In spring 2008, an unprecedented event took place in Chechnya when a quarrel between President Ramzan Kadyrov and Sulim Yamadaev, the commander of the Vostok battalion, almost led to military action when Kadyrov’s paramilitary detachments surrounded the Vostok base. In the clashes, several people were killed, and several officers of the Russian forces were arrested. The event is Kafkaesque given that Kadyrov’s forces and the Vostok are both legitimate military detachments supposedly fully controlled by Moscow, the latter even an integral part of the Russian army. Yet Moscow chose to ignore the event as a minor brawl. Understanding the meaning of the event requires placing it in a broad context that indicates further problems and. paradoxically, opportunities, for Moscow.

BACKGROUND: Since the collapse of the USSR, Chechnya – in fact, the entire Russian Northern Caucasus­­­­ – has been one of the unstable regions of the Russian Federation. Chechnya's attempt to secede led to the first Chechen War (1994-1996). In 1999, several Moscow apartment buildings were blown up, killing several hundred people; the crime was attributed to Chechens. Putin, at that time striving for the presidency, proclaimed that he would "bump off terrorists even when they are in the toilets.” He immediately acquired the aura of a tough leader who would defend Russians and end the anarchy and crime so characteristic of the Yeltsin era.

Following his election, Putin started a war in Chechnya in earnest, capturing Grozny, the capital, reducing it to ruins, and driving the insurgents into the mountains. But he was not able to prevent spectacular terrorist attacks. In 2002, Chechen terrorists took over a theater in downtown Moscow, and a rescue attempt led to numerous deaths among the hostages. In 2004, several hundred children died in a daring attack on a school in Beslan. Putin realized that relying mostly on Russian troops would not work and set out to “Chechenize” the conflict.

The leading role was assigned to the Kadyrov clan; first to Akhmad, then president of Chechnya and the republic’s former mufti, and after his murder, to his son Ramzan. At the beginning, the plan worked well. Ramzan Kadyrov gave amnesty to thousands of members of the resistance, who became part of his paramilitary detachments and engaged in most of the fighting with the insurgents. While outwardly expressing complete dedication to Putin, Kadyrov acted as a shrewd politician. He used a lavish subsidy from Moscow to restore Grozny and bring visible improvements in the life of Chechens. For a considerable number of Chechens, he also emerged as the protector from Russians. During the recent violence between Chechens and local Russians in Kondopoga and Stavropol, Kadyrov proclaimed that if Moscow would not protect the local Chechens from the Russian mob, he would take justice in his own hands; and, in fact, some Russians in Stavropol claimed that several armed Chechens, indeed, emerged in the city with implicit threats against Russians. They also complained that those Chechens who committed crimes had escaped to Chechnya.

Finally, Kadyrov skillfully played on the conflict between Akhmad Zakaev, the leader of the moderate Chechen nationalists, and Doku Umarov, the president of virtual Chechen government, who recently transformed himself into “emir” and effectively made Chechens as well as the other members of the resistance just a branch of the global jihad. Kadyrov emerged as proposing the middle way, a compromise solution. On the one hand, he resolutely rejected jihadism as foreign to Chechnya and dragging Chechens into endless war for a mystical Caliphate – pleasing those who might have gravitated to Zakaev – at the same time emphasizing his adherence to Islam by introducing Islamic regulations, making him acceptable for those Chechens who might have been lost to Umarov. Not only had Kadyrov acquired support among certain segments of the Chechen populace but also increasingly exercised direct control over all Chechen military forces in Chechnya except Vostok. The military/paramilitary forces in Chechnya either became absorbed into Kadyrov’s controlled forces or virtually disbanded. Moreover, Kadyrov showed an ability to physically eliminate his enemies even if they found refuge in Moscow.

Vostok, led by Sulim Yamadaev, seems to be the only viable force directly controlled by the Russian Ministry of Defense. Kadyrov’s conflict with Vostok is part of his broad plan to eliminate it as the only Chechen military force not directly under his command. Moscow’s apparent acquiescence could gave him absolute control over both the Chechen civil administration and its military force, a force that could well be a match for the Russian army in the region.

While closing its eyes on Kadyrov’s direct use of violence against Ministry of Defense units and implicit direct challenge to the Center, Moscow still was not anxious to give Kadyrov complete carte blanche and rejected his demand to disband Vostok. Still, the entire incident was rather a victory for Kadyrov. First, it demonstrated that he could openly attack the detachments under the direct control of the army without any negative repercussions for himself. Moreover, he was accepted as a member of the State Council, as a sign that he has not done anything outrageous. Moreover, the growing flow of funds to Chechnya continues.

IMPLICATIONS: Moscow clearly demonstrated the central government’s weakness by accepting Kadyrov as the de facto independent ruler of Chechnya. Putin, who started his presidency with the promise of bringing Chechnya under the control of the center, may well have left Chechnya virtually independent by the end of his official term as President. More importantly, it sends the message to the other members of the Russian federation that Putin’s “vertical of power”, which appeared to have been completed after the Beslan outrage in 2004, is not all that strong.…, It provides to other rulers of ethnic enclaves, such as Tatarstan’s president Mintimer Shaimiev, the right to challenge Moscow’s power. Recently, Shaimiev made a public statement asking Moscow to return to the policy of elected governors that prevailed before Beslan and which provides local governors much more autonomy from Moscow than now. Still, another interpretation of the events is possible. It implies that Moscow has actually pursued a different policy and depends largely on the level of resistance of the ethnic enclaves. In the case of comparatively weak rulers and where Moscow assumes that the populace would in general be compliant, it tries to increase the “vertical” pressure. In other cases, where armed resistance is possible, as it is in Chechnya, Moscow tries to ease control and buy the local elite. In any case, Kadyrov’s increasing assertiveness hardly bodes well for Moscow’s control of the Northern Caucasus.

Yet, Kadyrov’s rise does not only carry negative implications for Moscow. To begin with, because of the lavish subsidies, Kadyrov most likely will not rebel openly; and he will still fight against the insurgents who regard him as a Moscow Quisling. This is especially the case with Kavkaz Center, the vehicle of Umarov’s “emirate.” Contributors to the publication continue to blast Kadyrov and Zakaev, whom they regard as traitors and infidels. In this situation, Kadyrov might have no choice but to fight them and thus follow Moscow’s policy of “Chechenization” of the conflict.

Moreover, his militia and similar loyal Chechen detachments could be used as crack troops in the event of a Russian war with Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Finally, Chechens could well be janissaries to quell potential revolts of ethnic Russians if other forces fail. Thus, recent events are not just one-dimensional and could have a variety of outcomes.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent conflict between Ramzan Kadyrov and the Vostok battalion led by Sulim Yamadaev reflects not only the internal strife between the various Chechens clans, but also Kadyrov’s lingering proclivities to ensure absolute control over Chechen forces in Chechnya and to challenge the Ministry of Defense and thereby the central government. While Kadyrov was unable to achieve his plans completely and “Vostok” survives, one could still regard Kadyrov as the winner in the conflict. Despite his direct attack against Vostok, he preserved his position and assured his leadership. It indicates that at least in the case of Chechnya, the “vertical of power” is hardly viable.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University South Bend.