During the last few weeks, tensions have mounted in South Ossetia. One concrete issue under dispute has been a shortage of drinking water to both Tskhinvali and Georgian villages, something both sides have ascribed to sabotage. The water dispute began in May, after residents of Georgian villages north of Tskhinvali extracted water for irrigation purposes from a pipeline supplying Tskhinvali with drinking water. The South Ossetian de facto government has since claimed that it has not been allowed to repair the pipeline, while Tbilisi officials state that repairs are concluded and the remaining water shortage is an effect of Ossetian mismanagement of its pipeline system. Simultaneously, Georgian villages south of Tskhinvali have been left without irrigation water, which has triggered protests at the Ergneti checkpoint. Demonstrations on the Georgian side dispersed on July 4, as the water supply was partly restored, while South Ossetian authorities claim water to Tskhinvali is still suspended.

A second strain of Georgian-South Ossetian problems relates to construction work on a road linking two Georgian villages. On June 27, Georgian workers resumed reconstruction of the road between Nikozi and Avnevi, two Georgian-controlled villages in the conflict zone, work on which had previously been interrupted on June 15, following the deployment of South Ossetian militia near the road. South Ossetian de facto authorities state that this road will grant Tbilisi a strategic advantage should hostilities resurface, and the Russian peacekeeping contingent opposes reconstruction until this is acceptable to both Tbilisi and Tskhinvali. Russian peacekeepers thus moved in to block the construction work, triggering a public protest involving several hundred Georgian villagers. On June 28, Russian troops left the scene and construction work was resumed with the oversight of Georgian peacekeepers. Boris Kochiev, the South Ossetian minister for special affairs, commented on the incidents as conscious attempts by Tbilisi to escalate tensions in the region, while Georgian officials stated that the interference by Russian peacekeepers was a clear sign of their destructive influence on the peace process.

Simultaneous with these disputes, exchanges of fire have been reported between Georgian and Ossetian villages close to Tskhinvali. These have involved snipers and small arms fire leaving several wounded and reportedly killing an Ossetian policeman, while Tskhinvali has been shelled on several occasions. Georgian media has reported a transfer of fighters from North Ossetia to Tskhinvali via the Roki tunnel, and North Ossetian president Taimuraz Mamsurov expressed support for providing armed volunteers to South Ossetia should violence escalate. Tskhinvali authorities claimed a Georgian build-up of forces on Georgian-controlled territory around Tskhinvali, but this was later denied by both Georgian and Russian peacekeepers in the region. The Georgian side instead claimed snipers hade been deployed by the Ossetian side near Georgian villages. Kokoity on July 9 stated to a South Ossetian newspaper that South Ossetia possesses the capacity to carry out “combat operations” on Georgian territory, interpreted by the Georgian side as a threat of conducting terrorist acts.

Events over the last few weeks should be viewed in the light of changes in Tbilisi’s tactics toward the conflict since last fall. This strategy involves increasingly focused efforts to isolate Kokoity’s de facto government and denounce it as a criminalized regime, lacking legitimacy and support among the region’s population at large. Instead, Tbilisi has put much effort into setting up a provisional administration on Georgian-controlled territory under Dmitri Sanakoyev, and in promoting him nationally and internationally as the legitimate leader of South Ossetia. This has recently been accompanied by statements by Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili, claiming that the conflict is coming close to a peaceful resolution, that Kokoity’s time is running out and that Georgia will negotiate on South Ossetia’s future status with Sanakoyev. The quest for international credibility is part of Tbilisi’s overall strategy for changing the conflict resolution format. This has previously focused on internationalizing the process through demanding the replacement of Russian peacekeepers with ones representing neutral states, and on EU participation in the negotiation format. However, gaining international acceptance for Sanakoyev as a stakeholder in the negotiations and including him as a party in the Joint Control Commission would add a component supporting Tbilisi’s position, whereas it is currently opposed by South Ossetia, Russia, and North Ossetia. While Tbilisi has had some success in promoting Kokoity to the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, both Moscow and Tskhinvali denounce him as a puppet of Tbilisi. Recent events on the ground in South Ossetia, the increasingly inflamed rhetoric between Tskhinvali and Tbilisi, and Kokoity’s refusal on July 7 to take part in a JCC meeting in Tbilisi, indicates that Tbilisi’s new strategy is indeed affecting the conflict dynamics, for better or worse.