With its continued policy of intimidation and military provocation toward Georgia, Moscow is seeking to prevent Georgia’s integration into transatlantic security structures. Russia also wants to achieve a much greater geostrategic objective: to close the strategic access route to the heartland of the Eurasian continent for Western interests. The ports and railroad systems of the South Caucasus, as well as an air corridor through the region, provide a vital supply link for NATO and allied forces in Central Eurasia, including in Afghanistan. The destabilization of Georgia would impact the functioning of this vital system, as well as the functioning of the oil and natural gas transportation system that connects the Caspian Sea resources to world markets.

BACKGROUND: Georgia, together with Ukraine, is an aspirant country for NATO membership and was very close to receiving a Membership Action Plan during the recent NATO summit in Bucharest. But certain European countries, led by Germany, resisted this initiative, mostly under pressure from Russia, although the summit expressed its ultimate commitment for Georgian and Ukrainian membership, and decided to return to discussing the issue at the December 2008 NATO ministerial summit in Brussels.

The Russian political leadership apparently feels that it has a window of opportunity to destabilize Georgia, and if possible Ukraine as well. Since Russia’s efforts to pressure Georgia through various economic sanctions in recent years produced no results, provoking military confrontation in the breakaway region of Abkhazia seems to be the only way Russia sees perceives that it has a possibility to close Georgia’s door to NATO membership.

Georgia went through the turmoil of civil conflicts and ethnic tensions in the early 1990s, with the heavy involvement of forces in Russia that were displeased with Georgia’s strong drive towards independence and its Western orientation. The ensuing conflict in Abkhazia produced almost three hundred thousand predominantly ethnic Georgian displaced persons. The conflict left Abkhazia with a population of 150,000, with a devastated economy and Russian “peacekeepers” to maintain the status quo in the region. Despite erstwhile political statements on the part of the Russian Government recognizing the territorial integrity of the Georgian state, the fact is that Russian peacekeepers are supporting and implementing a policy of de facto annexation to Russia of this part of Georgia. Following decisions in April to solidify its relations with the Abkhazian and South Ossetian breakaway regions, Russia recently moved paratroopers and engineering forces into Abkhazia, steps perceived by Georgia as military provocations.

IMPLICATIONS: Russia is already pressuring Central Asian governments and their transportation companies to divert their cargos towards Russian transportation options. The Russian leadership is apparently hoping that should it manage to provoke a military confrontation in the South Caucasus and thereby destabilize Georgia, the strategic transit function of the South Caucasus region would be weakened, and the West would be forced to seek better terms to deal with Russia in order to secure alternative supply routes to Central Asia. If the Georgian link is weakened, Moscow’s next target would in all likelihood be Azerbaijan. With its strategic energy reserves, and its position as the only country bordering both Iran and Russia, Azerbaijan constitutes the prize in the region. Should it be rendered ineffective as a conduit for East-West trade, ultimately the South Caucasus would become dysfunctional for both military and economic access to Central Asia.

With the relative calm in Pakistan’s tribal areas and the pressure on Taliban being somewhat relieved following the coming to power of democratically elected forces in Pakistan, militants are strengthening their positions in Afghanistan. Russia, in this context, is trying to seek the role of an indispensible actor for Western military and security operations in Afghanistanm in the hope of securing much greater say in the geography and design of the operations. Russia also hopes that the next U.S. administration will be forced to have a much more pro-active diplomatic policy vis-à-vis Iran and will need Russian support at the UN Security Council.

In addition, Russia is hoping that European, and in particular German, dependence on Russian energy will continue to stimulate passive policies vis-à-vis Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan and other states of the former Soviet Union. The vertically integrated European energy companies, closely affiliated with their national governments, have special relationships with the Russian state-controlled monopoly, Gazprom. This, in turn, affects the decision-making process in those countries.  Russia still considers its neighboring states as its own exclusive domain, and large European powers such as Germany, France, and Italy seem to be comfortable with this attitude. However it is clear that there is mistrust in Russia towards Europe as well.

Neither are Russia’s recent moves limited to Georgia. In a set of developments corresponding to Moscow’s habitual policies if sending test balloons of incipient policies, Moscow’s mayor Yurii Luzhkov appeared in the Ukrainian province of the Crimea last month. There, he strongly stressed Russia’s right o the Sevastopol navy base in particular and the Crimea in general, openly flaunting Russia’s customary lip service to Ukraine’s territorial integrity. Far from condemning his actions, the Russian parliament and Foreign Ministry endorsed his views, lambasting Ukraine for its decision to declare Luzhkov  undesired person in the country. These events show that Moscow may be moving toward a more general policy of challenging the post-Soviet border delimitation of 1991, and that Georgia is merely the first instance where this policy is being tested.

CONCLUSIONS: The recent acceleration in Russian policy towards Georgia and Ukraine clearly needs to be considered in the context of attempt by Russia to revitalize both military-political and economic dominance over Central Eurasia. In absence of developed transportation links from Central Asia to the South or to the East, the Western direction through the South Caucasus is the only alternative to a Russian-dominated transportation system for the region. For the West, the South Caucasus transportation corridor is a vital access link to Central Asia and the Northern frontiers of the Middle East. That is why stability in the South Caucasus in general, and in Georgia in particular, cannot only be a concern for Georgians. Georgia has become the testing ground for the West’s commitment to its own security interests, as well as to the values of democracy and free market economy in this strategically important area of the world. Success in Georgia sets the precedent for success on the Southern flank of the former Soviet Union, similarly to how the success of the Baltic States represents a precedent to follow for Georgia. Failure to uphold these principles, however, would resonate strongly in Central Asia and beyond.

Unfortunately, not everyone in the U.S. or Europe realizes the strategic importance of Georgia for long-term Western security interests. Except several congressional non-binding resolutions and European parliamentary statements, a forceful and unified Western response to recent Russian policies is yet to be seen.  A NATO Membership Action Plan for Georgia and Ukraine is the best way to ensure stability in those countries, and thus keep alternative access routes to Eurasia alive. But more urgent steps are needed before December to secure western interests in this region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Mamuka Tsereteli is the President of Georgian Association in United States and a Professor at the School of International Service at American University in Washington D.C.