BACKGROUND: After the voting in the November 6 Parliamentary elections in Azerbaijan was over, many international and domestic observers were anxious to see the follow-up events. On the one hand, many feared that a repeat of October 16, 2003 would take place. At that time, police forces and opposition activists clashed in downtown Baku following the fraudulent Presidential elections, resulting in the death of a protestor as well as the severe beating and arrest of hundreds of opposition members. A few dramatically-inclined analysts feared that Azerbaijan’s post-election scenario would be similar to the Andijan events this May, when Uzbek authorities reportedly killed hundreds of civilians. Finally, there was a small minority of Azerbaijan watchers, who believed that the Ukrainian revolutionary scenario was likely in Baku. Indeed, the prevention of post-election violence seemed the highest priority of the diplomatic circles. Both the U.S. ambassador in Baku as well as the OSCE and Council of Europe delegations urged restrain on both sides. They called on Azerbaijani authorities to permit the opposition’s post-election rallies and asked opposition leaders to avoid destructive behavior. Both sides followed the lead. The opposition decided to wait until November 7 (the day when the international observers came out with preliminary assessment of the election process) to declare their further actions. When the assessment came out to be highly critical, the date for the first rally was set on November 8. However, the authorities refused to sanction protests that day and instead offered November 9. The opposition, eager to demonstrate to the world that it has peaceful means of struggle in mind, agreed. Looking back, it is clear that it was a tactical mistake. Organizing protest demonstration only three days after the elections was similar to missing the train. The demonstration was approved by the authorities and a significant police force was present around the venue of the demonstration. This eliminated any chance for an “orange revolution” in the country. Besides, the Galaba square, which was agreed upon by both opposition and the authorities, was far away from key governmental buildings. The opposition gathered a maximum of 10-000-15,000 supporters to their first rally. Two other rallies were held since, but both were of similar nature and strength. By November 26, it was clear that the opposition’s weekly demonstrations did not produce the desired results. Foremost, the rallies gathered the same amount of people, mostly from the core membership base of the Azadliq (Freedom) bloc. This showed that the majority of citizens did not care much about Azadliq’s struggle and already moved on into the post-election period. The pre-election surveys proved right: the opposition did not have major popular support due to their outdated election message and poorly chosen tactics. Time was working against the opposition, as the international attention to Azerbaijan’s elections was fading. Most foreign journalists and observer missions left Baku and the majority of opposition members started to express frustration with the Azadliq bloc leadership’s lack of a post-election vision. It was time to make a drastic change and that change came on November 26. During this fourth demonstration, opposition leaders Ali Kerimli, Lala Shovket Hajiyeva, and Sardar Jalaloglu called for a sit-in campaign and urged the demonstrators not to leave the square. The police responded with excessive brutality, using tear gas and batons to crack down on the protestors. Hundreds of people were injured or arrested.

IMPLICATIONS: In the short-term, both the opposition and the government gained from the November 26 crackdown. The opposition leaders showed their determination to their core supporters and once again reinforced their image as a “peaceful and civilized” force. It made international headlines and managed to show to the rest of the world how “despotic” the regime in Azerbaijan is. The opposition’s face was well saved. At the same time, the government forces, tired of a senseless wait-and-see game with the opposition, seemed happy to show who the real master in the neighborhood is. However, in the long run, both the opposition and the government have lost from this situation. The opposition is in its most difficult time since Azerbaijan’s independence. It is clear that having lost all elections in the past 12 years, opposition parties have lost the faith not only of a large portion of the country’s population, but also of its core members and supporters. Many people believe that the current traditional opposition parties have outdated themselves, and thus it is ever harder for them to gather public support. As the BTC pipeline starts bringing major oil revenues to the country and the welfare of the citizens starts gradually but steadily improving, it will be even more difficult for the opposition parties to garner public support in the future. Thus the opposition is in a deadlocked situation and short-term face saving will not help it in the long run. Besides, the division of opinion inside the Azadliq bloc is also becoming increasingly clear. Isa Gambar now supports a non-violent means of struggle, and Ali Kerimli and Rasul Guliyev urge confrontation with the authorities. The divisions inside the Azadliq bloc will finalize once some of the elected members from this bloc decide not to boycott Parliament, as is urged by the opposition leaders at the moment. The November 26 brutality was also a major defeat for the authorities and more specifically for President Ilham Aliyev. His intentions to hold clean elections in the country, no matter how sincere and honest, nevertheless ended up with another brutal crackdown on the political opponents of the regime. This shows either that President Aliyev does not have a full command over the political processes in the country or that the regime can not help but use the stick whenever it wants. The usage of the excessive force against the opposition has become somewhat of a norm, which is a dangerous trend, and raises the issue of control over and reform of the law enforcement structures. Another major loser in the situation in Azerbaijan’s public image abroad. With images of police forces beating its citizens, the acceptance of Azerbaijan as a democratic state has been shelved for years. Azerbaijan will receive an adequate response from international organizations as well as during the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. It is highly unlikely that the West will support Azerbaijan’s quest for a favorable solution to Nagorno-Karabakh with this poor human rights record. Finally, the perhaps major loser is the West. As Sardar Jalal-oglu, deputy chairman of the Democratic Party, stated, “the pro-Western opposition in Azerbaijan has failed.” Opposition newspapers have full of angry and disappointed words towards the U.S. and ordinary citizens are becoming convinced that the West is interested only in Azerbaijan’s oil. Of course, it would be naïve to assume that the West was ready to intervene into Azerbaijan to overthrow the Aliyev regime. Yet the opposition’s expectations were too inflated and the disappointment comes with a bitter taste now. This will significantly weaken American policies in Azerbaijan and will start a new phase in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics – a phase full of fertile soil for the growth of Islamic radicalism.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite some major improvements in the electoral process, Azerbaijan’s authorities have failed to change the image of the country abroad, and with the November 26 crackdown on the opposition parties, they once again showed its repressive nature. The opposition parties, meanwhile, have failed to develop an adequate post-election strategy. Their slow and weak response to the electoral fraud has put them in a limbo situation, in which they can move neither forward nor backward. It is expected that some of the elected members from the opposition will join the Parliament and thus will split the unity of the Azadliq bloc. In the long-run, the traditional opposition in Azerbaijan will experience a further major weakening.

AUTHOR’S BIO:Alman Mir-Ismail is a freelance writer on Azerbaijani and Caspian affairs.