BACKGROUND: The latest opinion poll conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) in April suggests that if elections were held “tomorrow”, the pro-presidential “Alliance for New Georgia” led by Shevardnadze (officially formed as an election bloc in March 2003 by Shevardnadze’s Citizens’ Union of Georgia, the rather weak Socialist and National Democratic parties, along with some influential, but discredited governors and the Greens), would barely clear the 7% threshold necessary to gain seats in the parliament. While the opposition is still fragmented, on the whole it enjoys considerable popular support. In the June 2002 local elections, the Labor Party and the National Movement Party, two populist parties running under the slogan of “Tbilisi without Shevardnadze” emerged on top of the race in the capital Tbilisi, clearly showing the increasing power of the protest vote. The CUG, the main pro-presidential party, failed to clear the election threshold in Tbilisi, after Zurab Zhvania, the former Chairman of Parliament was forced to leave it just several days before the elections. Since then, State Minister Avtandil Jorbenadze has assumed the leadership of the CUG, aiming to revamp the ailing party, albeit without convincing success. Despite low popular support and the weakness of its member political parties, the pro-presidential bloc ardently opposed some of the most popular opposition initiatives, such as the proposal of the United Democrats to increase minimum salary to 115 Laris (US$55). More recently, the pro-governmental factions of the government, supported by the majoritarian members of parliament, (MPs elected in single-mandate districts, who usually happen to be presidential supporters) have acted jointly to thwart a crucial compromise on electoral administration. This failure prompted a visit by an American Special Envoy, former Secretary of State James Baker, who “imposed” election guidelines (the “Baker Scorecard”) and brokered a compromise over the Central Electoral Committee composition. The election commissions at all levels should be composed of nine members proposed by the opposition and five members proposed by the pro-governmental forces. The Central Electoral Committee should be led by an independent, non-partisan and respected Head, who would be appointed by the OSCE Mission to Georgia. Both the government and the opposition have accepted Baker’s proposition, however it is far from clear whether and how this will materialize. The opposition parties have so far failed to agree how their nine seats will be divided, since the Industrialists and the Revival Union (Aslan Abashidze’s party) demand more than one seat. This continuing stalemate demonstrates the level of mistrust in the opposition. Yet the decision on the composition of the Central Electoral Committee is vital for the preparations for the November elections, as well as for securing international assistance for an orderly election process.

IMPLICATIONS: The inflexibility of both the pro-presidential block and the opposition has given current election race quite an unconstructive slant. The governmental parties are counting on discord within the opposition camp to prevent a broad and lasting opposition alliance. So far, this expectation has been met, as up to date the opposition leaders have failed to reach a consensus on the proper representation of their partisan interests within the future bloc, despite their repeatedly expressed willingness to form an election coalition. Both opposition leaders and independent observers agree that the key hope of electoral success for the “Alliance for a New Georgia” is their so-called “administrative resources” – in other words, the ability of the appointed provincial governors and other officials on governmental payroll to influence voters in areas they govern. The frequent visits of Avtandil Jorbenadze, the CUG leader, to the provinces aiming to create his party chapters “top down” while meeting with local government officials, support these fears. As a result, a dangerous trend emerged in the Georgian parliamentary election race. The blending of administrative powers and the pro-governmental election block feeds the frustration of the opposition with the government institutions. The opposition grows unequivocal in its condemnation of the current government, and President Shevardnadze personally. Even some of the more moderate figures, including former parliamentary chairman and leader of the United Democrats Zhvania, have adopted a radical discourse, including calling a June 3 protest rally for the resignation of Shevardnadze. This radicalization of the opposition, combined with popular dissent (support for the government was between 6 and 10 per cent over the last year), is further radicalizing the political culture in Georgia and bringing back elements of civil disobedience and violence. Electricity shortages triggered spontaneous protests against the government already in winter, and since then the frustration of the public and among the opposition has grown. Recently, public frustration found yet another escape valve in a student protest, movement “Kmara” (“Enough”) that styles itself after the Serbian “Otpor” which was instrumental in bringing down the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia. Kmara activists have already staged peaceful protests in several provinces.

CONCLUSIONS: As Georgia heads toward the elections that will define the partisan landscape after the end of Shevardnadze’s term in 2005, the country would benefit immensely from a constructive election race that would bring forward the platforms and agendas of the competing parties. The importance of these elections is well understood, as polls show that some 80 per cent of citizens intend to cast their vote in November. However, the apparent lack of willingness to cooperate on the part of the pro-governmental political forces triggers an aggressive response on the part of the opposition and civil pressure groups. Not only does such confrontational behavior impede the passing of the vital election legislation, but it also builds up a dangerous trend of public aggression against the already weak and under-performing institutions of the state. The international pressure applied from the OSCE, European governments, and, most visibly, from the United States on the Georgian authorities to ensure a fair election race and free and fair elections have not, so far, proven very productive. However, only continued national and international pressure both on the government and opposition forces can bring about a change of attitude to discussion of the vital legislative and political agendas.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Blanka Hancilova earned her doctoral degree at Charles University, currently she serves with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.