BACKGROUND: To date, China has reacted to the Kyrgyz revolution with muted rhetoric. Beijing has let Russia take the lead in responding to developments and has refrained from asserting its desires publicly. Officially, the Foreign Ministry has merely stated that “China hopes the situation in Kyrgyzstan turns stable at an early date… As a friendly neighbor of Kyrgyzstan, China is paying close attention to the development of the situation and wishes social order there restored to a normal state as soon as possible.” Additionally, the border crossing to Kyrgyzstan that was closed at the start of the revolt has already been reopened. While China has yet to exert significant influence on the evolving situation, other than telephone diplomacy and demarches to the new government to protect Chinese citizens in Kyrgyzstan, China may still assert itself if its interests become threatened. This was the subtext to SCO Secretary General Zhang Deguang’s statement that he has “deep concern over the current complex situation” and that it is “important now that the course of further events in Kyrgyzstan develop in line with the Constitution, that law and order return to the society, and that national concord and peace be properly provided.” As the new government begins to take shape, China will weigh several factors in deciding its next course of action. These will include the shape of the new government, its position toward the Uyghur Diaspora, security threats created by the new power vacuum, and the effect of a potentially democratic Kyrgyzstan on Beijing’s regional strategic interests.

IMPLICATIONS: The first factor shaping China’s reaction is the shape and make-up of the new Kyrgyz government. As of now, the majority of new leaders are former government officials, not grass-root activists. All of these leaders, including acting President Kurmanbek Bakiev, former acting internal security coordinator and opposition leader Felix Kulov, acting Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva, and former Foreign Minister and current leader of the opposition Party for Justice Muratbek Imanaliev, have had a long history of engaging with China over the course of their careers. For now it seems that they have no interest in changing Kyrgyzstan’s relationship with China. Acting Foreign Minster Otunbayeva has already stated publicly that Kyrgyzstan will continue to develop its foreign policy in line with the status quo and that China is an important friend and economic partner. This being said, to some analyst, anti-China rhetoric is a large part of the opposition’s base. It was the Asky riots in 2002, ostensibly a protest against the Kyrgyz government ceding too much territory to China in land negotiations (but at its heart an anti-Akayev protest) that helped galvanize the opposition. In fact, it was the five deaths caused by government forces that forced then Prime Minister and now acting President Kurmanbek Bakiev to resign. And while there has been little anti-China rhetoric used by the opposition since the Asky riots, the current political situation may still restrain how quickly the new government embraces China, lest a rival opposition leader resurrect the old anti-government/anti-China chants. Secondly, Beijing will keep a close eye on how the new government handles the Uyghur Diaspora in Kyrgyzstan. With approximately 50,000 Uyghurs living in Kyrgyzstan, in addition to the thousands of shuttle traders going back and forth between Xinjiang and Kyrgyzstan, the country represents ones of the largest Uyghur populations outside of China. Prior to the revolution, China had done an efficient job of convincing the Kyrgyz government and all other Central Asian regimes to do Beijing’s “dirty work” when it came to the Uyghur populations. The former government helped monitor Uyghur activities in the country, prevented many Uyghur associations from organizing fully as political groups, and arrested and extradited Uyghurs as needed. Under a new, more democratic government, Uyghur groups could be able to develop more politically. If allowed, they may more aggressively seek to influence the situation in Xinjiang or organize the Diaspora community more effectively. Both possibilities worry Beijing. If the Uyghurs of Kyrgyzstan are in fact allowed to challenge Beijing more openly, or, alternatively, if democratic activists start penetrating into China from Kyrgyzstan, Beijing may forcefully assert their interest to the Kyrgyz government and use all their levers of influence, including ties to the as-of-yet unreformed security branches, to make sure the situation does not become troublesome. Thirdly, Beijing is as always concerned about potential instability created by a power vacuum in Kyrgyzstan. While an interim government has taken power and new elections will be held in June, the unstable situation may allow for radical Islamic groups to infiltrate more deeply into Kyrgyzstan and drug smuggling networks to more effectively establish their presence. Both situations create problems for Beijing, and not just because of the threat these groups could pose to stability in Xinjiang. China has come to recognize over the last decade that internal instability in Central Asian countries affects China’s own national security, and a failed state on its borders would require a great deal of resources and attention, assets that China currently would like to focus on its economic development and the Taiwan situation. If Beijing perceives a new threat, Chinese leaders would be likely to exercise whatever levers of influence and power they find necessary before they have to consider new military and security options. Lastly, China is watching developments in Kyrgyzstan with an eye toward what it means for China’s influence in the region. China has made impressive inroads into the region since the end of the Soviet Union both through bilateral engagement and the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Analysts and government officials in Beijing have already stated their fear that the Kyrgyz revolution will provide an opportunity for the United States to more forcefully assert its presence there, as the new government reaches out to new partners. China suspects that the United State was the hidden hand behind the revolution, and a new partnership between the United States and Kyrgyzstan could unravel many on the recent gains for China, especially in keeping the SCO an organization of Chinese dominance. While this may be a knee-jerk reaction by Beijing, two recent Xinhua headlines highlight this concern, reading: “U.S. Meddling in Central Asia Through Military, Economic Infiltration” and “U.S. Influence in Central Asia To Rise After Change of Kyrgyzstan Government.”

CONCLUSIONS: In conclusion, China is currently in a “wait and see” mode when it comes to Kyrgyzstan. Beijing will likely continue to follow Russia’s lead and not attempt to assert any strong influence on the new government until the Chinese leadership feels absolutely compelled. China will continue to watch developments in Kyrgyzstan with an eye for the factors discussed above. Only if the situation turns against China would Beijing decide to act, using a growing assortment of tools for influencing events in Central Asia. Until then, China may yet introduce a modicum of stability into the region and could be an important partner of the United States and Russia in helping to manage this rapidly changing situation.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Matthew Oresman is the Director of the China-Eurasia Forum (www.chinaeurasia.org) and can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .