IMPLICATIONS: The official first-round results gave Otan 60.6 percent, followed by Ak Zhol with 12.0 percent, Asar with 11.4 percent, and AIST with 7.1 percent. (the law establishes a threshold of 7 percent to gain representation.) The 77-member Majilis is elected through 67 single-member constituencies and 10 seats elected by party lists. The law mandates a second-round run-off if no candidate receives 50 percent of the vote in a given constituency. Forty-five of the 67 deputies were elected in the first round, and of these 33 are from Otan, nine from AIST, and two from Asar with eight independents. Ak Zhol won representation only through the party-list voting, with one of the ten deputies elected by that method; Otan took seven of the others, with Asar and AIST each also taking one. Otan is thus guaranteed 40 of the 77 seats even before the second round takes place. The CPK/DCK bloc won no seats under either method. The only member of Nazarbaev\'s cabinet to belong to either Ak Zhol or DCK, the Ak Zhol leader Altynbek Sarsenbaev, appointed July 12 as information minister (a post he held under Nazarbaev for much of the 1990s), resigned in protest against alleged widespread fraud. Russian and CIS observers have stated that the elections were satisfactory, while an official American statement has declared them to be more democratic than past elections in Kazakhstan. The OSCE report took note of improvements over 1999 but remained critical and gave detail of numerous shortcomings, including media bias and voter intimidation. One positive factor favoring progress is the ongoing generational change in the Kazakhstani elite that empirical sociological research has established to be taking place. DCK embodies this inevitable movement; it and Ak Zhol grew out of the need for and constituency of younger and technocratic managers. Ak Zhol is well-connected among the ethnic Kazakh business elite that has emerged since independence. However, the extension of Ak Zhol\'s or DCK\'s influence and the prospect for ultimate political reform are complicated by the fact that procedures for political decision-making remain far from routinized and rationalized. An aide to President Nazarbaev has recently opined that, on the basis of the announced results, Otan should be considered Kazakhstan\'s \"ruling party\" and be institutionalized as such. It is not out of the question that a \"one-party-dominant\" system in Kazakhstan around a pro-presidential (rather than \"ruling\") party may lead to a genuine multiparty system that culminates in the legitimate alternation of another party in power: Mexico followed a similar pattern in the twentieth century. If that occurs, Kazakhstan\'s level of social and economic development suggests that it should not be necessary to wait, as did Mexico, many decades for this to come to pass. Also the cultural requisites for a multiparty system are better established in Kazakhstan. In India, the alternation in power of another party occurred in three decades after independence, a period only twice the present lifetime of sovereign Kazakhstan. Nevertheless, the present political system remains highly \"presidential\" with little substantive role for parliament. The question for Kazakhstan, under its present constitution, is whether the political executive will allow a multiparty system genuinely to emerge.
CONCLUSIONS: The greatest fundamental restraint on democratization in Kazakhstan is continuing restriction upon the growth of socio-economic strata interested in and capable of supporting real alternative parties. There is no growth in Kazakhstan of an upper-middle-class to complement its emerging lower-middle-class. It is still easy to establish a modest small enterprise but much more difficult to expand into, or to establish outright, a more substantial medium-sized enterprise. This results from conscious policy decisions at the highest leadership levels. The second, and related, greatest problem is the absence of a public sphere. \"Social opinion\" exists in Kazakhstan but it would be incorrect to speak of \"public opinion,\" because there are no regular public forums for social opinion to aggregate, manifest politically, and engage in dialogue with officialdom. That is due to the second greatest fundamental restraint: the distortion of the media system, which remains under the direct and indirect control of members of the president\'s family, not least the president\'s daughter Dariga Nazarbaeva, head of the Asar party.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert M. Cutler