The ongoing polemic between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan over the latter’s decision to construct the Rogun hydropower station has intensified, threatening to escalate amidst regional environmental challenges, widespread poverty, border disputes, and lack of inter-state cooperation, especially on water management issues. This context creates a potentially explosive environment in Central Asia that has witnessed a number of ethnic and resource-related conflicts in the past, primarily in the Fergana Valley, requiring effective intra and extra-regional policy responses to avoid water wars that are to some extent already under way across the region.   

BACKGROUND: The regional water (mis)management in Central Asia resembles a vicious circle. In summer, the upstream countries of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan release water for the downstream oil and gas-rich states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan to meet the latter’s agricultural and consumption needs. In winter, the downstream countries provide electricity and fossil fuels to the upstream neighbors. Frequently, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan cannot afford to pay what they claim are high electricity prices. This enhances the leverage of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, which can cut energy transfers and close borders for the upstream republics if necessary.

Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan therefore produce their own electricity during winter to meet their energy needs, but not without damage to their neighbors. The release of water in the process floods lands downstream and leaves less water for the spring and summer seasons. Occasionally, the upstream states would retain water during summer as well, strengthening their leverage over neighbors. To put these dynamics into perspective, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan possess 90 percent of the region’s water resources, while Uzbekistan alone uses about half of the water. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan can only meet 14 percent and 45 percent of their water needs through their own water resources, respectively.

It is in this context that the Rogun project, dating back to 1970s when the USSR undertook but failed to construct the dam, evokes both fears and cheers from different audiences. The dam, if completed, will be one of the largest in the world. Having an annual electricity production capacity of 3.6 billion kilowatt-hours, it might cope with energy deficits and promote economic development in Tajikistan that currently utilizes only 5 percent of its 527 billion kilowatt hydro-energy potential.

To explore this potential, Tajikistan entered an agreement with the Russian company Rusal to construct the station but then terminated the agreement in 2005 due to strategic considerations. As the Tajik president emphasized, “We will not allow the fate of such an important strategic entity for Tajikistan to lie in the hands of one private company”. The government started a national fundraising campaign, having already collected US$150 million through the sale of shares to the public. However, it currently needs US$2 billion dollars, about half the country’s GDP, to complete the construction.

Opposition from Uzbekistan also affects matters. In a letter to his Tajik counterpart on February 3, which appeared in the media before reaching the addressee, Uzbek Prime Minister Shavkat Mirziyoev called on Tajikistan to reconsider the construction of the project in order to prevent environmental dangers, maintain water balance, and provide continuing access to water for millions of people.

On February 6, Tajik Prime Minister Akil Akilov responded by emphasizing the country’s sovereign right to build the dam to rectify energy deficits, which have plagued the country for years now but “have been impossible to cover by energy imports because of ongoing man-made obstacles.” He also referred to the project’s compliance with international law and the 2006 assessment by the German Lahmeyer corporation. The latter allegedly confirmed that the project takes ecological issues into consideration, something Uzbekistan seriously questions.

Yet, according to other assessments, the Rogun dam could lead to a decline in the water levels and quality in downstream countries, despite the possibility of more water and cheaper electricity down the road. This is against the backdrop of expert opinions that global warming will cause most glaciers in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to melt by 2020, causing significant water shortages.

Akilov, however, states that outdated irrigation technologies and large-scale use of new lands in the region, with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan accounting for 720,000 and 4,2 million hectares respectively, are factors negatively affecting the regional water balance and the drying Aral Sea. The existence of about 100 reservoirs in Uzbekistan, which contain 1.5 times more water that the Sea’s volume, also aggravate the problem, putting further strains on Uzbek-Tajik relations. 

IMPLICATIONS: Tensions over water have long been evident in Central Asia. In the late 1990s, Tajikistan limited the release of water to Uzbekistan due to bilateral disagreements, which resulted in damages to 100,000 hectares of cotton. In 1997, tensions between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan led to the former’s military build-up across Kyrgyzstan’s reservoir near the joint border and a resolution from Kyrgyzstan declaring water a commodity. Uzbekistan also held military exercises in 2000, purportedly basing the related scenarios on the seizure of Kyrgyzstan’s Toktogul reservoir. And in 2008, some Tajik residents of Isfara attempted to demolish a dam in Kyrgyzstan that disconnected them from water flows.

In this context, the Rogun dispute between Uzbekistan and Tajikistan is but one such regional squabble that might result in a more open confrontation, especially given Uzbekistan’s water needs this summer and Tajikistan’s plans to import construction materials for its dam through Uzbek territory. Reportedly, Uzbekistan has already cut gas supplies to Tajikistan by half and has closed the railway connection to its areas in the Fergana Valley through Tajikistan. Earlier, it also interrupted electricity transmission to Tajikistan after withdrawing from the regional power grid.

Uzbekistan clearly seeks to maintain leverage over upstream countries by opposing Rogun and other similar projects. At the same time, it is not prepared to take measures against its excessive reliance on the cotton industry. Tajikistan’s leadership, in turn, views Rogun as a factor of national independence that can bring energy independence, economic development, and legitimacy to the domestic regime in light of poor economic conditions, energy crises and the country’s negative international image.

But the Central Asian countries’ relations with great powers are also a factor affecting the water problems. Russia and the U.S., for instance, want regional countries to consider the interests of neighbors, in relation to both Rogun and other projects. Yet, when possible and convenient, the upstream republics seek Russia’s support to disadvantage or deprive downstream countries of their leverage. The latter, in turn, views it as beneficial to more openly distance themselves from Russia on certain issues. This often spurs the downstream states, especially Uzbekistan, to call for intra-regional approaches to resolve water differences.

However, with the current regional policies in place, no effective solution is on the horizon, including on the Rogun project. Border problems, for example, continue to aggravate the situation. Uzbekistan, which is at the heart of Central Asia, has border disputes with most neighbors. Yet, while geography is not always incidental, it is also not forever determining: the nature of regional regimes, and particularly that of Uzbekistan, is a factor that substantially bears on regional security.

CONCLUSIONS: The involvement of extra-regional parties, as well as appropriate water and fossil fuel pricing and trading mechanisms could well ease water tensions in Central Asia, including over Rogun. However, without constructive intra-regional dialogue, no outside intervention alone is able to produce enduring cooperation to alleviate multi-dimensional challenges in the region. If materialized, the construction of Rogun in this context might either exacerbate security conditions or help break the vicious cycle of water disputes in the long run. In any case, a comprehensive and realistic water management system is needed to prevent hostilities given ongoing conflicts, poverty, and economic misbalances. Partner-like relations between the upstream and downstream countries is therefore a must, just as the need for diversification of regional economies, democratization, and realization that regional cooperation is a key rather than a barrier to national development. 

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roman Muzalevsky is an international affairs and security analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia. He is also Program Manager at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute.