Wednesday, 09 February 2005

TOWARDS A BI-PARTY SYSTEM IN AZERBAIJAN?

Published in Analytical Articles

By Fariz Ismailzade (2/9/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: In August 2002 the national referendum, held at the initiative of then President Heydar Aliyev, put forth 29 questions to be decided by voters. Among them was the abolishment of the proportional system of elections to the Parliament. The voters overwhelmingly supported the idea, thus transforming Azerbaijan’s electoral system from ‘mixed’ to ‘majoritarian only.
BACKGROUND: In August 2002 the national referendum, held at the initiative of then President Heydar Aliyev, put forth 29 questions to be decided by voters. Among them was the abolishment of the proportional system of elections to the Parliament. The voters overwhelmingly supported the idea, thus transforming Azerbaijan’s electoral system from ‘mixed’ to ‘majoritarian only.’ From now on, all 125 deputies to the Milli Mejlis (Parliament) were to be elected from single-mandate electoral districts. At the time, opposition parties and NGOs fiercely defended the proportional system. Many argued that the abolishment of the proportional system would kill the multi-party system in the country and hurt democracy in the long run. Some oppositionists even stated that the government had made a move towards a total dictatorship in the country and the gradual disappearance of political parties. Indeed, political parties in Azerbaijan seemed more interested in those 25 proportional seats than in the 100 majoritarian ones. Although much of their reaction to the abolishment of the proportional system of elections was emotional and based on their hostility to the government, many indeed believed that it was the party lists and proportional elections that kept the parties floating and attractive during elections. By 2000, there were more than 40 parties in the country. Yet, at the same time bitter competition between the opposition parties did not allow them to unite prior to the crucial parliamentary elections of 2000. The proponents of the idea, mainly from the ruling party, argued that deputies elected from single-mandate districts feel more responsibility toward their voters in a concrete geographic area than deputies elected from the general party list would. With the 2005 parliamentary elections approaching, opposition parties have renewed their dialogue towards consolidation. Major opposition parties such as the Popular Front, Democratic and Musavat parties have come out of tri-party negotiations saying that a preliminary agreement for a united coalition has been reached. Other minor parties and NGOs seem eager to join the coalition, which has been announced by the chairman of Popular Front party Ali Kerimli as “open for all democratic forces in the country.”

IMPLICATIONS: The abolishment of the proportional system may have hurt the opposition parties in the short run. Foremost, the chairmen of the parties, who simultaneously fulfill the roles of fundraisers, godfathers and charismatic, irreplaceable leaders, lost the power they had when they were in charge of drafting the lists of candidates for the proportional elections. Members of the political parties now do not feel the necessity to completely submit to the party chairperson, as the majoritarian race puts them on more equal grounds. Secondly, the absence of party lists made the opposition parties as such less attractive for potential members and politicians, as the race in a single mandate electoral district requires more personal power and popularity than the party’s support, a support that the parties in many instances are unable to provide anyway. In the long run, the abolition of the proportional system benefited the opposition parties in the country. Although it is too early for some oppositionists to realize this, some have been already stating that it is indeed the case. What many opposition parties did not notice or refused to notice in 2002 is becoming clear now. On the one hand, the abolition of the proportional system also abolished the bitter and unnecessary competition between political parties. Instead of fighting for 25 proportional seats, the opposition parties are now engaged in a dialogue on how to contest all the 125 majoritarian seats together. Since none of the existing opposition parties is strong enough to fight for all 125 constituencies, they have to look for potential allies in the areas where they are weak. This will allow them to share resources and thus form a united coalition – known as seat adjustments in other national contexts. On the other hand, the proportional system was also used to put a tight grip and discipline on the ruling New Azerbaijan Party (YAP), in which the deputies were heavily dependent on the party headquarters. Now, with the majoritarian elections in place, many deputies wonder if they should rely on their own wealth and resources instead of waiting for the party leadership to help them. This, in turn, works to weaken the ruling party. Local media has already reported that several influential deputies from YAP advocated for the re-establishment of the proportional system. Rumors about this still circulate in local politics. What is obvious in 2005 is that, perhaps for the first time in the post-Soviet history of Azerbaijan, the political spectrum is slowly moving from a multi-party system to a bi-party system. It is not a coincidence that the U.S., UK and many other countries where the majoritarian system is practiced, have two main strong parties, whereas countries like Turkey and Italy, where party lists still exist, have a multi-party and often shaky political system. In Azerbaijan, these two large political parties have not been formed yet, either logistically or ideologically. However, if things continue to develop in such a way, it should not be excluded that a bi-party system will be established in the country. One party will for the foreseeable future be the ruling YAP, with the ideological base of strong statehood and a heavy role for the government; and the other is likely to be a united opposition with an ideological base liberalism and smaller central government.

CONCLUSIONS: The parliamentary elections in November 2005 will be a key test to the development of political processes in the country. Should the opposition be able to unite, as seem to be the case presently, they will be able to pose a credible challenge to the ruling party. At the same time, the unification of the opposition parties will pave the way for their long-term merger and the formation of unified opposition front. This, in turn, could become the beginning of a large political force in a bi-party system, where rivalries between individual parties are less relevant. The abolishment of proportional system of elections will play a crucial role in the formation of such a system. Although it has several known shortcomings such as a lack of choice for voters, it can nevertheless boast with a record of a more stable system of government than a multi-party system.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Fariz Ismailzade is a freelance analyst on Caucasus politics and economics. He received his master’s degree from Washington University in St. Louis and is a regular correspondent for various international media outlets.

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