Wednesday, 05 November 2003

ELECTIONS IN PARLIAMENT OF GEORGIA – TEST OF DEMOCRACY

Published in Analytical Articles

By Maia Gvritishvili (11/5/2003 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: The parliamentary elections were of great importance for Georgia. These elections were understood as a test of democracy which was all the more important as they formed a dress rehearsal for the Presidential Elections of 2005. Moreover, the parliamentary elections will bring forward the political spectrum that will govern the country in the post-Shevardnadze period.
BACKGROUND: The parliamentary elections were of great importance for Georgia. These elections were understood as a test of democracy which was all the more important as they formed a dress rehearsal for the Presidential Elections of 2005. Moreover, the parliamentary elections will bring forward the political spectrum that will govern the country in the post-Shevardnadze period. Domestic and western experts agree that no election held in a post-Soviet countries has elicited more international interest. The high number of observers, over 2,000, illustrates this. American interests have been most visible. After the visit of former secretary of state James Baker earlier this year, Senator John McCain visited Georgia in early October, reiterating America’s commitment to the accomplishment of fair and transparent elections in Georgia. According to Mark Malen, director of the National Democratic Institute, “the fate of the elections is in the hands of Georgia’s citizens”. He considered that all parties, in one way or another, should take responsibility for holding fair elections. The unrest following the presidential elections in Azerbaijan also affected the international community’s attitude. It was widely assumed in Georgia that international community would not be as lenient towards Georgia as it had been in Azerbaijan. This assumption was proven right as Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, declared Europe’s intent to strictly supervise the election process in Georgia, which will then demonstrate the future of Georgia’s ambition to be fully integrated in Euro Atlantic Space. Fears that Russia would utilize the election process to further the destabilization of Georgia were also rife before the elections. The array of forces contesting the elections were dominated by parties or alliances claiming to be in opposition, and in a sense competing with one another on being in true opposition. Three major political parties, which came out leading in pre-election ratings, are all originally breakaway factions of the formerly ruling “Citizens’ Union of Georgia”. First among these was the National Movement, led by former Justice Minister Michael Saakashvili. The National Movement won the local elections, putting Saakashvili as the Head of the Tbilisi city administration. The second block, the “Burjanadze Demcorats”, was an alliance of two former parliamentary speakers under Sheavrdnadze, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania. Finally, the New Rights party led by David Gamkrelidze and Levan Gachechiladze contested the last elections under the umbrella of the Citizens’ Union of Georgia. Aside from these, the Labor Party considers all the above parties for not being a true opposition. Likewise, the Revival Union (Agordzineba) was the main competitor of the Citizens’ Union previously, and is the ruling party of the Autonomous Republic of Adjara. The unification of the opposition, while strongly desired in society, was made impossible by the personal ambition of the various leaders, almost all of whom aspire openly or secretly to become the President of Georgia. The electorate, moreover, is mainly oriented toward the personality of the leaders and not on the political ideology or political/economic programs of the parties. Hence, all political parties are identified with its leader and not its political program, as is even clear from the commonly used names for these parties.

IMPLICATIONS: Just as had happened in Azerbaijan, the opposition made statements in the pre-election period that the falsification of the elections was inevitable. Once results were being generated, public demonstration that carried a potential of civil unrest also became all but inevitable. The events in Azerbaijan also led to an expectation of unrest following Georgia’s elections. Most controversy surrounded the voters’ registration lists, with the government, the opposition, the Central Election Commission and NGOs all accusing each other of falsifying the lists. However, opinion polls were also an important destabilizing factor in the election campaign. The discrepancy between the results of pre-election polls and the actual election results, as expected, became a major reason for unrest after the election. The preliminary official results showed the Governmental “For New Georgia” bloc leading with over 24% of the vote, followed by the National Movement with 22%, the Labor Party with 13%, the Burjanadze-Democrats with close to 9%, and the New Rights Party barely over the 7% threshold. While these results showed ca. 70% of the votes going to the opposition, they were also fiercely contested, as parallel tabulations and exit polls had all shown the National Movement over six percentage points ahead of the Governmental Bloc. Both official and independent results were most disappointing for the Burjanadze-Democrats, whose rating prior to the elections had varied between first and second place. International observers showed little leniency while assessing the elections. Mr. Bruce George, special coordinator of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, noted that “these elections have, regrettably, been insufficient to enhance the credibility of either the electoral or the democratic process”. Reports of voter intimidation, violence, ballot box stuffing, all came in gradually on election day, showing the government’s desire to secure continued control over the parliament.

CONCLUSIONS: While final results are not yet released, it is clear that the largest faction in parliament will be the governmental one, while the opposition, even by official results, won a large victory. The exact distribution of seats remains to be determined. The further development of events will depend less on the CEC final results than on the scope of opposition demonstrations. The prospects for instability, as well as the final reports of the international observers, will be the main factors determining Georgia’s future relationship with the international community. It is clear, however, that Shevardnadze position is increasingly fragile.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Maia Gvritishvili is a Tbilisi-based independent journalist.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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