BACKGROUND: China’s increasing interest in Central Asia does not get a lot of analysis in the West. This is unfortunate because in terms of economic interest and military capability, China’s presence is steadily growing. In the last 12-18 months, it has finally begun to consummate energy deals with Kazakstan and Azerbaijan, and it has particularly asserted itself through the medium of the Shanghai Cooperative Organization or SCO. China has been the driving force pushing for an expansion of the SCO’s capabilities and range of activities, intending to make it a true collective security organization. Thus it has established a precedent here of committing its troops to come to the defense of other members if they are attacked by terrorists, separatists, fundamentalists etc., has conducted extensive military exercises inside China and in Central Asia with all the other members of the SCO, concluded bilateral exercises with Kyrgyzstan, and is about to undertake such exercises with Russia. More such exercises are imminent, as it has announced that it and Pakistan will undertake joint anti-terrorism drills in Xinjiang in August 2004. China has always been active in Central Asia and the presence of U.S. bases there since September 11 as well as Russia’s efforts to exclude it from a direct share of the region’s energy economy have galvanized its leadership into a comprehensive effort to enhance all the dimensions of China\'s presence in Central Asia. Russia\'s rejection of an earlier deal to pump oil from Siberia to China and its efforts to constrain Kazakhstan’s exports so that they only go through Russian pipelines created a perfect opportunity for invigorating Sino-Kazakh partnerships to complete the pipeline from Aktobe province to China through Xinjiang. Similarly, its acquiescence in the American military presence must have strengthened China’s resolve to make the SCO into a true security provider and to rely ever more on direct political and military links with Central Asian states that did not have to be mediated through Moscow. China has also alertly seized upon strains in Uzbekistan’s relations with Washington and inside the country as an abortive uprising took place there in March, to conclude a new pact with Tashkent that obliges the latter to further circumscribe Uighur activities inside Uzbekistan and thus allay Chinese fears of the continuing insurgent movement inside Xinjiang. There is little doubt that doing everything possible to consolidate Beijing’s hold over that province is one of the drivers of Chinese policy in all dimensions in Central Asia: economic, political and military. But beyond the pact with Uzbekistan and the energy ties with Kazakstan and Azerbaijan, what is most striking are the military moves underway. IMPLICATIONS: As part of its deal with Uzbekistan and as part of its broader policies to the other members of the SCO and throughout Central Asia, China is strengthening its military capacity and legitimacy to intervene in the area should a crisis develop. This policy involves not just extensive exercises with all SCO members and bilateral ones with Kyrgyzstan, it also entails strengthening the real capacity of the SCO to function as a kind of political alliance that provides genuine regional collective security. Second, it is strengthening its bilateral linkages with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular, but more generally with the other members as well. Thus increasing amounts of bilateral military assistance are going to these states and the signs of coordination in intelligence on terrorism are multiplying as they crack down on Uighur movements in their homelands to retain China’s friendship. Indeed, for Beijing such crackdowns have increasingly become preconditions for any kind of friendly relationship with Central Asian states and the provision of desperately needed aid. Third, to strengthen China’s cooperation with Pakistan and its position in South Asia as well as in Central Asia, it is undertaking anti-terror drills with Pakistan in August, 2004. It is holding out the prospect of using Xinjiang as a laboratory for increased cooperation with Pakistan, thereby tempting Islamabad with the possibility of realizing a long held vision of greater trade with Xinjiang and Central Asia. These exercises, which will occur in the Tashkorgan Tajik Autonomous County in the Uighur Autonomous Region of China, aim to send a message to India as well as to insurgents, but they also reinforce the idea that China remains a reliable and ready protector of the region against military action by terrorists, fundamentalists, and separatists. These new exercises also represent a reward for Pakistan, which finally got rid of some of the leading terrorists wanted by China who were hiding in or operating out of Pakistan. China, at one point, even went public about these activities, a sure sign of its displeasure with Pakistan, because such issues were usually handled in private. Pakistan got the message and in raids earlier this year killed Hasan Mahsum, a leading Chinese Muslim separatist leader and bète noire of Beijing.

CONCLUSIONS: China’s comprehensive policies in Central Asia appear to represent the elements of an across-the-board strategy to enhance every dimension of its capabilities and its security as regards Xinjiang and Central Asia in general. These moves also tell us that an exclusive focus on Chinese military operations as they pertain to Taiwan risks losing sight of the fact that China sees Central Asia as a potential theater of military operations and is taking steps to be ready to fight there and project its military as well as economic power beyond its borders. As China’s overall capabilities grow, there should be little doubt that both its interest in projecting those capabilities into Central Asia and its ability to do so will grow as well. Consequently, those who say that the great game is over are only seeing half the picture. It is true that increasingly it looks like nobody will secure a monopoly over energy assets in Central Asia, but that does not stop the competition for strategic access and influence in the region because Central Asia’s importance goes beyond energy, no matter how significant energy is. China, like the other players, understands that and is therefore augmenting its capabilities to play a comprehensive role in the area. Failing to pay sufficient attention to China’s activities, we only ignore them at our and Central Asia’s peril.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War college, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Dept., or the U.S. Government.