Wednesday, 24 August 2005

RULING PARTY’S LIST OF CANDIDATES REVEALS PRESIDENT ALIYEV’S DESIRE NOT TO “ROCK THE BOAT”

Published in Analytical Articles

By Alman Mir Ismail (8/24/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: President Ilham Aliyev was elected to the Presidency on October 15, 2003, on the expectation that he would conduct cadre changes and bring new, young faces into the government. Being young himself, President Aliyev was said to be wanting to give more power to the team of young, Western-educated and reform-minded specialists. This even caused rumors in the local media that President Aliyev was at odds with the “old guard”, the team that once supported and served as the power base for his father, President Heydar Aliyev.
BACKGROUND: President Ilham Aliyev was elected to the Presidency on October 15, 2003, on the expectation that he would conduct cadre changes and bring new, young faces into the government. Being young himself, President Aliyev was said to be wanting to give more power to the team of young, Western-educated and reform-minded specialists. This even caused rumors in the local media that President Aliyev was at odds with the “old guard”, the team that once supported and served as the power base for his father, President Heydar Aliyev. Yet, since his election, President Aliyev did not rush to fire off the old Ministers, instead replacing only four of them. Some analysts linked it to his weak position in the ruling elite and inexperience with the political leadership. Others claimed that he was not willing to upset the old team. Indeed, sudden changes in the ruling elite could lead to the latter joining to the opposition, causing much problems for the younger Aliyev in the long run. Thus, President Aliyev chose a gradual path of cadre change policy. The upcoming Parliamentary elections on November 6 seemed like a good opportunity for President Aliyev to make another step in the cadre reforms and bring a younger team into the legislative body and thus speed up the process of reform in the country. At the same time, analysts predicted that YAP’s list of candidates would become a major battle between various regional-based and business power centers within the ruling elite, thus making it more difficult for the President to push “his list of candidates” through. Indeed, the published list of candidates from the ruling party on August 16 showed that President Aliyev decided not to make – or proved incapable to make – radical changes to the Parliament’s composition. The list included such deputies as Musa Musayev and Ahad Abiyev, notorious for their scandalous behavior in the Parliament and slanderous remarks towards NGOs, media and opposition. At the same time, the current speaker of Parliament, 77-year old Murtuz Aleskerov and the President’s equally 77-year old uncle Jalal Aliyev will also seek re-election. So will old singer Zeynab Khanlarova and several other representatives of culture, known for their silence and absolute passiveness in the Parliament. Analysts were shocked and disappointed to see these conservative and outdated faces in YAP’s list. It should be also noted that the candidate list of the ruling party includes first lady Mehriban Aliyeva and the first-ever representative of the community of mountain Jews in Azerbaijan, Yevda Abramova.

IMPLICATIONS: YAP’s published candidate list seemed to have eliminated the much-rumored fragmentation of the party into competing fractions. From this point of view, President Aliyev may have managed to balance out the interests of various groupings within YAP and thus preserve the superficial unity of the ruling elite. At the same time, those few people in the Parliament who did not make it to the YAP’s list seem to be openly frustrated with the decision of the party and plan on running independently, against the decision of the party. The Head of the Parliamentary Committee on Economic Issues, Sattar Safarov, is one of them. Thus, the list of candidates nevertheless created a group of “unhappy” YAP members, who might in the future even join the ranks of the opposition. President Aliyev might consider appointing some of them to executive positions in order to avoid this outcome. Meanwhile, a number of other YAP members and independent candidates/ businessmen/ heads of state enterprises, who are close to the ruling party, have also nominated themselves. In some election districts, the candidates from the “official” YAP list find themselves running against several other YAP or pro-YAP candidates. This situation shows that the struggle for seats in the Parliament is not over within the ruling party. Different business circles and power centers seem to be sponsoring these candidates to get more influence in the legislative body. This open lack of unity in the ruling party creates much criticism and sarcasm from opposition groups. In the past, YAP has always bashed at the opposition for its lack of unity, so this situation does not earn much credit to the ruling party. Last week, the opposition daily Azadliq published an article in which it claimed that there exists an “alternative” list of YAP candidates to the “official” one. By doing so, it wanted to show that not everything is calm and finalized within the ruling party and that some candidates might get elected from YAP even if they are not on the official list. The same newspaper stated that YAP’s list is a perfect indication of President Aliyev’s loss to the old guard. The fact that so many old, passive and conservative faces have been re-nominated by YAP generates doubt on the capability of President Aliyev to get rid of the “old guard” and conduct overdue political and economic reforms in the country. The local analysts note that although President Aliyev desires these reforms, he hesitates to upset the power centers within the ruling party and thus “rock the boat” of stability in the country.

CONCLUSIONS: Eventually, President Aliyev has two choices: continue to balance the interests of the power centers, business groups and region-based clans within the ruling party by refraining from conducting massive changes and keeping all in their places; or ending his hesitation and implementing the cadre reforms. Should he choose the former option, the visual stability in the country and the ruling elite will be preserved, yet the continuous corruption and socio-economic problems will continue to raise frustration among the population and the international community. This might negatively affect the image of the President himself. Should he be inclined towards the latter option, this might win him much credit in the short run, but eventually he will end up having some fired officials and rich oligarchs switching sides and joining the opposition. This, in turn, might make the power struggle in the country even fiercer. The upcoming Parliamentary election are hence unlikely to significantly refresh the ruling party. President Aliyev remains dependent on the “old guard”, either due to weakness or a lack of will to make radical changes. In the long run, either scenario is risky for him.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Alman Mir-Ismail is a freelance political analyst, based in Baku and specializing in regional politics and economics.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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