BACKGROUND: The interim Constitutional Council – consisting of state officials, parliamentary deputies, political parties and non-governmental organizations – suggested amendments to the Constitution in 2002. One of the recommendations was the introduction of a party list electoral system. However, in February 2003, the party list electoral system provision was removed from the agenda by a presidential task force. All candidates for parliamentary election must run as individuals, not party nominees. In December 2003, an array of parliamentarians appealed to the Constitutional Court to preserve the party list electoral system. This petition was recently rejected by the Court. Since 1995, changes in the parliamentary structure had increasingly impeded the development of political parties as functioning and policy-oriented institutions. As a result of these changes, the activity of political parties in the next parliament are set to be considerably diminished after the forthcoming elections. Last March, during the visit of Kyrgyz opposition parties to the United States, high-ranking State Department officials stressed that elections should lead to changes in the power structure of Kyrgyzstan. In late May, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lynn Pascoe and U.S. Ambassador to the OSCE Stephan Minikes visited Bishkek to remind the Kyrgyz leadership that Kyrgyzstan still ranks as the most democratic country in Central Asia. Widespread and influential Russian mass media nevertheless rapidly shaped opinion among the Kyrgyz political elite regarding the possibility of an export of the Georgian “Rose Revolution”. The statements of U.S. officials were perceived by the Kyrgyz authorities as a threat to the existing political regime. Top officials of Kyrgyzstan appear to have come to believe that another “Rose Revolution” is being promoted by the U.S. and western governments.

IMPLICATIONS: In late May, former Security Council Secretary Misir Ashirkulov founded the Civic Union For Fair Elections. It includes four opposition leaders and one pro-presidential deputy. In an interview with local mass media, Mr. Ashirkulov states that he strives to be a mediator between the Government and the opposition, as well as to provide for fair and open parliamentary and presidential elections in 2005, without “any velvet revolutions”. Ashirkulov’s statement was officially welcomed by the new pro-presidential party “Alga, Kyrgyzstan”. Thus, the Georgian Rose Revolution has brought to light many concerns and challenges within the political leadership of Kyrgyzstan itself, that are mouting as elections are nearing. Concerned with the international support for opposition leaders as well as increasing resistance from political opponents in the south of the country, key strategists of the presidential administration are working to prevent the scenario of a “velvet revolution” in Kyrgyzstan. However, the following question arises: what common interests unify Misir Ashirkulov, Akayev’s close associate, with the President’s rivals and opponents like Omurbek Tekebaev, Adakhan Madumarov, and Emil Aliev (of the “Ar-Namys” party)? First, some might argue that having used Mr. Ashirkulov as the mediator, the presidential strategists struck a bargain with opposition figures, promising them financial support during the next election in exchange for a promise not to provoke a “Rose Revolution”. Second, another aim of this political maneuver might be to prepare favorable conditions for the transfer of power to a successor, if the current head of the state is aggressively pressured by the world community. In an interview with local opposition newspapers, Akayev’s potential rival Feliks Kulov (who is still in prison), points out that Akayev will not run in the next presidential election. Therefore, by joining this Union, Kulov hopes to push his party members into the parliament, thus creating preconditions for his long-term political plans. Another rival, the President’s opponent and former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiev, has been recently nominated as a presidential candidate by several members of the radically-inclined southern opposition. As a reaction to this, Kyrgyz authorities set up the Presidential Support Fund in the south, which collects voters’ signatures in favor of nation-wide referenda. As a second choice, supporters might suggest conducting a referendum to extend Akayev’s term. Despite the ongoing crisis of presidential power over the past several years, the Kyrgyz Head of State has attempted time and again to prolong his tenure. For the decision to quit his post depends not only on Akayev himself, but also on his family clan. During the past few years, Akayev’s family has become his “key advisor” on many presidential initiatives. His family clan has profoundly penetrated all spheres of politics: from personnel policy to business. It has been able to surround itself with Kemin and Talas fellows, from Akayev’s and his wife’s native regions in the northern part of Kyrgyzstan. To a certain degree, the family shares its power with fellow members of the tribes, and thus bears certain responsibilities for them. Representatives from other parts of the north are still in power as well, thanks to old communist ties and patronage. Because of fear of losing power and access to finance, they also stand behind President Akayev. Meanwhile, there are among state officials those who have been selected for their reformist initiatives, professional background, or technical skills. However, they are few and represent neither support for, nor a threat to, the incumbent power.

CONCLUSIONS: Current political events suggest that “Rose Revolution” will not occur during the Kyrgyz election. First, unlike their Georgian colleagues, the Kyrgyzstan opposition figures have so far failed to become a consolidated driving force against the ruling regime, as most of them discredited themselves by championing private rather than party interests. The majority of the political parties are shaped around personalities or narrow, tribal, or regional interests. Second, although as in Georgia some Kyrgyzstani non-governmental organizations and mass media outlets demonstrate strong independence, they are still unable to replace the incumbent ruling elite. The political space for arguments and debates among opposition NGOs and mass media are becoming increasingly limited. Since their financial sustainability is fragile and depends on grants, civil society organizations do not have the additional financial resources to confront governmental policies. Unlike was the case in Georgia, in Kyrgyzstan many private mass-media are controlled by pro-presidential business groups that shape a positive perception of ruling regime among public. Truly independent corporate businesses able to support mass media or NGOs have not been formed yet. In the meantime, the upcoming national elections may become crucial and decisive not only for Kyrgyzstan, but also for neighbors whose political regimes are more autocratic. A positive democratic outcome of both the parliamentary and presidential elections could have a regional effect and spark political reform in neighboring countries.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ainura Cholponkulova is a Fulbright Scholar at the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at SAIS. In Kyrgyzstan she heads the \"Initiative\" Center, a policy research and training organization. She is also a Professor at the School of International Relations, Kyrgyz National University.