Wednesday, 25 February 2004

ANTI-DRUG EFFORTS OF KAZAKHSTAN: OLD METHODS IN NEW GARBS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Marat Yermukanov (2/25/2004 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: A recently released report of the Healthcare Ministry of Kazakhstan states that the number of officially registered drug users rose from 49,700 in 2002 to 52,800 in 2003. Non-government organizations call these statistics into question, suspecting that these figures are underreported. According to their estimates at least 350,000 people in Kazakhstan regularly use various kinds of drugs and intoxicating substances.
BACKGROUND: A recently released report of the Healthcare Ministry of Kazakhstan states that the number of officially registered drug users rose from 49,700 in 2002 to 52,800 in 2003. Non-government organizations call these statistics into question, suspecting that these figures are underreported. According to their estimates at least 350,000 people in Kazakhstan regularly use various kinds of drugs and intoxicating substances. Both official and independent statistics are hard to verify, since the majority of drug addicts dodge treatment and remain unregistered. Local authorities always tend to file false reports to higher government offices trying to whitewash their own failures in combating drug addiction. Even so, patches of information coming from the Interior Ministry clearly indicate that drug use is on the rise. In the former capital Almaty, 600 drug dealers were detained by police in 2002. Last year more than 800 were caught in that city for the same crime. Ironically, Kazakhstan, which has raised the healthy-way-of-life slogan to the level of national policy, has gradually, and easily, become the most frequently used conduit in drug trafficking. Kazakhstan’s anti-drug units have failed to bring under full control the notorious smuggling southern route linking Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan. Hopes that poppy plantations in Afghanistan would be destroyed after the fall of Taliban led nowhere; instead, with increasing production figures in Afghanistan, particularly in the Badakhshan province bordering Central Asia, narcotics are still pouring in from that region. Via Northern Kazakhstan, drugs are brought to Russian and European consumers, primarily by rail. According to some estimates, 20% of Afghan drugs on the way to Russia settle down in Kazakhstan. The national Law Statistics and Information Center (LSIC) states that last year, 264 cases of trafficking by railway were registered and 253 cases were brought to court. Perhaps the most alarming sign is the spread of narcotics use among the Kazakhstani youth. Not long ago, the leading government paper “Kazakhstanskaya Pravda” ran an article showing that drug dealing has already wormed its way into the prestigious Eurasian University, a place often visited by the president of the country and foreign guests. The article said that any amount of hashish could be bought in the University canteen. In night clubs, young people get high on Extasy pills imported from Europe. Broadly speaking, a narcotic substance can be bought at any drugstore.

IMPLICATIONS: As if these developing trends are not bad enough, what is more depressing is that police forces and criminal gangs tend to blend. This month, two police officers from Shymkent were sentenced to 14 and 15 years of prison terms and confiscation of their property for attempting to sell 5 kilograms of heroin. This is the maximum punishment for drug dealing according to Article 259 of the Penal Code. “We must toughen the punishment” says deputy Justice Minister Johann Merkel. Security bodies and police clash quite often, accusing each other in assisting to drug dealers. One of the long-standing problems for Kazakhstan is the wild-grown hemp of the Chu valley in southern Kazakhstan, a vast space of 130,000 hectares which annually produces 145 tons of marijuana and 6 tons of hashish. The area attracts drug traffickers from all CIS countries. According to information of the Interior Ministry, 70% of the addicts use the cheapest drugs made from the Chu hemp. Local people believe that hemp-related drugs, commonly called “trafka” (“grass”) in vernacular language, pose no serious health hazards. This error dampens down public awareness to the consequences of drug use. Analysts from the LSIC cite the South, Central, and West Kazakhstan regions and in particular the cities of Karaganda, Pavlodar, Shymkent, Atyrau and Almaty as areas of intensive drug trafficking. High unemployment, boredom and desperation drive the youth in the South into the arms of narcotics traders. Many of them are lured by the high prices offered for drugs if sold in Russia. In Kyzylorda (South Kazakhstan) a kilogram of marijuana costs less than $200. In Moscow the same amount of marijuana can be sold for $500. The difference of $300 is quite a fortune for unemployed people. The Mangystau region in West Kazakhstan is another potential “goldmine” for drug dealers. Some addicts have taken up the drug habit at the age of 12. The local rehabilitation center can offer only 30 beds, only half of the needed. After Aktau seaport on the Caspian was put into operation, the volume of maritime trade with Russia and Iran has considerably increased. But Kazakh coastal guards were ill-prepared to cope with the growing flow of drug traffic. There have been reports of North Caucasian gangs smuggling in weapons and drugs across the Caspian sea using fishing boats. Other international linkages are also problematic, including diplomatic couriers: in May 2000, a diplomatic row broke out when the Kazakh police seized 86 kilos of heroin hidden in the car of a high-ranking Tajik diplomat.

CONCLUSIONS: The Kazakh Government admits that without full cooperation with the international community, every effort to curb drug trafficking will remain fruitless. Meanwhile, anti-drug activities are limited to old methods of occasional police crackdowns, lectures, formal campaigns, acting on tight instructions from superiors and window-dressing at lower levels. The only thing that is new is the phraseology about the threat to national security posed by drug addiction.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Marat Yermukanov is a Kazakhstan-based freelance writer.

Read 3995 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

  

2410Starr-coverSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Greater Central Asia as A Component of U.S. Global Strategy, October 2024. 

Analysis Laura Linderman, "Rising Stakes in Tbilisi as Elections Approach," Civil Georgia, September 7, 2024.

Analysis Mamuka Tsereteli, "U.S. Black Sea Strategy: The Georgian Connection", CEPA, February 9, 2024. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, ed., Türkiye's Return to Central Asia and the Caucasus, July 2024. 

ChangingGeopolitics-cover2Book Svante E. Cornell, ed., "The Changing Geopolitics of Central Asia and the Caucasus" AFPC Press/Armin LEar, 2023. 

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell and S. Frederick Starr, Stepping up to the “Agency Challenge”: Central Asian Diplomacy in a Time of Troubles, July 2023. 

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AM

Silk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.



 

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter