By Richard Weitz (7/12/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)
BACKGROUND: On June 15, 2006, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its fifth anniversary summit meeting in Shanghai. The heads of state of the six full members – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – adopted several joint statements, including an overarching declaration marking the SCO’s fifth anniversary. Representatives from the four formal SCO observers – India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan – also attended.
BACKGROUND: On June 15, 2006, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) held its fifth anniversary summit meeting in Shanghai. The heads of state of the six full members – China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – adopted several joint statements, including an overarching declaration marking the SCO’s fifth anniversary. Representatives from the four formal SCO observers – India, Iran, Mongolia, and Pakistan – also attended.
Before the summit, there was considerable media speculation that the SCO would expand its membership. The precise number of countries seeking to obtain full membership or observer status in the SCO remains unclear. Shortly before the Shanghai summit, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Li Hui claimed that many countries, including some outside of Asia, had applied to become SCO members or observers. At the conclave, however, the SCO declined to increase its membership roster. The SCO staff said that the organization had not yet finalized the legal basis for such expansion. Another factor that may have played a role were concerns that allowing Iran or Belarus to join would reinforce Western perceptions that the institution has become a dictators’ club.
The fifth anniversary declaration and other summit statements reaffirm the SCO’s longstanding opposition to the “three evils” of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Shortly before the Shanghai summit, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mikhail Kamynin told ITAR-TASS that SCO members had already prevented hundreds of attempted terrorist acts thanks to the information exchanged through the SCO Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) in Tashkent. The RATS, which officially began operations in June 2004, arranges studies of regional terrorist movements, exchanges information regarding terrorist threats, and advises members about counterterrorist policies. It also coordinates exercises among SCO security forces and organizes efforts aimed at disrupting terrorist financing. According to the Xinhua news agency, the director of the RATS executive committee, Vyacheslav Kasimov, stated that the structure also has adopted unspecified “early-warning and prevention measures” designed to preempt terrorist threats.
The SCO members also highlighted the need to make further progress in promoting mutual economic cooperation. For several years, they have been establishing institutions to foster greater economic ties: the SCO Development Fund, the Business Council, and the Inter-bank Association. These organizations all aim to strengthen collaboration among members’ state enterprises, private businesses, and government officials responsible for foreign economic relations. Nevertheless, the fifth anniversary declaration reminds the SCO member states that they needed to make further progress in implementing the Program on Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation. Adopted in September 2003, the program includes a commitment to achieve the free movement of goods, services, capital, and technology by 2020.
At the summit, Russian President Vladimir Putin advocated the creation of an “energy club” among SCO members. Energy is likely to become an increasingly important area of interest for the member governments. The present lack of international energy institutions linking supplier and consumer countries provides an opportunity for the SCO to assume this role. Its roster of members and observers includes some of the world’s largest oil and gas exporters (Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan) and importers (China and India).
The summit documents express a broad consensus among members over core security goals. The signatories of the fifth anniversary declaration pledge not to join alliances or otherwise take actions that would “allow their territories to be used to undermine the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of the other member states.” The statement also affirms their readiness to hold immediate consultations during “emergencies that threaten regional peace, stability, and security.” Lastly, the declaration states their interest in signing a SCO multilateral “treaty of good-neighborliness” and creating a regional conflict prevention mechanism.
In the political realm, the fifth anniversary declaraton affirms the need for greater democracy, but only in regard to countries’ international relations. Thus, it defends the “right of all countries to safeguard national unity and their national interests, pursue particular models of development and formulate domestic and foreign policies independently and participate in international affairs on an equal basis.” It also declares SCO leaders’ support for the United Nations, including reform of the UN Security Council, and their belief that the next UN Secretary-General should come from Asia.
When it comes to the domestic affairs of their member states, however, the summit leaders objected to international efforts to promote political reform in the region: “Diversity of civilization and models of development must be respected and upheld. Models of social development should not be ‘exported’.”
IMPLICATIONS: Of the joint summit declarations, the most interesting (and disturbing) is the one on “International Information Security.” In this statement, the SCO leaders express concern that modern information and communication technologies presented a danger “for the entire world tantamount to that from the use of weapons of mass destruction.” Their declaration warns against attempts to use the new technologies to interfere “in the internal affairs of sovereign states” and “for criminal, terrorist, military and political purposes that run counter to the maintenance of international security, which will . . . trigger social instability in countries.” The summit attendees called on the United Nations and other parties to take “collective action to eliminate these threats.” They announced the formation of an expert group to develop a detailed action plan for managing this issue.
One of the reasons for the delays in realizing SCO economic goals such as the Program on Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation has been the need to reconcile conflicting national laws, regulations, and standards. The SCO member governments only began holding annual meetings of their legislative leaders in May in a belated effort to harmonize their national legislation. Thus far, they have declined to establish a permanent inter-parliamentary body like NATO’s North Atlantic Assembly. The absence of a free trade zone, countries’ excessive customs duties, and the limited financial resources SCO members have allocated to its various multilateral economic initiatives have further constrained intra-SCO commerce.
Another impediment to the SCO’s development has been the serious rivalries and disputes among its member governments. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are perennial competitors for regional primacy. In addition, Russia has repeatedly opposed Chinese efforts to accelerate the creation of a SCO free-trade zone or to acquire control over Eurasian energy resources. Its members continue to disagree over many important questions, including the desirability of a Western military presence in Central Asia, the SCO’s role in traditional defense matters, and whether member governments should collectively suppress domestic unrest.
The SCO’s interest in strengthening censorship represents a logical extension of its recent efforts to counter internal political challenges to the member governments. The organization has long insisted on the principle of “non-interference” in countries’ domestic affairs, regardless of their human rights policies. After perceived election improprieties served as the immediate trigger for the “colored” revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, the SCO formed its own cadre of election observers. Since their debut in the February 2005 ballot in Kyrgyzstan, they have endorsed every election held in a member state, despite the comprehensive criticisms offered by foreign observers from the OSCE and other groups. The observers help bolster the legitimacy of SCO ballots by prominently certifying results that more independent organizations typically question.
CONCLUSIONS: The fifth anniversary declaration states that the SCO “welcomes participation by relevant partners in specific projects in priority areas like energy, transportation, information and communications and agriculture.” It also says the SCO “will endeavor to actively participate in international campaigns against communicable diseases and contribute to environmental protection and rational use of natural resources.” Western institutions like NATO and the EU should pursue this opportunity and propose initiatives for functional cooperation with the SCO to combat narcotics trafficking, regional terrorist movements, and potential biological threats such as avian influenza.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Richard Weitz is a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at the Hudson Institute.