BACKGROUND: Kazakhstan’s Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev has designated Germany as the country’s leading partner in Europe. During talks in Berlin on May 18, he noted the depth of shared interests and perspectives between Germany and Kazakhstan. “Kazakhstan considers Germany its key partner in Europe. Astana and Berlin share similar positions on many topical issues of international and regional policy by continuing a regular political dialogue,” Tokayev declared. He also told Christoph Heusgen, head of the department for foreign policy and security of the Federal Chancellor’s office, that Astana is keen to support efforts to reform the UN and in particular Germany’s aspiration to gain permanent membership of the UN Security Council. Heusgen offered support for what Berlin considers as Kazakhstan’s efforts to promote regional integration, trade and economic cooperation in Central Asia, as well as its measures to strengthen security and stability in the region. However, Tokayev’s timely visit to Berlin signals Kazakhstan’s institutional recognition of the potential benefits of greater input from the EU into Central Asia. Crucially, Kazakhstan wants to do everything possible to support Germany’s initiative to work out a single EU strategy for the Central Asian countries. Since Germany will chair the EU in 2007, Astana is trying to bolster such efforts. Berlin is endeavoring to develop and implement a single political and economic strategy of the EU, which is consistent with Tokayev’s belief that Central Asia is “transforming from a peripheral role to one of the key geoeconomic elements of the Eurasian continent.” The mineral and energy resources of the region, combined with its important geopolitical position between Russia and China and access to their markets, demand a more consistent program from EU countries, which has lacked effective coordination. Tokayev also stated in Berlin that the “new globalization challenges require the reassessment of regional policy and the working out of a single regional strategy that would meet the interests of all the parties concerned.” There is little doubt that Astana is pushing its own agenda into such plans, maximizing its own interests within the region, and once again restating its claim to lead the region economically. Kazakhstan’s foreign policy is evolving rapidly, often sending mixed signals to observers and partners alike. Most notably, this has manifested itself in recent machinations within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Traditionally Astana has been a strong supporter of the SCO, playing an active part in its development and keen to demonstrate that the organization can tackle seriously many of the security and economic issues discussed amongst its members. Ahead of the SCO Summit of 15-16 June 2006, Kazakhstan’s foreign ministry has been actively downplaying speculation that the SCO may enlarge. Tokayev, in fact, explained that Kazakhstan finds it necessary to refrain from SCO enlargement because the organization currently lacks the legal basis regulating the procedures for admitting new members. Instead, Astana seems to prefer a more gradual and certainly cautious approach to admitting new members to the SCO. Observer status and dialogue partner routes are the preferred options, as opposed to full membership. The concerns held in Kazakhstan, relating chiefly to the possible inclusion of India, Pakistan and Iran, are based on the nuclear status of two of these countries and the aspirations and controversy surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Astana’s fear is that the SCO could become viewed as a ‘nuclear club’ and anti-western’ in its orientation. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan believes there is need for continuing joint antiterrorist exercises, saying that the Kazakhstani and Chinese special services plan to hold a border exercise in August this year.

IMPLICATIONS: President Nazarbayev on his return from meeting President Putin in Sochi on May 20 made efforts to persuade the Kazakhstani media that major decisions will be taken by the SCO in June; implying that Putin has explained and perhaps offered support for the accession of key states to the SCO. Economic and military-security cooperation are simultaneously being deepened between Russia and Kazakhstan. “All the accords reached during Nursultan Nazarbayev’s official visit to Russia are being implemented. Primarily, progress has been observed with the agreement of tariffs, which is of key importance to our Kazakh partners and which raises the volume of deliveries by Russia’s railways,” Putin said. Nazarbayev places great confidence in bilateral trade, which he would like to raise from its current levels of around $10 billion a year. “I think we’ll be able to double it soon, as what lies ahead for us is joint work on a new deposit in the North Caspian, Kurmangazy, the reserves in which are forecast to be one billion tons of oil,” Nazarbayev explained. The points emphasized by each leader in their official statements confirmed their respective priorities. Putin highlighted advances in energy cooperation including joint steps in extraction, processing, refining and supplying Kazakh gas, over and above the proposed deepening of military cooperation, including more deliveries of Russian military equipment to Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev, on the other hand, was keen to highlight Russia as an economic partner. The Kazakhstani leader gained the chair of the CIS Council of Heads of State. Realistically judging the present condition of the CIS, and focusing his efforts on bilateral relations with Russia, Nazarbayev presents himself as a reliable partner. “The CIS is 15 years old this year. This is not an easy time for the CIS. That is what some of our partners, we all know who they are, are saying. Everyone can judge for themselves and say what they want, but the CIS played a major role in the period following the collapse of the Soviet Union. And all honest people should be grateful that because of it, the entire process of divorce and restoration of independence passed off without bloodshed or conflict on a large scale between the republics,” commented Nazarbayev.

CONCLUSIONS: Astana has developed adeptness in balancing its relations between Russia and China. It is equally increasingly aware of its economic and security needs, which seem to signal diversity and avoiding relying on any one key state as a partner. Persistent rivalry with Tashkent, both vying for regional leadership, may also support moves to boost its partnership with Germany, facilitating EU initiatives, at a time when Uzbekistan’s relations with the West are in need of rebuilding. Regardless of the actual outcome of the forthcoming SCO summit, Tokayev’s comments point to reluctance in Astana to become embroiled or tarnished with an ‘anti-western’ image. Kazakhstan’s partnership with Germany, its bilateral programs with the UK and cooperation with Turkey and recent efforts to open up cooperative dialogue with Poland confirm Astana’s drive towards NATO and EU states to improve its economic potential and its security concerns. By committing its support for German plans to construct a EU wide strategy for the region, Kazakhstan is also sending out signals concerning its ongoing interests in western security cooperation. Nazarbayev is perhaps inadvertently raising the question of the terms of the divorce settlement throughout the CIS.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Roger N. McDermott is an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington D.C.