On April 23, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Turkey and Switzerland published a joint statement regarding their success in efforts to normalize the relations between Armenia and Turkey. This document can be considered a  milestone in the Turkish-Armenian negotiations that began in 2007 in Switzerland, with that country as a mediator, and which received renewed impetus following the meeting of the Presidents of the two countries in Yerevan in September 2008. However, the road map has not been published, and the parties seem to have many remaining obstacles hindering the real normalization of their relations. 

BACKGROUND: Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize the independence of Armenia after the breakdown of the USSR. However, the two countries never established diplomatic relations, and moreover, in April 1993, Turkey closed its border with Armenia as an act of solidarity with Azerbaijan, which was involved in an armed conflict with Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh, when Armenian forces took control over the Kelbajar region outside the disputed territory. In addition, Turkey imposed an embargo on imports of Armenian goods. As a result, Armenian exports to Turkey have been negligible ever since, whereas the Armenian market has been open for Turkish goods. For example, in 2008, Armenia imported Turkish goods worth US$267 million, and Turkey was the sixth largest exporter to Armenia. Of course, these goods were imported through Georgian territory, as the land border remains closed. Turkey also stopped air communication with Armenia in 1993, but resumed it a year later. Currently, the two countries have direct air communication, and their airspace is open for each other’s aircraft.

Since the cease-fire in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in 1994, Armenia has maintained that it was seeking the re-opening the border and the normalization of bilateral relations with Turkey without preconditions. This position has been supported by the U.S. and European Union, and,  following the August war in Georgia, by Russia as well. In response, Turkey presented two major preconditions: the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and Armenia's abandonment of the policy aimed at international recognition as genocide of the 1915 massacres of Armenians in the Ottoman Turkey.

The April 22 statement read, among other, that “the two parties have achieved tangible progress and mutual understanding in this process and they have agreed on a comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral relations in a mutually satisfactory manner. In this context, a road-map has been identified. This agreed basis provides a positive prospect for the on-going process.” However, the ‘road-map’ itself has not been made public so far, which creates concerns about its real value, and even its existence. The officials refuse to comment on the document and only say that they hope it will be published “in the observable future”, as Armenian president Serzh Sargsyan put it on April 25).

As the April 23 statement lacks a clear confirmation that the sides were set to reach a normalization of their bilateral relations without precondition, critics in Yerevan raised concerns that the Armenian leaders were going to make concessions in one of the above-mentioned issues, which Turkey had long presented as preconditions for normalization. In particular, Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's recent statements that Turkey would not reopen its borders with Armenia unless the occupied Azerbaijani territories (evidently, thouse surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh) were freed stirred feelings in Yerevan. President Sargsyan said that these statements constituted a “violation of previously reached agreements.” 

IMPLICATIONS: The fact that the road map has been kept secret so far leads to the conclusion that the sides are not yet fully ready to present the results of their talks. Moreover, it seems that the final text of the roadmap may not exist at all in ready format, given the fact that, according to the April 23 statement, it was just “identified,”  rather than agreed upon. If so, the decision to release the April 22 statement may have been imposed on the sides by a third party. Washington appears to be the most likely player to have done so. This is evident from the timing of the release of statement, namely, 1AM on April 23, Yerevan time. At that hour, it was night both in Armenia and in Turkey, but it was daytime in Washington. That enabled the State Department to immediately issue its positive reaction to the document. This was the only combination of events that would enable U.S. president Barack Obama to avoid using the term “genocide” in his message on the next day, the anniversary of the 1915 killings. Obama had evidently promised Turkey not to use such language. However, during his election campaign, Obama had stated that the Armenian massacres of 1915 were an act of genocide and had promised to use this term as president. Obama was helped out of this quandary as he now could rationalize it by a need not to damage the reconciliation process announced by Ankara and Yerevan.

As for the parties themselves, Ankara appears to have more problems than Yerevan before a road map can be made public. Armenian officials strongly argue that the road map contains no link either to Nagorno-Karabakh issue or to rescinding on genocide recognition. The publication of the Statement on April 23, on the eve of the official genocide commemoration day, arose  criticism in Yerevan. It even resulted in the breakdown of the ruling four-party coalition, as one of its members, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaktsutiun) with 3 seats in the 18-member cabinet decided to turn into opposition. The ARF may also oppose any agreement to officially recognize the current border between Armenia and Turkey, as it argues that these borders were drawn by the illegal Soviet authorities. These problems do not appear to cause too much trouble for Serzh Sargsyan.

Interestingly, the radical opposition Armenian National Congress, led by former President Levon Ter-Petrossian, expressed its support for Sargsyan’s policy towards Turkey. The only difficult problem for the Armenian president may be his alleged agreement to create a joint Armenian-Turkish commission of scholars to “study the reality about the events of 1915,” as the Turkish side names them. In fact, this agreement, if real, would be criticized not only by the ARF and most of the analysts, but also by Ter-Petrosian, who said, that by agreeing to create this Commission, Sargsyan has made the Genocide, a sacred issue for every Armenian, “a subject of bargain.”

Ankara seems to have more difficult problems in reaching a normalization of relations with Armenia, which is seen as part of its policy of “zero problems with neighbors”. The most difficult problem is Azerbaijan’s negative reaction of Azerbaijan. Baku is very unhappy with Ankara's attempt to de-link its policy toward Yerevan from the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Baku even hinted about the possibility of freezing economic relations with Turkey. In addition, Turkish opposition parties are very active in exploiting this sensitive issue, and accuse the government of “betraying” the interests of a “brother nation.” The possible creation of a commission of scholars, in turn, may have both positive and negative consequences for the current Turkish establishment.

Intense contacts continue with the involvement of Moscow and Washington. It is not evident that in October 2009, during the next stage of the “football diplomacy“ (and Serzh Sagsyan’s possible visit to Istanbul), relations between Armenia and Turkey will be close to normal.

CONCLUSIONS: The April 23 statement raised expectations that the two countries were close to starting a process of normalization of relations and opening the common land border. Both countries are interested in normalization, as Armenia would gain evident economic benefits and Turkey would become a very active player in the South Caucasus.  However, subsequent events have implied that a real “road map“ of normalization may not be ready, and that the countries still have many obstacles to overcome before normalization becomes a real perspective.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Haroutiun Khachatrian is an analyst on political and economic problems living in Yerevan, Armenia.