Thursday, 12 November 2009

FIRST OFFICIAL VISIT OF TAJIK PRESIDENT TO RUSSIA YIELDS LITTLE PROGRESS

Published in Field Reports

By Bek Boriev (11/12/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Tajikistan’s president Emomali Rakhmon has completed an official visit to Moscow, where he met with the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The meeting between the two heads of state was the first official rendezvous of this kind. Local media anticipated complicated negotiations since the Tajik government expressed a straightforward intention of charging Russia for the 201st military base in Tajikistan – local newspapers indicated the sum of US$ 300 million per year for the presence of Russian troops.

Tajikistan’s president Emomali Rakhmon has completed an official visit to Moscow, where he met with the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev. The meeting between the two heads of state was the first official rendezvous of this kind. Local media anticipated complicated negotiations since the Tajik government expressed a straightforward intention of charging Russia for the 201st military base in Tajikistan – local newspapers indicated the sum of US$ 300 million per year for the presence of Russian troops. At least two more hard topics were dealt with: Russian investment into Rogun hydropower project and the status of Russian language, which has been removed from any official use. The talks between the two presidents could be taken to imply that bilateral relations between Russia and Tajikistan have never been as cold as they are now, with few prospects of improvement.

The Tajik side anticipated that the presidents would reach a new agreement on the status of the military base, and the introduction of payment for its presence was one of the primary requests of the Tajik authorities. Russian authorities made an immediate reference to the bilateral agreement of 2004, where it was stipulated that the Russian military base will be deployed in Tajikistan without fees until 2014. Therefore, discussions on this issue were postponed, with no rearrangements agreed on. It should be noted that the 201st military base is the largest Russian land force outside its territory.

Another sensitive aspect in Tajik-Russian relations is the economic participation of the Russian Federation in hydropower projects in Tajikistan. One of the largest hydropower projects in Central Asia, the Rogun plant, was left out of the discussions. Russian minister of energy Sergey Shmatko said that he is fascinated by the efforts of the Tajik government to build such an energy giant on its own behalf, regardless of the world economic crisis. He also pointed out that Russia never refused to participate in the project, but that a plan for Russian participation is still missing.

One of the factors preventing the Russian side from investing into the energy sector of Tajikistan is the inability of the latter to fulfill its economic obligations. The two states are stakeholders of the Sangtuda hydro plant, with 75 percent Russian and 25 percent Tajik ownership. To this date, Tajikistan’s debt for utilizing Sangtuda stands at US$30 million. While negotiations have finally brought some results, it may well appear to international investors that Tajikistan is not prepared to carry the economic burdens related to the high cost investment projects.

Rakhmon has also expressed his concern over the criticism in Russian media on the adoption of the law on state language. The president said that it is unclear what may have caused such a controversy, as the law only regulates the status of the state language. However, the previous version of the law not only regulated the use of state language, but also identified Russian as the language of international communication, stipulating the citizens’ right to submit any official documents in both languages. The new version allows citizens to apply to state bodies only in Tajik.

This law creates significant barriers not only to the Russian-speaking population, but also to the Tajik speakers. An important problem in the use of Tajik is the absence of widely recognized terminology. In the judicial, political and social sectors both Tajik and Russian were practiced, which created a certain linguistic balance. Nowadays, Tajik scholars would face a strong pressure to come up with various kinds of terminology. The issue would also require changes in educational programs and extra funds are needed in order to fulfill the adopted regulation.

Prior to Rakhmon’s visit to Russia, some experts assumed that the Tajik government would not adopt the law, keeping it as an instrument to pressure Russia. Yet, its adoption indicates that the issue lacked significance in the eyes of the Russian government. The Russian minority in Tajikistan constitutes only 0.6 percent of the population and Russian officials were apparently prepared to sacrifice their language rights for a better negotiation position.

Overall, the Tajik president’s visit to Moscow hints at uncertainty in the relations between Tajikistan and Russia. The fragile strategic partnership between the two states is the result of continued distrust. The unchanged basis of the Russian military base in Tajikistan caused frustration, which is exacerbated by the US$30 million energy debts. A disregard of the position of the Russian minority implies that the Russian government firmly seeks to avoid weaknesses in its position. Progress in relations between Russia and Tajikistan in the near future is therefore is unlikely.
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