BACKGROUND: Having obtained over 96% of the vote in the 4 January 2004 elections, and significant support from Western leaders, President Mikheil Saakashvili has a unique opportunity to address the deep political and developmental crisis facing Georgia by embarking on substantial reforms. One of his greatest challenges is to increase the state’s legitimacy and efficiency after a revolution that demonstrated the population’s deep dissatisfaction with government. The 1995 Constitution of Georgia provided for three distinct branches of government, and a clear system of “checks and balances.” Unlike in other countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the Parliament was an engaged and transparent institution. Political debate and access to decision-making existed within its halls. However in practice, power was centralized in the hands of the President. As the head of the executive, he appointed ministers and regional governors. He could be impeached only if found guilty of a crime by the Supreme or Constitutional Court. The Constitution also established a highly centralized state where the internal territorial division of the country was to be determined “after the full restoration of the jurisdiction of Georgia over the whole territory of the country” (Art 2.3) Reforms of state structures were arguably necessary for two reasons. Firstly, they were needed to help restore citizens’ trust in government and sense of engagement in decision-making. Secondly, they were essential to facilitate decentralization and prepare the ground for national reconciliation with breakaway Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The amendments that passed at a special Parliamentary session on 5-6 February gave the President the right to dissolve Parliament – when it fails to ratify the budget – and to dismiss the Cabinet of Ministers. The post of Prime Minister was created to head the Cabinet of Ministers. President Saakashvili, who had repeatedly promised that the position will go to his revolutionary ally Zurab Zhvania, appointed the latter subsequently. With three fifths of its members, the Parliament will be able to pass a vote of no confidence against the government but not to impeach the President. The amendments will not effect Presidential control over the appointments of governors and the ministers of defense, interior and security.

IMPLICATIONS: The constitutional amendments have been the subject of heated discussion in Georgia among policy makers, government officials and NGO activists for the past weeks. Domestic analysts and legal experts tend to consider that the amendments strengthen the presidential system and maintain a centralized state. The President is likely to play a key role in the country’s transformation, largely guiding and regulating state institutions and political processes. The Prime Minister will be answerable first and foremost to the President. On the flip side, however, it is unlikely that citizens and political parties will be guaranteed maximum public participation and the necessary tools to engage in decision-making. Another concern is the extent to which the model of a strong and centralized state will mesh with alternative models calling for the transformation of Georgia into a loose federation. Abkhazian, South Ossetian and Ajarian conceptions of the central state are likely to be much more minimalist than the one being currently envisaged. They are likely to envision a self-restrained central government that shares much decision and policy making with federal bodies, if they at all are to think of taking part in a Georgian state. By rushing the passage of the amendments, President Saakasvhili did not promote a democratic process. He urged Parliament to vote before he was to appoint the new government, thus reducing the time available for public discussion. According to law, amendments to the Constitution are to be made public for discussion one month before being voted upon. The President nevertheless denied the public an opportunity for full participation, claiming that the amendments had been a subject of public debate since May 2001. With Parliamentary elections due on 28 March, he also tasked a de-legitimized and weak body - which was elected in 1999 - to decide upon an issue of fundamental importance for the future of the state.

CONCLUSIONS: Mikheil Saakashvili’s policy decisions will be closely scrutinized and measured against his pledge to advance democracy and conflict resolution. With a significantly weakened political opposition Saakashvili had little need to bargain to guarantee that his amendments passed in Parliament – though the Traditionalists Party, as well as the Socialists and several independent MPs made highly critical statements in Parliament on 5-6 February. Saakashvili and Zhvania successfully outweighed Nino Burjanadze, former Interim President and current Speaker of Parliament, and their erstwhile revolutionary ally. However, Saakashvili should be wise to consider how the reforms will affect political competition and public participation in the future and promote power sharing. This is particularly important when the amendment issue is linked to the negotiation process with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Since independence, each new government in Georgia has been able to work under the constitution of its choosing. The Georgian constitution has been repeatedly amended. Today, it risks becoming a document that is more widely identified with the party in power then as a representation of the fundamental law of Georgia.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Sabine Freizer is completing her PhD at the Center for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics and is an independent political analyst on the Caucasus and Central Asia.