BACKGROUND: When Pakistan won independence from British rule in 1947, Afghanistan was the only country in the world to oppose its membership in the United Nations. Kabul took the plea that the Pakhtun and Baloch people inhabiting Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) bordering Afghanistan had not been given the right of self-determination and, as such, their territories were forcibly merged into Pakistan. This led to the Pakhtunistan problem, as successive Afghan governments publicly highlighted the rights of Pakhtuns and Baloch and demanded a separate homeland for the Pakhtun people. However, Afghanistan\'s support for Pakhtunistan was half-hearted because it didn\'t want its own Pakhtun population to start thinking of a merger of Pakhtun territories into a single new state of Afghan and Pakistani Pakhtuns. An additional problem was the Durand Line border, which Kabul argued its past rulers agreed to under duress at a time when the British Empire was at its peak. Kabul began hosting separatist Pakistani Pakhtuns and Baloch and in retaliation Islamabad gave refuge to dissident Afghans. There were occasional border skirmishes during this period but the situation turned serious when Pakistan in the early 1970s agreed to give refuge to leaders of Afghan Islamic groups including Gulbaddin Hekmatyar, Maulvi Yunis Khalis and Burhanuddin Rabbani following a failed uprising against the government of President Sardar Mohammad Daoud. The communist Saur Revolution in Afghanistan in April 1978 and the ensuing Soviet invasion changed the political scenario of the region, making Pakistan a so-called \"frontline state\" that hosted the seven major Afghan resistance groups and arming, training and equipping mujahideen fighters in cooperation with the CIA. Pakistan became increasingly deeply involved in Afghanistan through its support first for the Afghan mujahideen and subsequently the Taliban. Yet Pakistan took a U-turn under U.S. pressure in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks by giving up its support to the Taliban regime and facilitating Washington\'s military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001. Islamabad\'s help was crucial in ousting the Taliban from power and pursuing the US war on terror against al-Qaeda in the region. The US is keen to seek continued Pakistani support in its war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. It knows that friendly relations between Islamabad and Kabul are vital to sustain this war and extend the writ of President Karzai\'s fledgling government to all parts of Afghanistan, particularly the Pakhtun-populated provinces on the border with Pakistan. American military commanders have frequently complained that their soldiers risk harm at the hands of Taliban fighters who often find refuge in Pakistan and receive sympathy and support in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. It was largely due to U.S. pressure and inducements that Islamabad agreed to deploy about 80,000 soldiers in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which includes the restive South Waziristan and North Waziristan, to hunt down al-Qaeda and Taliban-linked foreign and Pakistani militants hiding in the tough, mountainous terrain close to the Durand Line border. More than 600 Pakistani soldiers have been killed in fighting in the area. Even though the foreign and local militants have suffered setbacks and lost most of their sanctuaries in both South and North Waziristan, that war is far from over.

IMPLICATIONS: The uncertain nature of Pak-Afghan relations could also be evidenced from the criticism one hears from certain Afghan intellectuals and sections of the increasingly vibrant media in Afghanistan about Pakistan Army\'s operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects in the two Waziristans and rest of the tribal areas. In their view, the Pakistan government under certain protocols was under obligation to take Afghanistan into confidence before sending troops and undertaking military action in the Pakistani tribal areas. The US and NATO military commanders, on the other hand, want even more Pakistani troops in the tribal areas to take the battle to the al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders and fighters reportedly hiding there. The Afghan authorities, together with the media and some members of the intelligentsia, are also critical of Pakistan for closing down camps for Afghan refugees in the two Waziristans and in other parts of the tribal areas. In fact, the Pakistani decision to shut down the camps for Afghan refugees is supported by both the U.S. and Afghan governments because it deprives the Taliban of places where they could find refuge and recruit new members. Such distrust and criticism has often led to angry rebuttals and poisoned relations between the two neighboring countries. Though much headway has been made in terms of enhanced trade ties linking Kabul with Islamabad, the political problems refuse to go away and prevent the two countries from achieving the full potential of their economic cooperation. The volume of Pakistan\'s trade with Afghanistan has reached one billion dollars from about $200 million during the Taliban rule. Some hesitant steps have also been taken to enhance social, cultural and sports ties and experimental runs of the bus service between Peshawar and Jalalabad have taken place. However, all this becomes irrelevant in forging closer ties between the two countries as soon as authorities in Kabul start blaming Islamabad for the violence in parts of Afghanistan and the Pakistanis react by pointing out how ungrateful the Afghans were after having enjoyed Pakistani hospitality for years.

CONCLUSIONS: Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan are still hostage to the past. The bitterness that began with Afghanistan\'s hostile reaction to Pakistani membership of the UN has haunted their ties for 59 years since Pakistan\'s independence. Interference in each other\'s affairs, culminating in Pakistan\'s influential role in choosing Afghan rulers for a while in the 1980s, has further complicated the situation. So much is the lack of trust among Afghan and Pakistani authorities that the former claim Osama bin Laden was in Pakistan and the latter insist the al-Qaeda leader was hiding in Afghanistan. This is one way to pass on the blame for the failures in the U.S.-led war on terror. The Americans have encouraged setting up forums to enable the Afghans and Pakistanis to quietly discuss their complaints against each other and remove misgivings. One such forum is the tripartite military commission aimed at coordinating anti-terror operations by armed forces of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the US in the region. Such arrangements have further empowered the U.S. to interfere in the affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and serve as a referee and arbiter in disputes involving the two countries. However, the lack of trust between Kabul and Islamabad is so acute that the two are often unable to bilaterally resolve their disputes without third-party intervention. Owing to growing Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, one cannot hope for any improvement in the security situation in the war-ravaged country. The embattled Afghan government is expected to become even more critical of Pakistan in future on account of the increase in Taliban attacks. Pakistan is likely to reply in the same currency, and there are already signs that its tone in denying accusations of support for Taliban is becoming aggressive. The fireworks will continue, and it would be futile to expect any major improvement in their uneasy political and diplomatic ties in the near future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Rahimullah Yusufzai is an executive editor of The News International, an English daily published from Pakistan\'s capital, Islamabad, and Lahore and Karachi. He is based in Peshawar, capital of the North-West Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan and is also a correspondent for the BBC, ABC News and Time magazine.