Over the past six years, Kyrgyzstan has lived through two forceful regime changes – one in March 2005 and another April 2010. Both times, the reconfiguration of political power required Kyrgyz citizens to adapt to a new reality and try to cope with the dual feelings of optimism after unpopular dictators were ousted and uncertainty about the new leaders. Kyrgyzstan’s complex and volatile criminal underworld needed to adapt to the new political conditions as well, in order to ensure continuity of the vast shadow economy and maintain their influence over government officials. The state-crime dynamics have therefore been changing rapidly during 2005-2011.

 

BACKGROUND: Drug trade, looting of mineral resources, corruption in the hydropower sector, and smuggling of various goods have tended to fuel strong state-crime networks in Kyrgyzstan. The operation of these networks changes over time, depending on the type of political leadership in the country. During former president Askar Akayev’s leadership in the 1990s, both state and non-state actors were able to enrich themselves by using their connections in public structures and the criminal world. The first wave of capital accumulation in Kyrgyzstan allowed local entrepreneurs to profit from the developing market economy, open political climate, and a weak state. In the 2000s, non-state actors who had accumulated capital through legal and illegal businesses sought to enter state structures in order to secure the continuity of their economic activities. Corruption in state structures was booming, but there was still a clear separation between the political and criminal worlds. Leaders of both worlds interacted whenever their interests met and often conflicted over ownership of businesses.

 

Under the leadership of Akayev’s successor, former president Kurmanbek Bakiev, a small group of political leaders emerged whose business interests largely interconnected. About 10-12 high-ranking officials in the president’s administration and ministerial cabinet determined the country’s entire economic policy and political climate. Meanwhile, unlike before, non-state organized criminal groups and their leaders were no longer able to significantly influence the political domain, thus marking a sizable shift in state-crime relations in the country. In the new type of state-crime relationship in Kyrgyzstan, public figures were responsible for organizing major crimes in the country. Unsurprisingly, under Bakiev’s reign Kyrgyzstan increasingly served as a transit zone for drug trafficking, with illegal deals possibly brokered at the top levels of government, bypassing law enforcement agencies. As such, Kyrgyzstan was on track to a situation reminiscent of that in Tajikistan, where the bulk of Afghan heroin appears to be smuggled by state actors and institutions.

 

With such a government, Bakiev was able to reduce the powers of the parliament and curb the activity of civil society activists. The president was also able to form a circle of close allies with an interest in the continuity of his regime for the longest period possible. Bakiev disbanded the Drug Control Agency (DCA) responsible for intercepting illicit drugs transiting through Kyrgyzstan from Afghanistan and destined to reach Russia and Europe. By doing so, the president centralized illegal control over the drug economy, one of the most lucrative sources of shadow capital. Such unprecedented merger of the domains of state and crime during Bakiev’s leadership was one of the reasons for popular discontent with his regime that eventually resulted in his ouster in April 2010.

 

With some exceptions, members of the new government formed in the aftermath of the April 7 regime change and headed by President Roza Otunbayeva had fewer links to the criminal underworld. A limited influence over major criminal groups, particularly in the southern parts of the country, was one of the main reasons for the government’s weakness vis-à-vis criminal structures. Bakiev’s former cadres managed to hold on to their positions; Osh mayor Melis Myrzakhmatov is a typical Bakiev holdover. Of course, many officials in the region maintain links with the criminal underworld.

 

Overall, according to one Kyrgyz law-enforcement representative from Bishkek, control over drug trafficking in southern Kyrgyzstan still largely remains in the hands of pro-Bakiev forces. Major criminal leaders and over a dozen influential criminal groups continue to operate across the country.

 

IMPLICATIONS: Today, Kyrgyzstan’s state-crime dynamics are more reminiscent of the 1990s and early 2000s. That is, a strong criminal underworld collaborates with individual government officials and MPs, as well as political groups present in the government to maintain their own presence in the shadow economy. Two important factors have influenced the new state-crime dynamics in Kyrgyzstan. First, some old corruption schemes were distorted by the new actors in power who replaced former president Bakiev’s family members. Second, state power is decentralized in the new parliament, composed of 120 members representing five political parties and the government.

 

Preventing corruption among top officials was one of the indirect goals of the new constitution adopted by Otunbayeva’s government through a national referendum. The logic was that the more political power is diffused, the harder it will be for individual actors to grab control over major licit and illicit economic sectors and centralize control in their own hands. This logic paid off during the parliamentary elections, where competing political parties monitored each other’s actions to ensure that no vote falsification took place. Partly as a result of such dynamics, the October elections were the most transparent to date in the region. It is, however, doubtful whether this balance of power between competing political forces will continue in the parliament.

 

The protracted process of coalition building in the parliament has demonstrated that ruling parties are primarily concerned over distributing government seats as opposed to building blocks based on political programs. Arguably, the first coalition of the Social-Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan (SDPK), Ata-Meken and Respublika that took over a month to form, collapsed because of a last-minute disagreement over cadre politics. After a new coalition made of SDPK, Ata-Jurt and Respublika was formed, the parliament proceeded quickly with forming the government. The Ata-Jurt members, most of whom formerly served in Bakiev’s government and still openly support the ousted president, control key ministries for securing venues for state-crime links, including the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Emergencies. Bakiev’s former cronies not directly associated with the Ata-Jurt party are also present at the Ministry of Economic Regulations.

 

Control over jet fuel supplies to the U.S. Transit Center at the Manas airport, previously another lucrative source of informal and formal revenue, will likely change as well, but still remains corrupt. Supplying Manas has become one of the most lucrative and sustainable sources of revenue. If any shadow deals between Gazprom and Kyrgyz contractors emerge, the main stakeholders behind new contracts are likely to be members of SPDK (whose leader, Almazbek Atambayev heads the government) and Respublika party. Both hold key government positions.

 

Most corruption and criminal deals will be concealed as long as the leaders are able to find and maintain agreements on major cadre decisions. These decisions will inevitably influence the structure of informal leadership over resource control in the country. Should disagreements emerge along business or cadre lines, the parliamentary coalition will fall apart and corruption schemes become more evident. So far, President Roza Otubayeva plays an important role in preventing centralization of corruption. Although some rumors have sought to implicate her family members in various shady deals, such allegations have not been supported by evidence.

 

CONCLUSIONS: The newly emerging state-crime dynamics in Kyrgyzstan is more reminiscent of Akayev’s time in power, than that of Bakiev. That is, the state and criminal world are separated domains, but widely interact as both need each other’s services. A greater degree of transparency makes it more difficult for political leaders and factions to retain links with major criminal groups. The new political system in Kyrgyzstan is, however, too weak to break the state-crime link entirely. Politicians need powerful financial and physical support of informal networks, while criminal kingpins incessantly seek to maintain their own positions in the shadow economy by collaborating with government officials. These dynamics might intensify during the presidential elections in late 2011, when competing political parties will again try to consolidate political power and have their leader elected as president.

 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Erica Marat is a Nonresident Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, and author of The State-Crime Nexus in Central Asia, CACI & SRSP Silk Road Paper, 2006.