BACKGROUND: The statements and intentions coming out of Washington do not herald the advance of a new Cold War, as some of the more hysterical comments coming out of Moscow indicated, but the could very well signify an end to strategic partnership. More precisely, they do signify Washington\'s realization, albeit rather late in the game, that geopolitical rivalry in the borderlands is for real and not as former State Department officials claimed, a “mug’s game.” Win-win solutions involving Moscow and Washington are unlikely to be broached by Washington, and it may more forthrightly acknowledge that a rivalry in these areas exists. Despite earlier professions or expectations after September 11 of Russo-American cooperation in the CIS, Russia in fact used the advent of U.S. troops to Central Asia to reinvigorate its comprehensive drive to reintegrate the CIS around its energy, economic, and military initiatives. While State Department officials proclaimed that Washington sought no geopolitical rivalry in Central Asia and the South Caucasus, Russian officials increasingly loudly sought to induce or compel these states to follow Russia’s line and made clear their opposition to America’s presence there. And while American aid to Central Asia declined and its strategy became increasingly caught up in the call for democratization, Russia spent more money on building ties to the region and its instruments of power, including both economic and military means. Worse yet, Washington displayed no interest or willingness to counter the widespread propaganda, emanating from Moscow and local regimes, that the U.S. Government or the CIA was behind the Rose, Orange and Tulip revolutions, and that it was planning to unseat more Central Asian or CIS regimes. This lack of any kind of public diplomacy represented a grievous fault, and grievously has Washington paid for it. In fact, Washington’s silence convinced Central Asian governments that Washington either did not understand their region or share its concerns, or that it was actively opposed to the continuation of their admittedly repressive and authoritarian regimes. They were also convinced that Washington did not understand what was self-evident to them, although also self-serving, namely that the only alternative to their rule is not democracy but either a different set of authoritarian and crooked regimes or terrorism, a threat they take very seriously even if it is deliberately exaggerated. Worse yet, before 2005 Washington gave no answer either to local regimes or to Moscow and Beijing as to what its strategic aims or objectives were in Uzbekistan or elsewhere in Central Asia. And though it handsomely paid the Akayev regime for its use of the Manas base in Kyrgyzstan, it conspicuously refused to reward the Karimov regime equally. This last motive in particular, not the push for democracy, was the main driving force behind Uzbekistan’s estrangement from the United States. But Tashkent’s egregious human rights behavior at Andijan, as well as before and since that vent, only added fuel to the fire of mutual estrangement and encouraged Russia and China to support the ouster of U.S. forces from Uzbekistan. Both those states are also seeking to push the U.S. base out of Kyrgyzstan, though Washington is only slowly waking up to this.

IMPLICATIONS: The aforementioned trends indicated that as of 2005, the democracy campaign was becoming counterproductive, that the U.S. had taken Central Asia for granted, that its policymaking processes and institutions were incoherent as regards that region, and that Russia and China, newly invigorated by rising economies, were now confident in their ability to fight back and resist American imperatives. In reply, Washington has lately begun to craft a new policy to meet these changing circumstances. First, its relationship with Uzbekistan is moribund if not dead. Cooperation is unlikely except on urgent issues like removing nuclear materials and reactors from there with Russian cooperation. Instead, Washington will now look to the thriving Kazakhstan as its main partner there. This new stance owes much to the need for diversification of energy. Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman and Vice-President Cheney both traveled to Kazakhstan to encourage it to join the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline and avoid Russian schemes for total energy domination of Central Asia. But beyond that, Washington will continue aiding Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan militarily, particularly with regard to their navies so that they can independently defend their Caspian Sea energy platforms and interests, without being swallowed up in Moscow’s plans for a Russian-dominated Caspian navy. Second, the State Department has announced its intention to place Nagorno-Karabakh and other frozen conflicts on the agenda for the forthcoming G-8 meetings in July in St. Petersburg. While it is unclear if Russia is contributing to the stalemate in Karabakh, it certainly lies behind the failure to make any progress on the ‘frozen’ conflicts in Moldova and Georgia. Thus Washington will use this occasion to arraign Russia in public if not confront it in private at those meetings on those issues and possibly reinvigorate its diplomatic efforts to move them to resolution, as is currently happening with regard to the Karabakh conflict. Third, the State Department has not only reorganized itself to bring Central and South Asian states into a single bureau led by Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher, it also is offering bold new proposals to help integrate Central and South Asian infrastructures through massive electricity projects and other future energy projects. India and Pakistan already are seeking oil and gas from the area and they need electricity too. Success in implementing these large-scale projects will also redound very much to the stability and further prosperity of Afghanistan. In view of the U.S.’ strategic partnership with India, this program also would materially aid India’s continuing military and economic efforts to upgrade its strategic presence in Central Asia. Fourth, the Administration in April welcomed Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to Washington in spite of earlier qualms about human rights and democracy. Again, this signals intensified interest in energy and in neutralizing Iran as well as Russia in the South Caucasus. Although Azerbaijan cannot accept being used as a base in a possible Iran operation, it can continue to give overflight rights for planes going to Manas and Afghanistan, help influence Kazakhstan to join the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, and devise alternatives to Russian schemes for energy export. Aliyev’s visit to Washington and Cheney’s to Astana may also signify the Administration’s increased awareness that its democracy project ran into the sand and was terribly counterproductive in Central Asia. Certainly it gained nothing for Uzbeks, Kazakhs and others, and only led their governments closer to Moscow. Although a Senatorial move to impose sanctions on Uzbekistan’s leaders is now underway, any successful program to improve governance in Central Asia must engage both the governments and the reform communities in these regions to have any chance of success. Moreover, as geopolitical rivalry with Moscow grows, more classically defined national interests are likely to prevail as the U.S. priority, because if Washington cannot maintain dialogue with these regimes, it cannot gain much access to reformers or leverage the bilateral relationship with their governments in favor of reform.

CONCLUSIONS: All these moves add up to the beginning of a framework for a new and different American policy. But for it to succeed, there must be far greater inter-agency cohesion than was previously the case and much greater awareness of the strategic realities in the region. For example, it is unlikely that Kazakhstan can or will play the role of Washington’s main partner if that endangers its careful balancing act with its two neighbors, Russia and China. More resources must also be devoted to the areas along with placing it on a higher profile so that cabinet members and higher officials continue to travel there, and their opposite numbers visit Washington more frequently. Such a shift is necessary, because these are the areas of priority of Russian (and to a slightly lesser degree Chinese) engagement. As the past few years have clearly shown, Russia and China will not countenance anything like win-win schemes, which are completely contrary to their cognitive universe and experience. While it is not certain that America’s new moves represent a fully reconceived and coherent policy, what is clear is that the geopolitical rivalry in the Caucasus and Central Asia is now moving into high gear and will remain there for a long time to come.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. The views expressed here do not represent those of the US Army, Defense Dept. or the U.S. Government.