BACKGROUND: On the one hand, Azerbaijan’s strategic value to the West has gradually increased, due to its significant oil resources; its role in the international anti-terrorist coalition; and its symbolic role as a moderate, secular, and potentially democratic Muslim nation. While these elements were all assets to the incumbent regime, this was compounded by the Bush administration’s increased emphasis on democratization in the greater Middle East. Azerbaijan became a test case for the ‘Bush doctrine’: would Washington stick to its principles in case of a fraudulent election, or stand by a strategic if authoritarian ally? In the run-up to the elections, Washington took on a more active role in Azerbaijan’s electoral politics than at earlier occasions. Moreover, western media interest has been significant – not least as journalists erroneously smelled a potential revolution. In fact, Azerbaijan differed strongly from Georgia, Ukraine, or Kyrgyzstan. Thanks to rapid economic growth and President Ilham Aliyev’s success in casting himself as a force combining continuity and change, building on his father’s accomplishments but also appearing as a younger, reformist force, Aliyev commands increasingly high popularity ratings – unlike the Kuchma, Shevardnadze, and Akayev regimes. The opposition, on the other hand, lacks a political agenda, and has tended to focus more on Western attention and talk of revolution than on the electoral campaign. The opposition’s adoption of the orange color – directly borrowed from Ukraine – is symptomatic. In the period preceding the election, international organizations made numerous demands, from reform of electoral commissions, to greater respect for freedom of assembly and opposition campaigning. Many suggestions, though not all, were adopted. A major improvement over earlier practices was the smooth registration of candidates, with practically all candidates allowed to register. Candidates from various ends of the political spectrum were given air time on public television, and voter registration lists were also improved. Weeks before the election, the inking of voters’ fingers was introduced, and a ban on foreign-funded NGOs to observe the elections was lifted. Of course, numerous problems typical of post-Soviet countries remain. The composition of the electoral commissions still favors the government; electoral campaigns hardly operate in a fair environment; and the intimidation of candidates and voters by local authorities especially in rural areas persisted, as did irregularities in vote counting and tabulation. Influential forces spent large amounts of money supporting preferred candidates, and the administrative resources of incumbent candidates affected results in many areas. Voting in military bases also remained murky.

IMPLICATIONS: It is clear that the conduct of these elections was a significant improvement over the past. Practices that were ubiquitous in the 2000 parliamentary and 2003 presidential elections seem to be fading. There was less evidence of ballot stuffing, overt voter intimidation, multiple and carousel voting, or inflated turnout figures. In most polling stations around the country, observers agree that the voting process proceeded in a mainly orderly and disciplined manner. Many reforms implemented at the urging of the international community contributed to this progress. Significantly, in over 80 percent of districts surveyed, official results concurred with those of a USAID-sponsored exit poll. The problem with the vote count was at the center of the criticism forwarded by the international observation mission. The joint observation report and especially its presentation at a Baku press conference on Nov. 7 was cheered by the opposition, but considered by many Western observers to have been exceedingly harsh. Indeed, several members of the observation mission of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe were disturbed by the fact that the report did not correspond to the discussions among their delegation’s members. The four heads of delegation (OSCE, COE, NATO and European Parliament) met in closed chambers to draft the report, which delegation members did not see until it was later disclosed to the general public at the press conference – at which point it emerged in a tone that was generally negative and paid virtually no attention to the progress made compared to previous elections. The inherent flaws in the OSCE format of election reporting became painfully clear: the obligation to first of all determine whether elections ‘conform to international standards’ – that is, reach the same level as those in, say, Denmark – without considering whether progress has been made, let alone assess the level and significance of the progress made. Statements by the State Department and the British government were more balanced. The government moved fairly quickly to address the most pressing concerns. President Aliyev in a televised address on Nov. 7 acknowledged irregularities had taken place, in particular the interference of local executive bodies with the electoral process, pledged to investigate allegations of fraud, to cancel results if necessary, and to hold officials accountable. The government then moved to invalidate or partly invalidate results in five districts. As a result, several opposition leaders gained seats. These ongoing measures are crucial in order to rebuild confidence in the electoral process. The President has also fired and detained three governors and numerous functionaries on charges of electoral fraud. This marks a watershed, as it ends a climate of impunity for election fraud in the country. Importantly, this election was not a simple struggle between government and opposition. Candidates aligned with different interest groups within the ruling elite – and different opposition blocs – also faced off in many districts. In numerous occasions, independent candidates won over the ruling party’s candidate. One example is Elmira Akhundova, the late president Heydar Aliyev’s official biographer, who won her race with 29% of the vote ahead of two candidates representing the ruling party – how now allege fraud. This illustrates the multiple splits within the ruling elite. It also indicates that splits between various forces in the government are often more important to understand Azerbaijani politics than the traditional government-opposition divide. This has two important implications. First, electoral fraud often originates from the local level and in favor of a local candidate, not from the central government. Cross-cutting linkages of an ideological, regional, and economic nature create a web of interactions that makes running the country and implementing reforms of any kind, including democratic reform of the electoral system, a serious challenge to the President. In fact, the gradual liberalization of the political system in the country also decentralizes authority and appears to make the presidential office less – not more – able to control the electoral process. While ultimate power does rest with the President, power is more decentralized. Hence influential figures and local potentates are benefiting from the increasingly liberal atmosphere to seek to influence elections for their own narrow goals, irrespective of and sometimes conflicting with the objectives of the President. This election illustrates that authority in Azerbaijan’s political system is much more decentralized than often assumed. In fact, it is worth stressing that electoral fraud in this election could originate from several sources: those controlled by the president, or those that the President does not control. Establishing which of these forces have been involved in the fraud that took place during the elections is crucial in order to fully understand the dynamics of Azerbaijan’s politics – and most of all, to determine the level of commitment to democratic reform in the governing structures as well as to understand the internal challenges faced by reformist forces within the government.

CONCLUSIONS: Azerbaijan has hardly become a model democracy, and still has a long way of reform ahead. But the voice of the people of Azerbaijan in electing a parliament mattered more in this election than ever before. As such, Azerbaijan deserves criticism of the remaining problems but also encouragement for its accomplishments. For the West, much is at stake as Azerbaijan is becoming increasingly important to Western interests. It is sandwiched between Russia and Iran, forming the only reliable air transport corridor between NATO territory and Afghanistan. It is emerging as a major non-OPEC oil producer, with high oil prices and supply problems making this all the more timely. Azerbaijan is also something as rare as a stable, moderate and secular Shi’a Muslim country aspiring to integration with Euro-Atlantic institutions. While not as rapid as one could wish for, Azerbaijan’s progress shows that advances toward international democratic norms is possible through evolution and not only through revolution. Constructive criticism is appropriate, but the West should give credit where credit is due.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, and Editor of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.