BACKGROUND: On November 23, 2003 popular protests, spearheaded by the key opposition parties – New National Movement and United Democrats – forced the ageing President Eduard Shevardnadze into resignation. Following this “Rose Revolution”, Georgian public voted the triad opposition leaders – Mikheil Saakashvili, Zurab Zhvania and Nino Burjanadze – overwhelmingly into the office. Analysts were suggesting initially, that the degree of hopes that Georgians pinned on the new government was unrealistically high. Responding to his own populist promises and public demands President Saakashvili undertook some drastic actions – such as arrests of the corrupt officials – which are now questioned on the grounds of human rights abuses. The most visible success of Saakashvili’s government was to restore control over the Adjara Autonomous Republic by forcing its maverick authoritarian leader, Aslan Abashidze, out of office. This success has extended the honeymoon period for Saakashvili, which ended only as his policies fell short of re-capturing breakaway South Ossetia and led to armed clashes in August 2004. The opposition and civil activists criticize the authorities for insufficient respect for human rights, for an attempt to build the new administration system on personal and partisan loyalty rather than merit-based competition, and in capping the freedom of media.

IMPLICATIONS: The criticisms of the Saakashvili administration have some grounds, but a superficial look is insufficient for making a judgment. The first year of the new government highlighted some key weaknesses of the Georgian political system which were obscured by the overwhelming impotence of Shevardnadze’s administration. A year after the Rose Revolution, it is clear that many institutions of the Georgian society, not only its government, need systemic overhaul. Saakashvili consolidated and centralized executive power. A bill was passed to grant the President the right to disband the parliament in specific cases, which according to some tilted the balance of power towards the legislature. Still, the Parliament got the rights to vote out the Cabinet, which was not possible under the previous system. Saakashvili also put in place a full-fledged cabinet of ministers capable of policy-setting led by the influential Prime Minister – Zurab Zhvania. Overwhelming support to his party granted the National Movement-Democrats coalition a constitutional majority at the Parliament. As National Movement-Democrats initially drew on a protest voters, many opposition parties lost their base of support. This has limited the partisan pluralism. Nonetheless, by fall 2004 opposition activism has resurfaced. Only the locus has shifted from still weak political parties to the civic movements, NGOs and professional unions. The debate over the draft Tax Code and the budget in October 2004 was spearheaded by the influential heads of parliamentary committees from the ruling party. This showed that the parliamentary majority is not necessarily a rubber stamp to government policies and that a healthy debate is possible. Further crystallization of dissenting opinions is likely to lead to reconstruction of the opposition political spectrum in the coming year. The private media, which built its popularity on slamming the resented Shevardnadze administration, chose to gloss over criticisms of the new government responding to the dominating public opinion. Georgian media boomed on the eve of November 2003 elections, as the financial tycoons invested heavily in the media, jockeying for influence. After the Rose Revolution, some of the media tycoons no longer considered this investment profitable and pulled the plug on private newspapers and TVs. The reputation of others, such as Erosi Kitsmarishvili of the influential Rustavi 2 station, was damaged due to very close links with the new authorities and political aspirations. This only highlighted how weak the financial base of the private Georgian media was and how extensively it was linked to the partisan groups of interest. New media regulations and legislation are needed to rectify the problem. The new liberal legislation on freedom of speech, which de-criminalized libel, was one step in supporting the freedom of media. A proposed bill on public broadcasting could represent yet another step. The heaviest criticism relates to continued human rights abuses and cases of torture by police and in preliminary detention facilities. The Minister of Interior and Prosecutor-General were forced to act on mounting criticism on October 18 as they announced creation of 47 independent teams under the Ombudsman’s Office, authorized to check all police detention premises at all times to record and prevent the cases of police brutality. The Prosecutor-General also announced that two high-ranking policemen were dismissed for malpractice and that criminal charges were brought against them. Apparently, the Human Rights groups maintain the clout to challenge the top levels of authority and demanding policy adjustments. Perhaps the biggest institutional failure of the new authorities lies in apparent de-facto restrictions on the independence of the judiciary. Observers noted that judges exercise political self-censorship in sensitive cases and lean towards the decisions they think are endorsed by the authorities. President Saakashvili himself repeatedly made statements that could have been seen as prejudicing the court. As a result, in all of the high-profile corruption cases the courts ordered pre-trial detention of the accused, a measure that is to be applied in very limited cases according to a “strict” interpretation of the Criminal Procedure Code. Human rights activists say that the accused were subjected to pressure, in some cases amounting to torture, to admit guilt and compensate for damages as assessed by the prosecution. Saakashvili’s administration faces daunting problems as the lack of educated and professional cadres in all walks of governance is apparent. It has taken some drastic steps to shake up some of the most stagnant and corrupt institutions – such as the ministry of defense and the traffic police. Nonetheless, critics point out that most appointments at the middle-management level are done based on personal and partisan loyalty. Reform of the civil service is lagging, while merit-based competitions for public positions are still few and far between.

CONCLUSIONS: Despite encouraging signs, the political landscape in Georgia remains in flux. The task for the new Georgian authorities in 2005 is to establish lasting, institutional changes. Analysts say the primary task of the new government is to tame the revolutionary spirit and revert to routine, transparent ways of governance. Saakashvili suggested that with passing the new Tax Code and the Law on Financial Amnesty the revolutionary stage of his government ends and the building stage begins. Progress will also depend on Saakashvili’s ability to act as more of a consensus-builder. His motivational leadership skills are apparent, but disdain for criticism has alienated some of his own allies. In 2005 the government must be able to deliver better thought-through policies, based on consultation with interested stakeholders. Smooth operation of the government and president’s public relations and information services, so far rather neglected, is important for bringing the message out. The new government also needs to cherish the support of Georgia’s pro-democratic middle-class, and invest in expanding its ranks by policies that encourage entrepreneurship, research and education.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Jaba Devdariani is the founder of Civil Georgia (civil.ge) and a works at the OSCE mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina.