BACKGROUND: Georgia’s current reform of the security establishment encompasses the restructuring of institutions, separations of areas of responsibilities for the various ministries and departments, and increased civil control over the armed branches of the state. To this day, the impact has been less than modest. As far as the armed forces are concerned, training of staff and procurement of material and weapons have been undertaken within the U.S.-funded Train-and-Equip Program, whose importance for Georgia is illustrated by the fact that it has a budget twice the size of Georgian military spending. Despite the majors improvements made, it is yet unclear what kind of defense forces Georgia is opting for. This is partly due to the fact that the current national security concept incorporates as disparate issues as military affairs, education and culture. Since it is vague, incoherent and unclear, it is of little use as a guiding star in reform or policymaking. Likewise, the military doctrine of Georgia, dating from 1997, merely states political intentions - at best. It elucidates the tasks of the armed forces among others including protection of territorial integrity, assistance to civil society, and international peacekeeping. Currently this is an overwhelming task for the limited capabilities and scarce resources of the armed forces. Moreover, actions related to the upcoming Parliamentary election have recently rocked the boat and speculations are made concerning what impact the inauguration of a new President in 2005 will have. The need for a security concept is more important for Georgia than for many states. Yet it nonetheless requires a stable and coherent security policy, found at all levels of civil and military policymaking that together fulfills the functions of a security concept. Unfortunately, Georgia’s past history points to the opposite. In sum, the need for stability on the domestic and international security venue is greatly needed. While an International Security Advisory Board is now overseeing the drafting process of a new security concept, it can be said that Georgia is currently missing a security concept in the traditional notion. This has paramount impact on the development of Georgia albeit the general recommendations given so far are self-evident issues, as the need to tackle corruption. At least four arguments support this thesis, and relate to predictability, doctrine, reform and NATO accession.

IMPLICATIONS: First and foremost, a security concept is the most fundamental document for handling security. It is the compass that shows how the map of security should be turned. Before a concept is formulated, action plans for implementation cannot be made. Georgia’s political prioritization and assessment of risks and threats are thus not formulated in the context of a long-term strategy. This has the result of invoking short-term opportunism and reduces factors of predictability and accountability in Georgian security policy. Secondly, a security concept must be formulated before a military doctrine can be adopted. Otherwise, the result is the blurring of tasks for the armed forces. Without knowing what they are expected to do, and against what kind of enemy they must prepare, any specific type of training is doomed to fail. What is more, reform of the drafting system, development of rapid reactions forces or renewing the aged and outdated Soviet military equipment cannot be properly made – even if external actors provide financial resources. Reform in Georgia may already be under way, but the expected outcome is unclear. Thirdly, Georgia’s intention is to move towards greater civil control of the armed forced, which is in line with most democratic states. However, it stands to reason that the missing security concept invokes doubts regarding the intensity of these commitments. A security concept approved by the Parliament would become statute law and would thus serve as incentive for continuing this process. This is the case as it constitutes a first real step towards the separations of responsibilities and mandates of the various ‘power ministries’, which along with corruption is the essence of the problems in the Georgian security system. Finally, it can be said that Georgia’s position within international security structures such as the CIS raises doubts on its strategic priorities, especially considering aspirations for NATO membership. Currently, this ‘Janus-like’ position is interpreted as pragmatism by search for support short of NATO. A comprehensive and coherent security concept would firstly facilitate reform towards meeting NATO-standards and secondly make it clear to the international community where Georgia wishes to go.

CONCLUSIONS: Drawing on what has been outlined above, at least three conclusions can be made. First, adherence to an agenda of reform prior to a clarification of political priorities may prove to be counter-productive. Considering the mixture of forces utilizing both asymmetric warfare and traditional Russian military divisions in the region, it is clear that such prioritization is urgent if security is to be enhanced. Second, lacking a security concept is not by definition a problem if the security policy previously has been coherent enough for all actors to have a sense of the course of action. In the case of Georgia, such a history is missing and thus a codified concept is pivotal. Finally, the International Security Advisory Board has a difficult task ahead and the implications mentioned in previous segments of this article calls for attention. In addition, if the concept is adopted by the Parliament by majority, future changes requires qualified majority. This is essential, and preferably it should be adopted before the election, as it would serve the purpose of bringing long-term stability.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Robert L. Larsson is a visiting researcher at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi, focusing on the reform of the Georgian security establishment and cooperation with the United States.