BACKGROUND: When this author served as head of the OSCE election observation mission during Kazakhstan’s parliamentary elections in 2004, the problem considered to be the most serious was the lack of transparency in the work of the Central Election Commission. This year, under new leadership, the Commission corrected this flaw. Moreover, the publication of election results broken down by polling station represented another major step forward towards transparency, since observers are now able to verify that the counts in polling station protocols were carried over into the vote totals reported by the CEC. In 2004, the OSCE was told that this practice would be inaugurated. This year, the promise was kept. There were other noteworthy accomplishments as well. It was decided well in advance that voters would be offered a choice of paper or electronic voting in polling stations where both were available. Voter lists were improved over 2004, and the practice of maintaining two voters lists for paper and electronic voting was ended. Voters were no longer pressured to use the Silau electronic system, as was the case last year. Improvements made the Silau system easier to use. There remains widespread public distrust of the Silau system, as evidenced by the fact that where there was a choice, anywhere from 66% to 90% of voters chose to use paper ballots. But given the fact that paper protocols are often the source of intentional or unintentional distortion of the vote, electronic voting is likely to be the wave of the future in Kazakhstan. Public trust could be enhanced by requiring international certification of the Silau system, and by modifying it to provide for a manually auditable paper trail, similar to that being gradually introduced in the Russian Federation. On election day, OSCE observers considered the vote count to be poorly executed in 27% of polling stations. In contrast in Azerbaijan, where I also observed the presidential elections in November, the percentage of vote counts considered “bad” or “very bad” was 43%. Positive developments in Kazakhstan this year included the following: improved handling of complaints and appeals; inclusive registration of candidates and provision of a real choice to voters; free airtime provided to candidates in accordance with the law; fewer occasions of official interference with media coverage than in the past; observers were provided access to election commissions at all levels and protocols of results were provided as required by law. On election day, OSCE observers assessed the vote positively in 90% of polling stations visited.The voter turnout of 75% reflected genuine interest on the part of voters as well as pressures to “get out the vote”.

IMPLICATIONS: Despite these positive developments, one must agree with the preliminary conclusions of the OSCE election observation mission that this election did not fully meet international standards – a conclusion that was also drawn, for example, concerning the most recent elections in Ukraine, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. Serious problems stemmed from the mistaken idea that an active opposition represents an unacceptable threat to “stability”, a concept fostered by statements from the security organs claiming that opposition supporters planned violent actions. The result was that actions were taken at the local level to limit access by opposition candidates to voters, and to harass opposition supporters. As has been the case in the past, local executives and employers have put pressure on voters to support the ruling party and its candidate. It is traditionally the case in post-Soviet societies for local officials to demonstrate their worth by “over-fulfilling the plan” when election time comes, and no amount of rhetoric from the top leadership will persuade them that this conduct will not be rewarded in the long run. This was clearly the case in Azerbaijan as well, even after President Aliyev threatened to remove local executives who interfered with the election process – something he also did in several cases after the elections. Further impetus for “squeezing” the opposition resulted from a misunderstanding of the “color revolutions” that swept Georgia, Ukraine and allegedly Kyrgyzstan as well in past months. In fact the cause of these upsets of long-serving rulers was the attempted suppression of the opposition linked with heavy-handed corruption. True stability can only come to pass when ruling parties accept not only the legitimacy, but also the necessity of a strong opposition as a precondition for democratic rule.

CONCLUSIONS: The presidential election is not an end point in the evolution of democracy in Kazakhstan. President Nazarbayev has a mandate to proceed with further democratic reforms, which were also endorsed by the leading opposition candidates. The increasing of the powers of the Majilis and the further expansion of the electoral principle to local government would help to demonstrate Kazakhstan’s credentials when a decision is made in December 2006 concerning Kazakhstan’s bid to chair the OSCE in 2009.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert L. Barry is a retired U.S. Ambassador, who administered national and local elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina as OSCE Head of Mission 1998-2001. Since then, he has headed or participated in OSCE election missions to Serbia, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Kazakhstan and Afghanistan. He has also observed elections in Indonesia, where he was U.S. Ambassador, for the Carter Center.