The Russian-initiated crisis against Georgia exemplifies the paradigm of coercive diplomacy.  Ironically occurring after earlier statements at the beginning of 2008 that indicated that Moscow wanted a kind of détente in its relations with Tbilisi, it has both stirred up the likelihood of a conflict with Georgia and shown a reversion of Russian diplomacy back to the kind of pretexts for the use of force that Hitler and Stalin habitually employed in their wars. 

BACKGROUND: The two triggers for this crisis were first the West’s recognition of Kosovo’s independence in the face of Russian objections and threats that this would destabilize the situation in the Caucasus, and second, the intention to award Georgia and Ukraine membership Action Plans (MAPs) for NATO.  Russia in response moved to boost its official ties with the separatist republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and unilaterally introduced several hundred soldiers in the ostensible guise of peacekeepers into Abkhazia, charging that Georgia is planning a military operation there against its citizens.  As the United Nations has now substantiated, the Russian air force also shot down a Georgian unarmed drone.  Russian officials have created a climate leading some of its officials and Georgian officials to warn that war is very close, while Georgia protest Russia’s “aggression” and “occupation” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 

The current crisis is only the latest manifestation of Russia’s coercive tactics. Previously, Moscow has repeatedly tried to overthrow earlier Georgian governments, supported assassination attempts against previous presidents, launched overflights and bombing raids, instituted repeated energy cutoffs, trade sanctions, given Abkhazia and South Ossetian residents Russian passports, launched economic embargoes against Georgia, deported Georgians in Russia, dropped bombs on Georgian villages, and constantly threatened Georgia. Thus the present crisis merely continues but at a more intense level, earlier examples of coercive diplomacy.  Thus, as in other examples of coercive diplomacy where a real threat of force is openly displayed, the question then becomes what Moscow wants to achieve by its tactics?

To understand Russia’s goals, it is necessary to understand that Moscow is simultaneously playing to three audiences.  The first audience is its own elites and domestic public opinion.  Moscow has for years saturated its media with demands that it be acknowledged as a great power, particularly by CIS states and depicted Georgia and its President, Mikheil Saakashvili, as a reckless, anti-Russian warmonger.  When we take into account the apparent mutual loathing between Putin and Saakashvili, and Russia’s campaign of abuse against him, it becomes clear that one issue at stake for Russia is its identity as a great power. 

IMPLICATIONS: Moscow has painted itself into a position where it cannot be shown as having yielded to Georgia, a state for whom the Russian elite has openly and publicly expressed contempt.  Thus after all the hysteria about a non-existent NATO threat should NATO expand to these states, Moscow cannot  let itself be seen as having surrendered to Georgia.  Moreover, such a ‘surrender” or acquiescence in NATO membership, means the end of any hope for reintegrating the former empire around Russia and would be taken in Moscow as signifying a “colossal” defeat vis-à-vis not just the domestic audience but the other two audiences – Ukraine and Georgia, and NATO.

Moscow’s coercive tactics are also designed to register in the second audience, Ukraine and Georgia.  Hence it is no accident that Russia has concurrently again raised the issue of revising the treaties with Ukraine so that the Black Sea Fleet can stay past 2017 in Sevastopol, which Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov proclaims, with support from the Foreign Ministry and Duma, as a Russian city. 

Russia’s coercive tactics reinforce the notion, voiced by Putin at the NATO-Russia Council, that Ukraine and Georgia are not really states, and that if they join NATO, Russia will see to it that they cease to exist as states.  Putin’s remarks are only among the many official statements from Russian officials that they do not really believe any of the post-Soviet states (or for that matter former Warsaw Pact members) to be truly sovereign states.  Therefore, the East European states merely do whatever Washington dictates to them, and CIS states can be intimidated and have their sovereignty – or even territories – diminished if Moscow so desires.

In this context, Russia’s moves against Georgia and Ukraine are intended to show that Moscow can stop them form joining NATO and will not let them act as truly sovereign sates with regard to their national security and foreign policy.  They must be neutral or openly pro-Russian, rather than covertly so under the guise of this neutrality, if they want to prevent their territories from being taken away from them. This is the case whether the subject is the Crimea, or Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

As Vladimir Frolov has written, in Georgia Moscow is moving to enforce a Cyprus solution where it is made clear to Georgia that it cannot have its integrity restored if it joins NATO, but that neutrality could lead to the restoration of its integrity.  Until such time as Georgia supposedly learns the lesson that Moscow is trying to teach it, Russia will make certain that it cannot ever regain sovereignty over those provinces in any form.  Thus the lesson Georgia is supposed to learn is also that Russian power dominates it, and that it cannot act against Russia’s preferences and must accept a truncated sovereignty and freedom of action in its international relations.  This truncated status would justify Russia’s belief that none of these states can stand on their own against Russia, and that Russia really is a great power which can act in the CIS with impunity much as the government acts at home, i.e. autocratically and arbitrarily.  At the same time, it may hope to provoke Georgia into a rash act that it can then use to destroy the Saakashvili regime or at least cripple it decisively, while pointing out to the world that this government does not deserve NATO membership. Its policies are thus part blackmail, part intimidation, and part provocation.

These lessons also relate to the third audience, NATO.  Moscow is determined to show NATO that it will prevent further enlargement and its consequence, European integration.  It is determined to revise the post-Cold War settlement of 1989-91 and demands a free will in the CIS as the price of its cooperation with NATO.  Beyond that, it also demands respect for its interests, including this revisionism and the disruption of European integration.  In other words, Russia eventually hopes to block European integration and restore its neo-imperial position as the arbiter of Eastern European destinies.  It tries to show Europe that neither the EU nor NATO can do anything to defend Ukraine and Georgia.  Furthermore, these states are anyway too unruly to join NATO, who would then have to deal with their unresolved security issues at the price of irrevocably antagonizing Moscow. Consequently, Russia never refrains from claiming that Georgia is planning a war and that Ukraine’s population opposes NATO membership.  But behind all these moves lie its threat not to permit these states to defy Russia’s neo-imperial program for them.  It demands that Europe give precedence to Russian interests over those of smaller states, and its officials, like Chief of Staff Yuri Baluyevsky and Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin have now threatened that if  Ukraine and Georgia  receive MAPs, then Russia could suspend all cooperation with NATO, a threat that Moscow presumably intends to carry out.

CONCLUSION: If NATO were to refrain from giving these states MAPs, that would not enhance either the security of these states, not that of NATO. There is little doubt that Russia would then move further to diminish the independence, security and sovereignty of Ukraine and Georgia, while demanding that NATO, as the price for  cooperation, acknowledge its suzerainty in the CIS.  Neither would the Kremlin, with a wetted appetite, stop there.  Russia has repeatedly threatened Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltic states with energy cutoffs and with being targets of Russian nuclear weapons.  European diplomats and intelligence agencies report a consistent campaign launched by the Russian government, operating in tandem with organized crime, energy companies and Russian intelligence agencies, to penetrate and subvert European public institutions in a revival of the old Soviet term of “active measures.”  There is little doubt that in the case of European irresolution, such  provocative behavior would be intensified to further break down European resistance.

Neither would Russia be likely to desist from corresponding military moves.  Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov recently said that Russia must possess one of the world’s five best militaries, entailing a vast modernization project. 

But the question thus forces itself: who is threatening Russia?  Certainly NATO is not and cannot threaten Russia, nor does Moscow perceive such a threat, for otherwise it would not have suspended its participation in the CFE treaty. Russia’s coercion directed against Tbilisi and Kyiv is really a demand that they and NATO let Russia revert back to being the kind of Russia that we thought had ended in 1991. Unfortunately, not only is that demand incompatible with the security of the rest of Eurasia, it also is incompatible with the security, stability, and prosperity of the sorely tried Russian people.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department or the U.S. Government.