BACKGROUND: By March 2004 it seemed clear that Russian troops and advisors were going to leave Tajikistan. Yet it also seemed that Tajik-Russian relations were good and improving. Key Tajik officials certainly made public statements to that fact and did so even into May, even granting the necessity of a base for Russian forces there. Nevertheless on March 1 the Tajik and Kazakh governments signed an agreement creating a basis for deepening cooperation between them as part of NATO’s Partnership for Peace program. This agreement occurred during a time when Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rakhmonov decisively moved against some of his own military advisors to begin reforming the Tajik armed forces with evident Russian and NATO support. Three days later, it was revealed that talks with Russia over a new base were deadlocked. Tajikistan wanted complete operational command control over this base and its infrastructure during times of threat. It also wanted what Russian authorities claimed were exorbitant financial payments for leasing the base, or the writing off of Tajikistan’s debt to Russia. For its part, Russia wanted a base not just for the 201st division and the FSB troops on the border but also to protect the “Nurek” space complex as part of its space and missile defense systems. And it certainly did not want to pay for these privileges. Even so, its desire for the base gave Tajikistan some leverage. The Russian forces in Tajikistan are being reorganized to form part of the broader forces of the new Russian-led Collective Treaty Security Organization (CSTO) in Central Asia. Nonetheless, this amenability did not lead to resolution of the financial or status of forces issues surrounding the 201st division or the Nurek facility and the new base that Russia wanted to build. By early May, Tajikistan had decided to send Russian military advisors home and was exploring new ways to defend the border including the phasing out of Russian troops. Tajikistan was demanding that Russia assume Tajikistan’s $300 million debts, pay another $50 million for Nurek, and grant Rakhmonov emergency command over the 201st division in an emergency. Although this decision reflected Tajikistan’s greater sense of security than at any time in the past, Russian officials and commanders immediately complained that the Tajiks could not defend the border against narcotics like they could or maintain the infrastructure they had built and launched a press campaign to that effect. Since there had been numerous scandals involving Russian troops themselves moving large amounts of narcotics to Russia, for example shipping drugs in military transports from Tajikistan, this argument is suspect and might conceal the usual reluctance of the Russian military establishment to yield any of the remaining “wrecks of empire” that it still owns. Given the neo-imperial mentality that dominates the Ministry of Defense and the Russian political elite, this motive seems to be equally as important as more practical, tactical, considerations. Russia’s unhappiness quickly expressed itself in a crackdown on Tajik migrant workers, whose remittances home are vital to Tajikistan’s economy. At the same time Tajikistan was establishing highly improved relations with Washington, including signing the agreement that gave U.S. soldiers immunity from the International Criminal Court. India too established a base in Tajikistan. All these actions indicate Tajikistan’ increasingly open efforts to move away from dependence upon Moscow and Russia\'s ire over this turn of events.

IMPLICATIONS: Russian reports were contradictory, some saying a retreat was taking place and other officials contradicting this and saying that a tactical group would be placed in Tajikistan. Thus matters continued until the announcement of June 4 which apparently represents Tajikistan’s surrender to Russian pressure. It appears that Russia successfully prevailed here by assuming some of Tajikistan’s debts and will invest in Tajikistan’s energy sector, particularly the Sangtuda hydroelectric station. As long as Tajikistan continues to invest in this project, Russia will suspend its interest payments but when the project is finished Russia will own part of it through the UES monopoly, another example of the liberal empire program sponsored by UES chairman Anatoly Chubais. It also conforms to Russia’s established practice of taking equity in key sectors in return for CIS countries’ debts. What made Tajikistan change its mind is not clear, but it is unlikely that it would have abandoned its earlier position so completely without such pressures being employed. Thus Russia will retain its military presence there and continue in its accelerating efforts to make the CSTO into a viable military force and representative of Russian interests in Central Asia. These events reveal many key aspects of the ongoing great game in Central Asia. First, regardless of protestations of win-win or mutual benefit, Russia regards the area as an exclusive sphere of influence, especially in military terms. Thus in the same interview that he lamented that Russia was leaving Tajikistan, Deputy Foreign Minister Trubnikov forcefully reiterated Russia\'s opposition to any foreign military presence in Central Asia. Second, Moscow will not hesitate to use all the instruments of power to achieve that goal. Today that largely means economic pressures such as debt for equity swaps but it could increasingly mean military ones as well. Third, Russian actions evidently confirm American reports in testimony to Congress by the heads of the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency that Russia now knows where it wants to deploy its military and is moving to do so. Fourth, Russia’s sense of threat from foreign influence in Central Asia is overwhelming and will probably preclude efforts to arrive at multilateral cooperation there. Fifth, while this rivalry creates opportunities for Central Asian governments to play off rival great powers, it also could lead to heavy-handed efforts to pressure them into acquiescence in agreements contrary to their interests. This would especially pertain to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the two most vulnerable states to foreign pressure.

CONCLUSIONS: By inference, these events underscore the importance for the United States, if it wishes to maintain its presence in the region, to develop appropriate instruments for training and development of indigenous military forces from among Central Asian governments so that they do not have to look to Moscow for help. The same principle applies to economic policies because these states are and will long remain vulnerable to foreign economic pressure, particularly if they do not begin to undertake serious economic and political reforms that can only strengthen their own independence and sovereignty – the stated goals of U.S. policy – over the long run.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Professor Stephen Blank, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War college, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013. The views expressed here do not in any way represent those of the U.S. Army, Defense Department, or the U.S. Government.