In early January 2010, the Kremlin decided to unify the North Caucasian autonomous republics of the Russian Federation with that of the Stavropol region, still mostly populated by ethnic Russians. The plan was a bureaucratic design by the Kremlin that supposedly would increase the ethnic/social cohesiveness of the region and the country and promote economic development in the region. This merger has received a strong response among locals who demanded that the Stavropol region remain a separate entity. This seemingly indicates the rise of what could be called “Russian separatism,” based on an ideology which is remarkably similar to that held by many Russians on the eve of the collapse of the USSR.
BACKGROUND: The major reason why the residents of Stavropol are so anxious to remain separated from the mostly Muslim North Caucasian republic is a fear of Muslim natives of various ethnic backgrounds, whose relationship with Russians has deteriorated from the beginning of the post-Soviet era. The presence of several different ethnicities in a comparatively small territory did not seem to create problems in the Soviet era. As one resident of Stavropol noted recently, Russians and many of the other ethnic groups, including those from Caucasus, lived peacefully alongside each other and even enriched each other culturally. The situation changed dramatically with the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent instability of the North Caucasus.
The vast majority of ethnic Russians left the Northern Caucasus during the 1990s, as a result of civil war and ethnic strife. At the same time, North Caucasian natives, freed from the restraints of the Soviet era, had moved in big numbers to the Russian heartland. While some moved in search of better opportunities, others moved from the area for the same reasons as ethnic Russians: to escape the vagaries of war. Regardless of their new place of residency, Caucasians followed the same pattern of behavior. Their tightly knit ethnic communities often dominated local markets and other businesses and, as many Russians believed, actively engaged in crime. As a result of growing tensions, ethnic riots erupted, the biggest ones in Kondopoga and Stavropol in 2006-2007, which in the Stavropol region continued until present.
In the four years following the major riots, the situation has not changed for the better, at least from the viewpoint of the many Russians. Moreover, a few months after the creation of the new administrative body, the influx of Caucasians increased. Russians believed that they had become increasingly visible and were actively buying property. The local Russians also believed that they could quite soon become a minority in the region and that they would eventually become part of a future state where “Caucasians” would be the dominant group. Some believed that the situation for ethnic Russians in this new state would be even worse than in Chechnya in the 1990s, because the future state would be nothing but a fundamentalist Caliphate. This view is obviously inspired by Doku Umarov, whose proclamation of the Kavkaz emirate rejected the nationalistic models entertained by previous members of the Chechen resistance. All of this has led to increasing tensions, which recently took a turn for the worse. In late November 2010, a group of Chechens tried to kidnap a minor Russian girl in Zelenokumsk, a small town near Stavropol. When locals tried to save her, it led to a skirmish as the Chechens opened fire and wounded eight locals. A huge crowd assembled, and a bloody conflict between Chechens and locals was barely avoided.
IMPLICATIONS: The most important part of the story is the belief entertained by many Russians that the Kremlin is not on their side. This has given rise to a new breed of Russian nationalists who proclaim that what has been called a Russian state has never actually been Russian. Rather, the state has been in the hands of minorities who have abused ethnic Russians. At the same time, they claim that the minorities have received the major support from Moscow. This feeling is reinforced by some of the recent moves by the Kremlin. One of the most controversial is the Kremlin’s decision to allow foreigners from the former Soviet republics to serve in the Russian army. Russian commentators noted that most of these new mercenaries would be Muslims from Central Asia and that the reason for the move is not a shortage of Russians but a desire to create a force that could be used by the Kremlin against ethnic Russians. Even when the ethnicity of the members of the police is not questioned, ethnic Russians still often believe that law enforcement is not on their side. After the Zelenokumsk incident, for example, Russians claimed that the police clearly was not on their side despite the fact that it was the Chechens who opened fire. Indeed, the witnesses complained that armed police surrounded the Chechens with a protective circle and faced the ethnic Russians with their guns. Some of the Russians even claimed that while surrounded by the police, the Chechens took advantage of the protection and continued to shoot Russians. The distrust of law enforcement among locals led them to demand the creation of special police units, composed mostly by local Cossacks, ethnic Russians, who would patrol Zelenokumsk. Residents of other cities in the region demanded similar arrangements.
The deep distrust of the Russian state has given way to the idea that Russians should create a “true” Russian state, not just making political changes but actually becoming much more ethnically homogenous, “true” Russian. This implies that Russians should strive to shed those ethnic enclaves of the Russian Federation where they are not in majority. And this explains the desire of Stavropol’s Russian residents and others to sustain complete administrative separation between the Stavropol region and the Northern Caucasus. Many would undoubtedly be happy to see the Northern Caucasus an independent republic, separated from Russia by state borders that, as these Russians believe, would save them from many problems.
While apparently considerable numbers of ethnic Russians would be happy to shed the North Caucasus, a similar feeling is apparently shared by some members of the North Caucasian elite. To be sure, the leaders of autonomous republics have publicly demonstrated their absolute loyalty to the Kremlin. Chechen president Ramzan Kadyrov recently proclaimed that he does not want to be called president, since this title should be reserved only for the leader in the Kremlin. Still, in the realm of real politics, he does his best to create Chechen armed forces controlled only by him and in 2009 did away with those Chechen detachments that were loyal to the Kremlin.
In Dagestan, a similar military detachment composed of natives is in the process being created, with Dagestani president Magomedsalam Magomedov obviously following in Kadyrov’s footsteps. Both of them seemingly entertain the desire to be a leader of an independent state in the future. Thus, the desire for divorce is shared not just among many Russians but also among elites of the North Caucasian republics. The situation is quite similar to that of the late Gorbachev era when Russia as well as the other republics of the USSR expressed their desire for divorce; the republics looked with hostility at the central power, which sought to preserve the unity of the state. One, of course, should not jump to the conclusion that the Russian Federation is about to fall apart. Such a scenario should nevertheless not be excluded, especially if the Kremlin’s power would become considerably weakened.
Book S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell,