BACKGROUND: Whilst most of the early militaries in Central Asia were developed on the basis of the units in the Soviet Turkestan Military District, in Tajikistan the experience of military construction was unique, relying upon volunteer groups. The Tajik armed forces inherited little from Soviet army, military schools and training centers were entirely lacking. This greatly inhibited the speed at which suitable forces could be constructed. Civil War soon interrupted that process further, resulting in the loss of more than 100,000 people during the years of conflict 1993-97. Russia, acting in its capacity as Tajikistan’s main strategic partner, provided crucial assistance in the formation and development of the Tajik armed forces throughout the 1990s. Russian military advisors formed a committee in the Tajik Ministry of Defense after the conclusion of the civil war in 1997, helping in forming a system of operational training throughout the armed forces. Since 1993 around 100 Tajik servicemen have received military training in Russia each year. Tajikistan now has an element of self-functioning military education, having opened the Higher Military Engineers College in Dushanbe as well as other military schools. Although the first Tajik military training establishments emerged during the 1990s, the backbone of the Tajik army still centers upon former Soviet officers. Russian assistance has been much more fundamental. The Russian 201st Motor Rifle Division is based in Dushanbe, under the operational command of Colonel Yuri Perminov, with an estimated strength of around 8,000 personnel. The 201st MRD supplies an important security lifeline to Tajikistan, and would almost certainly play a vital part in armed conflict involving Tajik forces. In addition the Russian border guard Service has a group deployed in Tajikistan with around 14,500 personnel, consisting of mostly Tajik conscripts preferring to serve in the border group than in their own army, under the leadership of Russian officers. The Tajik border Guard Service is too weak and under-funded to manage the task of patrolling the sensitive Tajik borders, which nevertheless see large quantities of illegal opiates pass through annually. Within the CIS, the Tajik army is a participant in the Collective Rapid Deployment forces and takes part in military exercises organized within the region. Tajikistan has regularly been involved in CIS military exercises, though it has not markedly improved the combat readiness and capability of its army, whose experience of regular training in Tajikistan is less than satisfactory. Since Operation Enduring Freedom began in the aftermath of 9/11, U.S. and Western military forces have been based in Dushanbe and Kulyob in Tajikistan. President Imomali Rakhmonov has also promoted military cooperation with countries beyond the region, including France, India and Ukraine. Notably, in February 2002, Tajikistan became a member of NATOs Partnership for Peace.

IMPLICATIONS: Tajikistan’s armed forces consist of ground forces, air and air defense forces and special and technical units. Air defense forces are badly in need of upgraded assets, since the present only ensure continuous radar coverage at an altitude of 5,000 km. The command and control system was badly affected during the Tajik civil war, and some Russian specialists doubt whether it is capable of being restored, perhaps requiring a complete overhaul. Indeed, the army itself, likewise, suffers from acute under-funding and poor discipline, as well as lack of training and adequate combat preparation. Personnel problems persist based on the hemorrhaging of former Soviet army officers in the 1980s and 1990s. Many of the young Tajik conscripts performing military service in Tajikistan are found in the Russian military structures based in the country. Those serving in the regular Tajik army are often poorly educated and suffering from poor health. The army, despite international assistance and military aid, continues to use Soviet equipment and weapons, relying on Russia’s assistance for repairs and maintenance. However, the armed forces suffer from severe shortage of military equipment, weapons and munitions. Its Military-industrial complex essentially collapsed after the disintegration of the USSR, with factories in the North, which had supplied the Soviet military, unable to continue functioning in the independent Republic. Economic constraints placed on the Tajik army forced the abandonment in 2000 of the experiment in switching manning system to one based on contract service. Many aspects of the military need improving, requiring systemic reform underpinned by serious investment, if the Tajik armed forces are to meet the challenges of the post-9/11 security environment. Operational planning and command and control must become more functional, currently poor despite the combat experience of many personnel, mobilization and combat readiness also stand in need of attention. Developing combat ready, mobile forces is still a long way off for the Tajik army. Tactically, soldiers are capable of performing at a reasonable level of competence but operational strategy is often weak. Furthermore, the development of basic principles for ‘operations other than war’ enabling rapid and effective response to the threat of terrorist activities or militant incursions remains neglected, despite their obvious importance to regional military planners. To develop an effective counter-insurgency strategy would require proper funding, new methods of training, upgrading weapons systems, and restructuring the collection and dissemination of military intelligence. President Rakhmonov has approved plans for the reorganization of the territorial defense of the country, which will be coordinated by the General staff and the MoD. These may utilize the local clan system to greater effect, and marginally improve national security by clarifying the duty of citizens to defend the homeland. Such measures, however, fall short of the needed genuine effort to address the problems confronting a weakened national system of defense, which may fail to fulfill its tasks in a competent manner in the midst of a crisis.

CONCLUSION: These deep and abiding problems within the Tajik army compel the state to rely heavily on the security structures within the CIS generally, and on Russian military assistance in particular. After a decade of existence, Tajikistan has made very slow progress towards a truly independent defense and security force capable of meeting the diverse needs of modern warfare and ensuring Tajik sovereignty. Threats to its security stem from religious extremism, militants, terrorism, transnational crime, drug trafficking and migration. Devising appropriate forces and funding their proper training will only adequately address these issues. This will necessitate international assistance, aimed at bringing about an enhanced level of professionalism with the modern Tajik army.

AUTHOR BIO: Roger N. McDermott is an honorary senior research associate, department of politics and international relations, university of Kent at Canterbury (UK). He is also the editor (together with Anne C. Aldis) of the forthcoming Russian Military Reform 1992-2002, London/Portland: Frank Cass, 2003.