Wednesday, 22 May 2002

THE LOYA JIRGA AND THE WAY TO A SOLUTION TO THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CRISIS

Published in Analytical Articles

By Azmat Hayat Khan (5/22/2002 issue of the CACI Analyst)

BACKGROUND: The Afghans, and especially the majority Pashtun population, live in a tribal, egalitarian society, in which Islam and the Pashtu Code (Pukhtunwali) are inseparable from one another - though the Pashtu Code often becomes dominant. During times of crisis, Afghans have always been led by traditional national leaders. As tribesmen, the Afghans defend their territory against one another, or against other tribes, but during national crises, tribal differences are shelved and the nation as a whole takes up arms against an invader or a rebel - as in the instance of Iran attacking Herat in 1832.
BACKGROUND: The Afghans, and especially the majority Pashtun population, live in a tribal, egalitarian society, in which Islam and the Pashtu Code (Pukhtunwali) are inseparable from one another - though the Pashtu Code often becomes dominant. During times of crisis, Afghans have always been led by traditional national leaders. As tribesmen, the Afghans defend their territory against one another, or against other tribes, but during national crises, tribal differences are shelved and the nation as a whole takes up arms against an invader or a rebel - as in the instance of Iran attacking Herat in 1832. Against an infidel, or a non-Muslim, the Afghans utilize national and religious slogans in an intermixed way. Defending his religion, country, neighbors, customs or traditions is considered a Jihad for the Afghan. Historical events demonstrate that all national uprisings were led by traditional national leaders, or by tribal leaders. During the First Afghan War in 1839-42 when Amir Dost Mohammad Khan fled to Bukhara, the lack of leadership was quite apparent. Tribal and local figures led and coordinated the Afghan national uprising jointly. When Wazir Akbar Khan appeared, the common leadership bowed before the traditional national leadership that led them to victory. In the Second Afghan War in 1878, all leaders agreed to the national leadership of Sardar Mohammad Ayub Khan, although there were tribal and local leaders as well. In this uprising, Mulla Mushke Alam and Mulla Sahib of Hadda represented the national religious leadership. During the Third Afghan War in 1919, national leadership lay with King Amanullah, and all tribal chiefs and religious leaders rallied behind him. Whenever there is an emergency or a national crisis, the Afghan people call out a Loya Jirga. A normal Loya Jirga consists of elected members from different tribes and constituencies, and nominated members, who are tribal chiefs, influential spiritual leaders, intellectuals, representatives of women and minorities, judges of the Supreme court, cabinet members, elected members of Ulusi Jirga and also the King who is the president of the Jirga. In the absence of the King, a Loya Jirga takes the name of a Momasal Jirga.

IMPLICATIONS: A political ideology that does not conform to the traditional ways of Afghanistan cannot survive there. For this reason, King Amanullah failed in his modernization reforms. Certain reforms regarding bride money and land reforms were all considered against Islam. Similarly, the Mujahideen struggle against Soviet Occupation failed to find a leader because it lacked a central legal authority, or someone on whom all the tribes could agree. The fundamentalists were well organized and armed, but they were unpopular among the masses, showing once again that political ideologies cannot find roots in Afghan society. Similarly, the Taliban were very quickly deposed after the U.S. military campaign, since their rule lacked a tribal base. After the Soviet Army withdrawal and the removal of Dr. Najibullah\'s government, the Mujahideen took over Kabul. The removal of Dr. Najibullah from power caused two powerful military establishments to break up, and there were only three significant military factions left: those of Dostum, Rabbani/Masood, and then the Taliban. The arms and ammunition dumps that the Mujahideen factions had inside Afghanistan fell into the hands of the tribes. In every province, tribal Shoras organized and tribal Jirgas became the acting force. Those who led the Afghan War and were praised by the leaders of the Western countries and the free world for putting up a stiff resistance against the Soviet, suddenly became warlords, and the same Afghan nation they were leading, stood up against them and wanted liberation from their clutches. They were not accepted as leaders by the Afghan nation, because none of these leaders had the tribal and ethnic credentials that are required for leadership in Afghan society. Two Loya Jirgas were held in Peshawar in 1979 and Quetta in 1981. Tribes and Provinces sent in their representatives, who were nominated by their people. Representatives from all provinces were present and each tribe sent in thirty representatives. The Quetta Loya Jirga decided they must find a leader who is acceptable to everyone, both as a national and a religious head, form committees to handle liberated provinces and Afghan refugees, and work for the establishment of a national government in Afghanistan, not a single party imposing its authority on the Afghan people. With the absence of the legal central authority a big vacuum was created, and therefore the tribes have constantly demanded that the royal family be brought back, in order to unite the people.

CONCLUSION: Before the Soviet invasion, someone who had served in a high government post was respected, whether he knew anything or not. During the war with the Soviets, a person who had taken an active part in the war against the Soviet army, or could mobilize a force behind him, was respected. But presently, only a person who is educated, has not committed crimes against his own people, and has some program for the welfare of his people is respected. The solution to the Afghan crisis is to find a leader who will be respected by all. Whichever way the Afghan problem is solved, whether by the neighboring countries or through the U.N., an important point that has to be taken into consideration is that Afghanistan remains united and as one nation. To bring peace to Afghanistan, and to work for a proper political solution, tribes and tribal chiefs need to be given more active roles, rather than, as present, the Afghan factional leaders that were created in Pakistan. It has been proved that in the last 15 years, no solution could be found through the \'seven factions\', and the only other alternative to the solution of the problem is the traditional Afghan solution, the Loya Jirga. The strength of the tribal system can be judged from the fact that in spite of both the Soviet\'s and the Mujahideen\'s attempts to destroy it, the leadership in Afghanistan is tribal To convene a Loya Jirga is much easier now than it was previously. The fundamentalist factions that were opposing the Loya Jirga have lost ground, both politically and militarily, and have melted away from the scene. A Loya Jirga is at present the best possible way to solve the Afghan crisis and to create a government with true national legitimacy in Afghanistan. However, challenges to the Loya Jirga\'s success remain. The competition among regional powers, and the imbalance of power within Afghanistan - with a minority faction holding excessive power - form the major threats to the success of the Loya Jirga.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Azmat Hayat Khan is Director of the Area Studies Center for Russia, China and Central Asia at the University of Peshawar, Pakistan.

Copyright 2001 The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. All rights reserved

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