BACKGROUND: When President Ilham Aliyev was elected to the presidency in October 2003, many expected sweeping political and economic reforms and significant cadre changes. After all, President Aliyev was young and had extensive experience working with Western companies as well as democracy building organizations, such as the Council of Europe and OSCE. Yet the slow pace of cadre changes made many both inside and outside Azerbaijan believe that Ilham Aliyev lacked the charisma, power and determination to deal with the “old guard”, implying members of the administration that had served under his father and since then grew into corrupt, powerful and well-networked power centers in the country. Among these, the chief ones were Head of Presidential Administration Ramiz Mekhtiyev, Health Minister Ali Insanov, Interior Minister Ramil Usubov, National Security Minister Namik Abbasov, Economics minister Farhad Aliyev, Customs head Kemaleddin Heydarov. Indeed, compared with his father, President Aliyev seemed rather week. Within the two years of his presidency, he had fired only four ministers (of which only truly influential one, Namik Abbasov) and a dozen local governors. The recent arrests of high-profile officials in Baku showed another side of President Aliyev. On October 19, the powerful Minister of Economic Development Farhad Aliyev and his brother Rafig were arrested in connection with an alleged ‘planned coup’ against the government. Farhad Aliyev, who is not related to the president, was in control of major monopolies in the country and had an extensive network of business loyalists. The next day, the very powerful minister of health Ali Insanov and a head of department at the President’s office Akif Muradverdiyev were also fired and arrested. Both were known to head one of the most powerful groupings within the ruling party the so-called ‘Yer-az’ grouping of Azerbaijanis originally stemming from present-day Armenia (‘Yer’ for Yerevan, ‘Az’ for Azeri). Insanov was deemed so powerful that he was thought to be untouchable. Local media and analysts have long speculated that President Aliyev cannot stand Insanov due to his independent behavior and lack of respect, but few thought that Insanov would let himself be fired without putting up a real fight. Dozens of local media outlets, political parties, businesses and high-ranking officials were said to have ties to (or be dependent on) Insanov, and his departure will mean a split within the ruling regime – something that President Aliyev was not believed to be ready to risk. It is noteworthy that Insanov’s supporters, with the exception of a group of his loyalists that had held a press conference and demanded his freedom, did not dare to oppose the President’s decision and instead organized a briefing in which they condemned Insanov’s actions. To the last weeks’ developments should be added the events in March this year, when the President ordered the arrest of several high-ranking officials within the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who were accused of having kidnapped and murdered several influential businessmen and politicians in the country throughout the past decade, though sparing a weakened Minister of Interior. Following that, Aliyev also sacked on charges of corruption the influential deputy minister of Justice Aydin Gasimov, who had been in charge of the penitentiary system for nearly a decade and was thought to have ties with the criminal circles. His dismissal, which even resulted in prison riots in Baku, was a very risky action for the President.

IMPLICATIONS: President Aliyev’s recent actions significantly increased his credibility among ordinary people, who doubted that he could get rid of corrupt and powerful officials. The majority of the population traditionally looked at Aliyev as a soft and liberal politician, but have now turned to believe that he does possess the necessary determination to fight his opponents in his father’s style. In retrospect, President Aliyev’s policy in terms of cadre changes shows that in spite of prevailing stereotypes, Aliyev indeed does hold an increasingly firm command over the country and is the principal decision maker in the domestic political process. Arguments on his dependence on – or fear of – the “old guard” have proven to be overestimated, as has the power of oligarchs and influential ministers. In many ways, the current situation in Azerbaijan is very similar to 1993, when President Heydar Aliyev came to power. At that time, the country’s political spectrum was full of independent warlords, each of which had paramilitary groups and used them to fight for power. It was dangerous times for the President, who had to manage these armed groups and their leaders. But within a few years, Heydar Aliyev arrested and crushed all these groups and established his command over the country. In Georgia, President Eduard Shevardnadze did very much the same in 1994-96. Today’s Azerbaijan is in some sense comparable, because power centers within the ruling regime possess not only large groups of loyalists, but also significant financial resources and, as widely speculated in the local media, armed gangs. To established a strong, powerful presidency in this situation could be as difficult as it was in 1993. Most of the influential members of the old guard have a deeply entrenched systems of clan and family networks, and the entire governmental apparatus is filled with their loyalists. Sacking or fighting them is a very risky venture for President Aliyev. In spite of this, in the past months Aliyev has taken the risk of making moves that even his father did not dare to do.

CONCLUSIONS: The process of cadre changes in Azerbaijan is likely to take a different pace now. With the President’s show of power and the absence of virtually any opposition to his moves on the part of the sacked officials, it is likely that the President’s authority and reputation will further increase, depending in great part on the way the parliamentary elections on November 6 are held and the international reaction to it. Powerful oligarchs and ministers are likely to lower their ambitions, as their respect for the young President increases. In this situation, President Aliyev will be in a position to press further with cadre changes and political and economic reforms. Meanwhile, it is likely that the recent dismissals will cause a long-term fragmentation inside the ruling party and the formation of a new opposition inside the country, financed and supported by the sacked officials. With the total failure of the current political opposition to produce a credible alternative to the ruling regime, the new opposition might spice up the domestic political scene in Azerbaijan.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Alman Mir-Ismail is a freelance journalist based in Baku.