BACKGROUND: Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, Central Asia played an active role in the development of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) due to its massive reserves of uranium tapped for fissile material. As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the Soviet military-industrial complex left behind significant amounts of WMD as well as poorly guarded reactors and facilities for uranium enrichment. These facilities have been of increasing concern for the states in the region, as well as the United States, as nuclear weapons and material could get into the hands of terrorists or rogue states. The Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent has been considered as especially vulnerable to terrorism due to the presence of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) in the country and their ties to Al Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahiri, Osama Bin-Laden’s top deputy, reportedly bragged that: “We sent our people to Moscow, to Tashkent, to other Central Asian states, and they negotiated, and we purchased some suitcase [nuclear] bombs.” The truth behind this could be disputed, but the fact remains that the United States have since 9/11 invested large sums to prevent such a development in Central Asia. Some of this assistance has been designated for the Institute of Nuclear Physics. The institute was founded in 1956 and is located 30 kilometers outside Tashkent. The INP operates a 10 megawatt research reactor, and it is the largest nuclear research center in Central Asia. Early on, the United States identified the risks involved with the INP and in 1997 the U.S. Department of Energy issued a report on improving nuclear materials security at the institute. To improve protection, entry control systems, an alarm assessment system, delay barriers, and improved communications systems were put in place. Security grills were installed at the entrance and on the windows at the ground level, video cameras and video display systems were mounted, and interior intrusion detection sensors were set up in critical areas of the facilities. After 2001, further measures were financed by the U.S. including a sensored external detection fence and new security doors. In addition to these safeguards, the INP has also repatriated some of the highly enriched uranium (HEU) to Moscow, and converted the reactor with American assistance to utilize low-enriched uranium fuel. According to U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Fried, 70kg of HEU have been repatriated to Russia, but it remains unclear how much, if any, remains at the institute. If there is one issue that the U.S. and the Central Asian states accord equal weight in terms of national security, it is nuclear theft and proliferation in the post-Soviet space. This is not least seen in the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone initiative launched by the five states where the importance of nuclear security and non-proliferation in the region is stressed. The Central Asian states are also particularly vulnerable to nuclear theft given their close proximity to Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan. In the words of Bekhzod Yuldashev, Head of the Institute of Nuclear Physics in Tashkent: “The whole world is concerned about this stuff…Uzbekistan is a pivotal transit point.”

IMPLICATIONS: In March 2000, this was made evidently clear as a truck, heading toward Pakistan, was intercepted on the Kazakh-Uzbek border with uranium hidden in 10 lead containers concealed among scrap metal. This led the then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to announce a $3 million package in assistance to improve Uzbek border security, and install radiation detector scanning. However, although Uzbekistan might see a threat in uranium transiting the country, there is no real risk of terrorists acquiring nukes at the INP. With most of the HEU being repatriated to Russia from the INP and tightened security at the facilities, any terrorist attempt to capture the INP would most likely not result in any major gains. As access to HEU more or less is the key to terrorists acquiring nuclear weapons, the low-enriched uranium used at INP is not of much value for acquiring a nuclear weapon. Iraq tried to enrich uranium for a decade but did not succeed, and it is highly unlikely that Al Qaeda or any other terrorist organization would have the ability or the facilities to do so either. That does not mean that an attempt to seize the INP is unlikely. Political unrest or revolution in Uzbekistan would provide an opportunity for terrorist elements to gain control over the facilities and cause major damage as well as a potential hostage situation. As reported, the exercises carried out by RATS also involved the training of Special Forces for a potential hostage situation at the INP. With the Andijon uprising last summer, recent reports of a potential resurrection of IMU, as well as the currently strained relationship between Uzbekistan and the United States, there might indeed be a real threat to the INP id Uzbekistan’s internal situation worsens. In addition, repatriation of nuclear material from Central Asia and the INP require significant planning due to the high risks involved and tight security needed. Some assessments indicate that at present speed, repatriation of all nuclear materials and HEU in Central Asia could take more than a decade. Even though evidence about the IMU’s resurrection remains inconclusive, it is clear that the IMU has posed the greatest threat to nuclear theft in the region, and that it was the group that caused the American response to the INP in the first place. The IMU’s links to Al Qaedamake it an organization that should be closely monitored. The presence of the United States in the region reduced the threat of nuclear theft significantly, due to the measures taken including repatriation, high-tech border control equipment, the crack-down on Al Qaeda and IMU, raising the risks involved in transiting uranium. Terrorists could most likely not rely on organized crime networks for transport as these networks are pre-occupied with the less risky and more profitable drug trade. However, should the U.S. depart as its operations in Afghanistan wind down or as Russia is seeking to push it out of the region, Central Asia would again be increasingly vulnerable to terrorism. RATS seems to be showing that it is the pragmatic arm of the SCO, and its development shows that the aim is to set up a Special Forces group that would be fit to handle security threats following a U.S. departure from the region. CONCLUSIONS: Three conclusions could be drawn from the exercises and their location at the INP: First, a terrorist capture could produce a potential hostage situation in an important building. But nuclear theft is highly unlikely as the INP has converted all or most of its production to low-enriched uranium. Secondly, with instability in Uzbekistan, the possible resurrection of the IMU, as well as a deteriorating relationship with the U.S., SCO and RATS is seeking to replace the U.S. and show preparedness in case it faces a similar situation as for example the Beslan raid, not least due to the high risk nature of the INP. Third, RATS is increasingly showing that it is the pragmatic arm of SCO. In divergence from the power-politics involved in exercises such as Peace Mission 2005 this summer, RATS seems to engage in exercises that could prove valuable for anti-terrorism in the future.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nicklas Norling is a Junior Research Fellow with the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, working out of its Uppsala office.