lugar Act. This would result in Islamabad stopping all supplies going to Afghanistan and the crisis will further deepen with moves and counter-moves. Another option would be to understand each other’s concerns and positions and act accordingly. It seems that both sides are working hard to do some damage control. The number of people in the U.S. alleging that Pakistan is playing a double game and is an untrustworthy ally have recently been rising. More and more voices are demanding that Pakistan be punished for sheltering Osama bin Laden and now for supporting the Haqqani network. While Afghanistan might be important in the short run, U.S. observers should remember that Pakistan is pivotal, and despite all its shortcomings is a viable state. It is important for both parties to work together for peace and security. Both countries need each other and their relationship is based on interests. It is high time that both Washington and Islamabad take joint steps to repair and improve the mutual relationship.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rizwan Zeb is based at the Centre for Muslim States and Societies (CMSS), University of Western Australia. He was previously a Benjamin Meaker visiting Professor of Politics at IAS, University of Bristol and a visiting scholar at the Brookings Institution. This article is based on a larger report he is preparing on Pakistan-U.S relations and the war against Terror.