The entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty this month has already started to affect the foreign policy machinery of the European Union (EU). Although the incumbents selected for the new positions of president of the European Council and EU foreign policy chief were perceived as weak, their positions could accrue more influence and authority after they assume office and begin to establish precedents through their actions. Even a marginal strengthening in the EU’s capacity for collective decision making could have important implications for the union’s foreign policies, including toward Eurasia.

BACKGROUND: One of the treaty’s priorities is to streamline and strengthen the EU’s external representation. Until recently, the EU had several, sometimes competing officials representing the organization to foreign countries and other international institutions. These include the country holding the rotating presidency of the European Council, the EU Commissioner for External Relations, and the existing EU foreign policy and security chief. The presidents of the European Parliament and the European Commission, constituent parts of the EU, exert considerable influence over the organization’s external economic policies but have a weaker role in foreign and defense decision making.

The Lisbon Treaty addresses this representation problem in two ways. First, it creates an independent president of the European Council, which consists of the heads of state and government from the EU member states. That individual is elected by the Council to serve a once-renewable term of 30 rather than 6 months, as is the case with the previous Council president (which is technically a member state rather than a person). Until recently, the expectation of some was that the incumbent, though not directly elected or endowed with executive powers like the American president, would be an important European political leader—perhaps a former national prime minister like Tony Blair—whose prestige and tenure would enhance the EU’s diplomatic clout.

Second, the treaty establishes a new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who would also become vice president of the European Commission. This position combines the duties of the present foreign policy chief and External Relations Commissioner. The new High Representative chairs meetings of the EU foreign ministers, represents the EU at major international meetings, administers the organization’s large foreign aid program, and directs a new diplomatic corps, the European External Action Service.

The treaty does not create an “EU Foreign Minister” or alter the current requirement of unanimity in foreign policy decisions, but it does allow the new High Representative to submit proposals on how to implement already agreed EU decisions.

The Lisbon treaty also expands the range of policy issues in which decisions can be made by qualified majority voting, reducing opportunities for a single country to exercise a national veto. Some of the new areas covered by qualified majority voting—migration, criminal justice, and judicial and police co-operation—are of potential significance for homeland security and counterterrorism. Yet, the treaty has “opt-outs” and “opt-ins” mechanisms. The former allow EU members to exempt themselves from certain treaty provisions, while the opt-in function permits them to pursue “enhanced cooperation” in other areas.

IMPLICATIONS: One concern is that a strengthened EU executive could make it harder for individual member governments to defend their interests in Eurasia. For example, in 2007, the governments of Poland and Lithuania were able to delay the opening of formal talks on a new Russia-EU Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) after Moscow banned the import of their beef on alleged health grounds. This leverage required Russia to make concessions before the EU and Russia formally agreed to resume the PCA negotiations.

Yet, EU governments’ preoccupation with internal reform has sometimes distracted them from responding to Russian initiatives that impinge on EU interests in Eurasia. In addition, the weaknesses of the EU’s collective bodies have frequently made it possible for the Russian government to bypass them and deal directly with the union’s most important members bilaterally, a strategy that has proven particularly successful in influencing the Eurasian policies of France, Germany, and Italy.

For example, a stronger EU collective authority would have made it more difficult for Russia to negotiate a deal such as the August 2008 ceasefire agreement in Georgia. Although at the time France held the rotating EU presidency, French President Nicolas Sarkozy negotiated a six-point peace plan largely on his own through shuttle diplomacy between Moscow and Tbilisi. While some of Georgia’s strongest supporters in the EU objected to the terms, many of which Russia never implemented in any case, the deal allowed Russia to avert threatened EU economic sanctions.

The Russian government has since sought to employ bilateral diplomacy with France, Germany, and other EU members to secure support for its proposed European Security Treaty that Russian policymakers hope could weaken NATO’s currently predominant role in European security affairs. The recently released Russian text would prohibit NATO members from taking “actions or activities affecting significantly security of any other Party or Parties to the Treaty.” Moscow would presumably consider offering Georgia or Ukraine a NATO Membership Action Plan a violation of this vague provision. The European Commission has urged EU members to develop a unified position on the proposed European security pact, but Medvedev and other Russian leaders have repeatedly promoted the enterprise in their bilateral meetings with European governments.

Russian leaders have also been skillful at exploiting the distinct national energy interests of EU members to prevent European governments from confronting Moscow with a united front on energy issues. For years, EU governments have expressed concern about their growing dependence on oil and natural gas supplies from Russian sources, which include both energy supplies produced in Russia and those that enter Europe from Central Asia through Russian-controlled pipelines. They fear that Russian policy makers will seek to manipulate this dependence to try to induce changes in European policies on other issues. Yet, Russian diplomats have successfully stymied EU attempts to pressure Moscow into ratifying the EU Energy Charter, drafted by the EU in December 1991. The Charter requires Moscow to give greater freedom for foreign companies to invest in Russia’s state-controlled energy sector, especially the vital pipelines that transport Russian oil and gas to Europe. Instead, the Russian government has been able to negotiate special deals with key European players to advance energy projects, such as the Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines, favored by Russian energy interests.

A stronger EU could also impart additional momentum to the EU's Eastern Partnership Program, an initiative to strengthen relations with many former Soviet republics, though not Russia. It represents an evolution of the EU’s 2004 European Neighborhood Policy, which incongruously grouped the former Soviet bloc countries with those of the South Mediterranean in the Middle East. In addition to boosting the financial assistance the EU provides Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, the partnership also envisages special meetings with these countries. Although the existing EU governments do not plan to offer them membership anytime soon, they nevertheless recognize the importance of promoting prosperity and security in these countries, since any problems there could easily spill over and adversely affect their EU neighbors. The Georgia War has convinced EU leaders that they need to devote more attention to, and exercise more influence in, such a sensitive region. Russian officials have complained that the initiative seeks to weaken Moscow’s influence in Eurasia. Greater coherence among its organs might also allow the EU to implement its “Strategy for a New Partnership with Central Asia,” adopted by the European Council in June 2007, more effectively.

CONCLUSIONS: A strengthening of the EU’s collective institutions could weaken the ability of the individual members to pursue their distinct interests in Eurasia, but it could also make the bloc a more formidable negotiating partner with Russia and a more coherent supporter of the autonomy and aspirations for east-west integration of Eurasian countries. As shown by recent Russian offers of special energy and defense deals with France, Russian leaders will likely seek to avert this transformation by continuing to seek privileged partners among EU countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Richard Weitz is Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. He is the author, among other works, of Kazakhstan and the New International Politics of Eurasia (Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2008).