BACKGROUND: On October 11, the Georgian Parliament unanimously passed a resolution instructing the government to take measures for the withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflict zones if their performance in South Ossetia and Abkhazia does not improve before February and July, 2006, respectively. Since the early 1990s, the Abkhazia and South Ossetia peace processes have been mediated by Russian peacekeepers deployed in both breakaway regions. In reality, the contingents stationed in the conflict zones have been used by Russia to consolidate its effective control over the regions rather than to fulfill the core functions stipulated by the peacekeeping mandate, such as preventing the militarization and the formation of illegal armed groups. The granting of Russian citizenship to a large number of Abkhazian and South Ossetian residents, the acquisition of the assets and properties of Georgian refugees, the arming and training of secessionist forces, and the sponsoring of their military exercises are listed as a basis for Georgia’s distrust of Russia’s role. Only last month, Russian peacekeepers turned a blind eye to a military parade in South Ossetia, staged as the unrecognized republic’s independence day. In a strongly-worded resolution, the Georgian Parliament holds Russia responsible for keeping the status quo of frozen conflicts and strengthening the separatist regimes in return of their de facto incorporation into Russia, and instructs the government to undertake appropriate measures for the rapid withdrawal of Russian peacekeeping forces from the territory of Georgia if no progress is reached by the deadline. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili made clear that he shares the indictment of the legislature. Saakashvili reiterated that Georgia is committed to a peaceful resolution to the conflict, but argued that Russia must take responsibility for its own role. “This is not a Georgian-Ossetian problem, it is a Georgian-Russian issue,” he said in a nationally televised speech. “Russia is doing everything in its power to maintain this status quo; Georgia will no longer put up with the freeze on the negotiating process.” Georgian authorities caution Moscow that the presence of its peacekeepers would officially be declared illegal by Georgia unless Russia agrees to the corrective changes in the current negotiating framework: establishing a new format for peace talks, altering current peacekeeping practices in the conflict zones; and stopping shipments of arms and supplies to the separatist territories. At the same time, Georgian State Minister for Conflict Resolution Issues Giorgi Khaindrava stated that it is necessary to increase the role of the international community in peacekeeping and that the issue of U.S. participation in the normalization of the conflicts on Georgian territory is also on the agenda. Meanwhile, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov declared that Moscow would pull its troops out of the two territories only if Abkhaz and South Ossetian leaders called on Russia to do so. Abkhazia and South Ossetia have also opposed to any changes to the existing negotiating frameworks.

IMPLICATIONS:

Since its installation in the office, Saakasvhili’s administration made no secret about its willingness to defrost the conflicts. Initial, rather spontaneous decisions that led to armed clashes in South Ossetia last August were followed by Georgia’s peace plan economic projects for the secessionist regions. But so far, the reaction from Sukhumi and Tskhinvali to Tbilisi’s peace proposal has showed that the years of animosity are hard to reverse. Abkhaz and Ossetian officials remain suspicious of Georgian potential plans of military solutions to the conflicts, and in the absence of other gravitational forces to support their economic recovery, welcome continued Russian patronage. The current low level of Georgian-Russian relations is not without precedent. Only months ago, the long running Russian-Georgian dispute over the fate of Russian military bases in Georgia was heightened and the talks also seemed deadlocked as Russian officials balked at even the hypothetical perspective of withdrawing bases. Nevertheless, Tbilisi succeeded in persuading Russia to withdraw. Notably, Georgia’s tough stance on Russian peacekeeping seems to be emboldened by this breakthrough in the reduction of Moscow’s geopolitical influence in the Caucasus. Moscow may have agreed to the Georgian terms of the bases withdrawal. However, when it comes to the current row, the stakes are much higher: Russia has made a huge commitment to the separatist regions, and its patronage of Abkhazia and South Ossetia is now deeply embedded in the strategy of Russia’s top political leadership. A total collapse in Georgian-Russian relations would be damaging for Georgia, as it is much too early to gauge how far the Russian authorities will go in embracing provocative maneuvers, as Russia could opt to utilize its political allies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to exert pressure on Tbilisi. Yet President Vladimir Putin has publicly declared that it is Russia’s state policy to respect the territorial integrity of Georgia. When it comes to nudge from West and the U.S., Putin may be inclined to stand up to his hardliner subordinates, and have seek a deal with Washington providing Russia with assistance in dealing with the many challenges throughout the Caucasus region. At the same time, the small if existing area of productivity for current Russian-Georgian relations may be maximized with Tbilisi’s consistent approach in dissuading Russia from providing an insurance policy for the region’s separatist leadership. Giving Russia a realistic period of time for correcting its peacekeeping instead of requesting an immediate withdrawal signals that official Tbilisi may have a pragmatic action plan. Under these circumstances, transparent and effective international mediation is crucial. While Georgian officials admit that the settlement of the conflicts is practically impossible without Russia’s participation, Tbilisi seeks the internationalization of the negotiating process as a powerful tool for reaching a political solution. Georgia’s call for intensifying the multilateral negotiating format appeals not only to the OSCE and European bodies, but to the informal groupings of the “Baltic-Black Sea Axis” and the “Democratic Choice” initiative (Ukraine, Georgia, Poland and Lithuania), with the possibility of Latvian and Ukrainian participation in peacekeeping, as voiced by the Ukrainian and Latvian presidents. Yet the EU’s Georgia policy is inactive. It reflects Europe’s passive conditionality, in trying to encourage the transformation of neighboring states into effective partners with a stable democracy and a competitive market economy, while avoiding direct obligations to directly guaranteeing eventual accession to the EU. This passive policy is laden with negative consequences as it both undermines the EU’s credibility, and halts the prospect of security arrangements in its immediate neighborhood, especially with Turkey’s EU accession negotiations now open. The freshened peace processes are supported by Washington, which has long questioned the impartiality of the Russian forces in Georgia. While avoiding open confrontation with Moscow, the Bush administration, with its broad political agenda in Georgia, is being fairly dismissive of Russian sensibilities about its influence in the South Caucasus. The new U.S. ambassador to Georgia, John Tefft, has stated that the U.S. wants to see more progress in resolving the Abkhaz and South Ossetian conflicts, and that keeping the Russian-led negotiating format does not seem to be an option. In trying to encourage Moscow to agree to a new negotiating format of talks, Tbilisi may pursue a pragmatic option of seeking international backing to broader Caucasus security issues where Washington could engage with Russia on the many problems it faces in the region.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia seems ready to accept constructive solutions with regard to Russian peacekeeping, but clearly indicates the status quo is no longer acceptable. Tbilisi has been exploiting international multilateral fora as useful avenues in persuading Russia over the withdrawal of bases. By moving further towards pushing Russia to play a more constructive role in the peace process, Tbilisi will now have to use the momentum of its own making and continue to diversify the gravitational forces for the secessionist provinces by engaging external mediators through economic and security assistance programs that will help to realize an economic and social rapprochement of Abkhaz and South Ossetians with Georgia. Whether Russian authorities will be receptive to a new pragmatic geopolitical agenda will also depend on greater Western engagement in the negotiating process.

AUTHOR BIO: Khatuna Salukvadze is an analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia. She holds degrees from Harvard University and London School of Economics, and is based in Tbilisi, Georgia.