Russia’s growing alienation and isolation from Europe’s NATO-dominated security order was evident when President Dmitry Medvedev delivered a speech in June 2008 proposing a restructuring of Europe’s security architecture. In place of “a bloc politics approach that continues by inertia,” the Russian President raised the idea of convening a summit of European governments to draft a new legally binding European security treaty that would establish equal and indivisible security throughout the continent. At the recently completed Astana OSCE summit, Medvedev acknowledged that his efforts to restructure Europe’s security order had failed. Russian security efforts are now focused on enhancing the role of the Collective Security Treaty Organization in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: After a year of probing questions by foreign governments and other parties attempting to determine the precise terms Russia wanted included in a treaty, the Russian government in November 2009 formally presented a draft of the “European Security Treaty” to all OSCE member states as well as various international security organizations. The relatively laconic text of the Treaty begins with the statement declaring the unacceptability of use of force or threats of use, which runs against the UN Charter, and an endorsement of the Security Council’s preeminence in international security matters. The first two articles oblige its parties, whether acting alone or as a group of states in alliance, not to harm the security interests of the other parties. The second article calls for states not to support the actions of others that that may infringe on the security of a treaty party. The third article entitles a treaty party to information regarding any measure taken by another party that it believes might affect its security.

Several subsequent articles outline conflict prevention and conflict management procedures states can use to settle their disputes. For example, if a party determines that a violation or a threat of violation of the treaty has occurred, the Treaty provides for various means of consultation, including the convening of an extraordinary conference. Each party could also consider an armed attack against another party as an attack against itself, and render assistance to the attacked party, including with armed support, in compliance with its right of self-defense under article 51 of the UN Charter, until the Security Council had taken measures to ensure international peace and security. Article 10 provides that all states, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, can join the treaty. In addition, the EU, the OSCE, the CSTO, the CIS and NATO are specifically listed as eligible to sign the treaty.

Foreign governments and observers identified many problems with the draft treaty. For example, in any specific case, the issue of whether the steps one country takes to enhance its security actually harms that of another, the key prohibition of Article 2, is likely to be very contentious and subjective. For instance, whereas Russian analysts would probably see NATO membership for South Caucasus or (much less likely) Central Asian states as harming Moscow’s interests, NATO representatives would claim their entry would enhance Russian security by making its neighbors more secure and prosperous. In addition, Article 9 of the Treaty would reverse the standard clause whereby parties to a new treaty declare that it does not prejudice their pre-existing commitments. On the contrary, the draft stipulates that previous obligations should not contradict the new treaty. Thus, NATO states could not take actions that harmed the security of others even in self-defense.

Although eager to renew dialogue with Russia, even officials in governments of countries traditionally friendly to Russia expressed concern that the proposed treaty could threaten the transatlantic protection they received under NATO and deny countries the right to decide which alliances, if any, they wanted to join. Governments skeptical of Russian intentions argued that recent Russian behavior toward Georgia and other countries violated the very principles Moscow was seeking to legalize by treaty. U.S. and NATO officials argued that existing European security structures — such as the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council — and the general principles embodied in the Helsinki Final Act were already adequate for meeting Russian concerns. Besides the adequacy of existing structures, Clinton and other U.S. diplomats argued that negotiating an entirely new treaty among more than 50 countries, which would then have to ratify the agreed text (or request amendments that would require further negotiation) would be an extremely cumbersome process that would take too long. They also raised the awkward question of who or what would enforce compliance with such a treaty. 

IMPLICATIONS: At the December 1-2 OSCE summit in Astana, President Medvedev appears to have acknowledged that his proposed legally binding treaty on European security would not soon be enacted. After recalling that “State representatives, political analysts and experts have been discussing this initiative over the last two-and-a-half years, including in the Russia-NATO Council, at Russia-EU meetings, academic forums, and in the OSCE as part of the Corfu process”, Medvedev concluded that, “Old stereotypes still remain strong perhaps, and this initiative might be a long way ahead of its time.” 

With regard to Central Asia and the Caucasus, current Russian diplomacy seems aimed at strengthening the role and capabilities of the CSTO. Its member states are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, which only joined the CSTO in 2006. The problem confronting other Eurasian states is that Moscow dominates the institution. Russia provides the largest troop and budget contributions for the organization. Russian military and civilian personnel also hold most of the positions, which are distributed partially based on members’ contributions to the organization. Furthermore, Russian officials have used the CSTO to legitimize their dominant military presence in Central Asia. For example, Russia justifies its controversial and rent-free possession of its air base in Kyrgyzstan on the grounds that it provides air support for the entire CSTO region.

Involvement with the CSTO imposes some clear constraints on its members’ foreign and defense policies. CSTO governments are supposed to update their partners about their basing arrangements, weapons sales, and other security ties with non-member countries. For example, Kyrgyz representatives have kept their partners abreast of the negotiations concerning the renewal of their Manas base agreement with the United States. In October 2005, Russia’s Defense Minister went further and argued that if any other CSTO member was considering hosting foreign military bases, “they should take into account the interests of Russia and coordinate this decision with our country”. CSTO Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha has acknowledged that the organization itself has no military bases, affirming they all belong to Russia or the other member governments. 

During this year’s Russian chairmanship, the CSTO has adopted additional military and legal instruments to enhance its military capabilities, including its ability to intervene militarily within a member country experiencing a domestic crisis. The CSTO came under criticism for failing to intervene to halt the mass ethnic violence in Kyrgyzstan in June. At their December 10 summit, CSTO heads-of-state signed 34 documents, including 10 inter-government agreements. One new document, entitled “On the order of response to crisis situations,” regulates emergency CSTO sessions and other measures aimed to prevent or manage crises through diplomatic, humanitarian, and if necessary military measures.

In addition, Russia has led efforts this year to expand defense industrial cooperation among CSTO members and establish an integrated air defense network within the organization. The CSTO also finalized the establishment of its new Collective Rapid Reaction Force. Some of its 20,000 troops have engaged in large-scale joint exercises under CSTO auspices—most notably the” Interaction-2010” drill that occurred from October 25 to 28 at the Chebarkul range in Russia's Urals. The CSTO is also completing the creation of a new peacekeeping force of 3,500 people. The organization’s new crisis response authorities could provide a legal basis to allow either force to intervene within a member country following a request from some local authority seeking Russian military intervention.

CONCLUSIONS: Central Asian and Caucasus countries were not the prime targets of Medvedev’s European Security Treaty, but they will be most immediately affected by its demise. While engaging in further security cooperation and competition with NATO in other regions, the Russian government aims to maintain its security preeminence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia by further strengthening the role and capabilities of the CSTO, which now can more readily intervene with force within its member countries as well as their neighbors.

AUTHOR’S BIO:  Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. He is the author, among other works, of Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008).