In early November, representatives of Uzbekistan’s state stock company “Uzbekenergo” announced the decision to withdraw from the Common Energy System (CES) of Central Asia. While the same intention had been declared several times during the year, the intention previously did not seemed serious. This time, however, Uzbek officials stated that they see no further incentives for staying in the CES, especially since the system is not capable of securing national energy systems from external factors. These developments could have positive as well as negative implications for Uzbekistan, as well as for its immediate neighbors.

The current functioning of the CES is in Uzbekistan considered to be a “remnant of the unitary state”. The system was organized and operated as one mechanism that would provide reliable and continuous energy supply for the whole Central Asian region. After the collapse of the USSR, however, the system’s operation was largely based on interstate trust – there were practically no authorities or legal regimes that would provide guarantees for its member states. At times, energy was consumed without control in certain parts of the region, and consequently there were no proper sanctions. In some extreme cases, especially during winter time, this contributed to serious conflict situations in the energy system.

The CES manages energy transfers from the networks of one state into the networks of others and coordinates the operation of reservoirs from the basins of the Naryn-Syrdarya and Amudarya Rivers. According to Valentina Kasymova, an independent energy expert, if any of the states would withdraw from the CES, the operation of the whole system will be compromised. Thus, she concludes, it will be very uneasy for states to overcome possible breakdowns independently.

Meanwhile, Uzbekistan’s neighbors have already experienced certain consequences of Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CES. Tajikistan, being one of the most energy-intensive states during the winter season, is facing a problematic energy situation already – since October 29 the delivery of electricity in some parts of the country has been limited. Moreover, Uzbekistan’s withdrawal from the CES makes the flow of Turkmen energy to Tajikistan through Uzbekistan technically impossible. According to Kasymova, Kyrgyzstan may also suffer from Uzbekistan’s withdrawal as it could disrupt the parallel energy systems of all the states, which have until now provided an uninterrupted frequency in high-voltage lines. Thus, she states that Uzbekistan’s withdrawal may lead to drops of frequency that may be difficult to control and that, in turn, may cause systemic breakdowns in Kyrgyzstan’s energy system. Kazakhstan does not seem to worry about Uzbekistan’s decision as it considers withdrawing from the CES itself. Turkmenistan, for its part, did so back in 2003. Therefore, Uzbekistan’s decision would largely affect Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, especially during the winter.

Interestingly enough, a shift from the centralized to autonomous mode seems to have few, if any, negative consequences for Uzbekistan. The state stock company Uzbekenergo stated that on December 1, 2009, new energy transmission facilities with a capacity of 500 kilowatt will be established on the route from Guzar to Surkhan. This power line will allow for the delivery of electricity to the Surkhandarya region, passing Tajik territory. Moreover, another new power line, “Uzbekistanskaya,” which connected the Tashkent region with three regions in the Ferghana valley, has freed Uzbekistan from its previous dependence on energy from Kyrgyzstan. Therefore, local experts forecast that these new power lines will allow Uzbekistan to withdraw completely from the CES by the end of 2009. In addition, the new power line would allow Uzbekistan to increase its electricity exports to Afghanistan.

The Common Energy System of Central Asia is a remnant of the Soviet past that does not seem to survive current realities. A lack of interstate legal regulations and mechanisms to coordinate the functioning of the system inevitably led to the disintegration of a mechanism that was designed to serve the whole region. Building national infrastructure, including energy facilities is perhaps required of independent states. However, in a situation when the states of the region have differing economic and technical capacities, it is hard to predict what form these transformations will take. While it is largely expected that future coordination of national energy system issues will be based on bilateral or multilateral agreements, in the context of Central Asian region where states tend to disengage rather than cooperate, even such agreements may well turn out to be redundant.