BACKGROUND:Arriving to Tbilisi after attending a Russian military parade in the Red Square, George W. Bush appeared notably relaxed as he tried to tune in to Georgian fiery folk dances. The country gave him an impressive welcome as 150,000 Georgians gathered in Tbilisi’s Freedom Square to listen to the U.S. President. Bush used this opportunity to stress his second term trademark values – the need for spreading democracy and liberty – and praised the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 for its important contribution to the cause of freedom and its inspiration of democratic changes elsewhere in the world: “before there was a Purple Revolution in Iraq or an Orange Revolution in Ukraine or a Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, there was a Rose Revolution in Georgia,” Bush said. Georgian President Saakashvili, who has also made it his mission to champion democracy in the region, was offered praise for Georgia’s drive towards the EU and NATO and for creating a template that triggered the installment of new governments in Ukraine, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, where Soviet-era officials were replaced by western-aligned democrats. Encouragement for additional efforts to advance power changes in former Soviet terrain ran equally strong – with Belarus, described by Washington as the “last dictatorship in Europe,” on the top of the list. Belarus opposition leaders arrived to the Georgian capital to attend the meeting in Freedom Square.

IMPLICATIONS: Among the core problems that Georgia faces and that were touched upon in President Bush’s address, many are of Russian making. This is particularly the case as regards Moscow’s support for separatist territories. This is why Bush\'s pledge of support, which came amid the heightened long-running dispute over Russia\'s continued military presence in Georgia, induced immediate and obvious implications from Moscow. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov reportedly sent a letter of protest to his American counterpart regarding the Latvia and Georgia visits. Saakashvili has put the Russian bases’ withdrawal as a priority on his political agenda. Two bases, one in Akhalkalaki in South Georgia and the other in the Black Sea port of Batumi housing 3,000 troops, are remnants of a much larger Russian military presence in Georgia in Cold War times. The row over the was the main reason for President Mikheil Saakashvili to boycott celebrations in Moscow after talks between Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili and Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on May 6 failed to reach an agreement over the final date of the closure of bases. Moscow refused its earlier stance to pullout the bases by January 1, 2008, thus challenging the resolution of Georgian parliament which instructs the government to veto the troops as unlawful foreign military presence on Georgian soil and request their forceful removal by January 2006 unless an agreement over a timeframe for bases’ withdrawal is reached with Russia before May 15. Russia’s main fear seems to be that NATO-aspirant Georgia is preparing for NATO and U.S. deployment on its territory. The country is unequivocally looking forward to start its process toward NATO membership as early as in 2007. Following the U.S.-sponsored “train-and-equip” program, Washington has launched a new military assistance program for the Georgian armed forces, and Georgia contributes 850 troops to coalition forces in Iraq. The issue of the bases was raised by President Bush in his talks with his Russian counterpart. In the difficult task to reassure Russia that the U.S. is not meddling on its borders, President Bush tried to persuade Putin to withdraw bases from Georgia. As Tbilisi will likely continue to mobilize pressures on Russia using the full force of international forums, Russia may soften its stance as it seems to fear the symbolism rather than security effect of withdrawing from Georgia. Militarily, Russia is still keeping the South Caucasus within its orbit by maintaining a large base in Armenia with the Armenian government’s consent. If this pragmatic foreign policy view prevails, the likelihood that a final deal on the bases could be imminent increases. As for Moscow’s sponsorship of Abkhazian and South Ossetian secessionists to break away from Georgia, Bush endorsed Saakashvili’s proposal to grant broader autonomy to the breakaway regions and raised the possibility of a larger American role in resolving these separatist conflicts, while proclaiming that \"the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia must be respected by all nations.\" Balancing the drive for democracy with energy supply needs – the cornerstone for cooperation between the two countries – Bush delivered a pledge, according to informed sources, to provide U.S. assistance for Georgia’s gas pipeline system that was up for a privatization deal with Gazprom, Russian state-owned gas company. This step would further restrain Russia’s desire to have a monopoly over Caucasian energy shipments.

CONCLUSIONS: As Washington’s support for Saakashvili’s administration comes to validate Russia’s enduring fears that Georgia gains enough support to permanently slip from Russia’s orbit, Russia will weigh several factors in deciding its next course of action. The most important challenge is the rapidly changing situation where Russia is being encircled by the spread of velvet revolutions in its immediate neighborhood. This will include Moscow’s influence waning on its borders, security challenges created by the new power vacuum, and the effect of a potentially democratic Ukraine on Moscow’s regional strategic interests. Bush’s visit to Georgia can be seen as symbolic show of support, yet, for Georgia, the symbolism of the visit may well mount the deliverable results as it provides a visible boost to Saakashvili’s young term in office. While avoiding open confrontation with Moscow, the Bush\' administration is being fairly dismissive of Russian sensibilities about its influence in the South Caucasus. President Bush has proclaimed Washington’s desire to promote a new, democratic order in the former Soviet Union. For that order to endure, Russia’s traditional imperialist ambitions will have to be curtailed. Georgia may become a good venue to push this agenda as Washington sees the country as a fighter, both in the global war for democracy and in the regional battle against Russian reassertion.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Khatuna Salukvadze is a freelance analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia. She holds degrees from Harvard University and London School of Economics, and is based in Tbilisi, Georgia.