BACKGROUND:The ensuing struggle has resulted in a number of resignations and appointments, including the appointment of Nodar Khabasha, who openly stated that he was sent directly by Russian President Vladimir Putin to help “stabilize” the situation in Abkhazia as well as the resignation of the Chairman of the CEC as well as the filing for resignation by the Chairman of the regional Supreme Court; it has not, however, resulted in a final President-elect. Abkhazia has practiced de-facto independence since it split from Georgia after a civil war in 1992-93, a war that was clearly won through Russian intervention. Since that time the breakaway republic has had only one president, Vladislav Ardzinba, who assumed power before the war had even played itself out and was ultimately elected president in the first two presidential elections held in the region, in 1994 and 1999. A two-term limit imposed by the self-styled Abkhazian constitution dictates that a new President will lead the country during one of the most crucial times for the de-facto republic. Although five candidates were officially registered in the elections, only two, Khajimba and Bagapsh, were considered as having legitimate chances for victory; Khajimba because he was supported by both the outgoing President and the Kremlin; Bagapsh because of the backing he received from the two main opposition movements in the region, Amtskhara and United Abkhazia, and, as it turns out, because of his loose ties to the Georgian population. During Ardzinba’s rein as President, a small but significant portion of the 250,000 Georgian Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) returned to the Gali District of Abkhazia. Because of this factor, the Gali District has become the central focus of controversy during the recent elections. Bagapsh, who is married to a Georgian, is considered a heavy favorite in this particular voting district, but Khajimba is claiming that a number of votes were cast by people carrying Georgian passports and not the required Russian or Soviet passport. Both Sergey Bagapsh and Raul Khajimba share similar political backgrounds, having both served as Prime Minister of the breakaway republic. But the roles they played during their time as Prime Minister greatly differ, a fact that may have heavily influenced the surprising outcome of the region’s third ever presidential election—the first election wherein voters where given an actual choice of candidates. Bagapsh, who currently heads the Abkhazian Power Company ChernoMorEnergo, was Prime Minister of the de facto republic from 1997-2001, a time wherein the real danger of a renewed conflict with Georgia existed and an outbreak of violence did occur in the region in the spring of 1998 which ultimately led to the evacuation of some 30,000 ethnic Georgians from Abkhazia. During this time period, however, President Ardzinba was strongly exerting his executive authority and the Prime Minister played a very secondary role, so much so that ex- President of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze once commented that Bagapsh never passed a resolution without President Ardzinba. Khajimba, on the other hand, had been Prime Minister for the last year and a half before stepping down to run in the October elections, a time in which the current head of the republic has been too ill to even make public appearances – thus allowing Khajimba to assume many of the presidential duties. This situation may have directly influenced voters who are dissatisfied with the situation in Abkhazia and viewed Khajimba as an incumbent candidate.

IMPLICATIONS:Post-“Rose Revolution” Georgia is prioritizing territorial integrity as the number one domestic policy pursued by President Mikhail Saakashvili’s government. With the recent re-integration of the Adjara Autonomous Republic back into Georgia and continual actions taking place in Georgia’s other de-facto republic of South Ossetia, Abkhazia is facing a heightened amount of political pressure to begin resolving the conflict in the region. The newly elected President will have to contend with a steadily growing population of ethnic Georgians in the region, the Washington-backed Saakashvili regime as well as Russia’s agenda, recently increased in the region after the Beslan tragedy, all the while maintaining the self interests of the breakaway republic and preserving its ultimate goal of independence. The recent election, to some degree, has shown that Abkhazia is doing just that—looking after its own affairs by distancing itself slightly from Russia, its most staunch ally. The initial reports by the election committee harmonized with Russia’s desires for the region, but when these reports were later refuted by the regional CEC who openly declared Bagapsh the outright victor, Abkhazia has seemingly refuted Moscow by letting them know that their support is not enough to decide a presidential election and that any future move towards independence may be assisted, but not directed, by the Kremlin. This recognition of the voting potential in the Gali District also alludes to the fact that Abkhazia is ready to make steps towards accepting this Georgian minority as part of their overall push towards independence.

CONCLUSIONS:As Abkhazia sorts out its election entanglement and waits for a Supreme Court decision regarding a potential re-vote, both official Tbilisi and official Moscow must begin structuring a new Abkhazia policy based on this latest maneuver by the de-facto authorities in the region to exert further independence from both sides. While Tbilisi tows the line that it makes no difference which candidate wins the presidential elections in Abkhazia and Bagapsh assures that his victory will result in Abkhazia moving further in the direction of Russia, it appears that the surprising October 3 elections will force both sides to re-evaluate these positions. By openly refusing the ascension of the Russian-backed candidate to the position of President, Abkhazian officials have clearly defined a more limited role for Russia in the political atmosphere of the republic. And Tbilisi, for its part, must begin grappling with a new scenario that could lead to more direct negations with the de-facto authorities, without the underlying presence of the Kremlin. While these new developments may not lead to large changes in the crisis in the immediate future, they could very well open the door for a much needed fresh approach to the stalemated crisis.

AUTHOR’S BIO:John Mackedon is a former Peace Corps Volunteer in the Republic of Georgia who is now based in Tbilisi and works as an editor for the online publication Civil Georgia and a correspondent and analyst for the International Relations and Security Network internet publication.