The suppression of violent demonstrations in Tbilisi on May 26 once again led to images being beamed out of a Georgia plagued by unrest and instability, complete with allegations of excessive use of force by the police. Meanwhile, bombings and other acts of sabotage with clear linkages to the Russian special services keep being reported. Yet the picture may be misleading: under the surface, Georgia’s politics are showing signs of normalization. The recent violence may just be the death spasms of the legacy of radicalism in Georgia’s post-communist politics.

BACKGROUND: Sixteen  years ago, leading Georgian intellectual Ghia Nodia observed the triumph of a “radical ethos” in Georgia’s post-communist politics, adding that its features included, among other, “disdain for compromise, lack of interest in solutions to economic and other mundane problems, disregard for political reality, rejection of gradualism, and admiration for heroic-aesthetical gestures.” Indeed, Nodia noted, Georgia was notable “not only for having all the problems and conflicts that other postcommunist countries have, but for displaying them in highly dramatic and sometimes even bizarre ways.”

On the surface, these words might seem equally valid today. Since the Rose Revolution, to be sure, the Georgian authorities have come a long way toward issue-based politics and governance. Arguments differ on the accomplishments and failures of the administration of President Miheil Saakashvil; yet it is clear that it has not yet succeeded in alleviating the sharp polarization of Georgian politics. While Saakashvili’s government and the president personally are increasingly popular, recovering from a dip in approval in 2007-08, considerable segments of the political and intellectual classes are irreconcilable opposed. In fact, much of the opposition to Saakashvili has been highly emotional and visceral. This has been the case especially for some of Saakashvili’s former associates: former speaker of parliament Nino Burjanadze, former Minister of Defense Irakli Okruashvili, and former Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli have competed in their radicalism and denouncements of Saakashvili’s government as a criminal, fascist or terrorist regime.

This radicalism was first at display in November 2007, when social and economic dislocations resulting from Saakashvili’s market reforms generated widespread disaffection among segments of Georgia’s population. Large demonstrations in Tbilisi were eventually suppressed by riot police, a crackdown that caused considerable damage to Georgia’s international reputation. Only months after the devastating Russian invasion of August 2008, the opposition launched a season of street demonstrations that nevertheless failed to provoke the authorities to a crackdown. Indeed, aside from minor scuffles, the Georgian authorities gathered well-deserved credit for the restraint showed in their handling of the protests, which included the setting up of mock jail cells that closed Tbilisi’s main thoroughfare for weeks on end. Seeing weakening public support, protest leaders eventually dissolved the demonstrations.

The protests in May 2011 nevertheless did turn violent. When protestors sought to block the route of the planned independence day parade – a location where they had neither sought nor obtained a permit to hold demonstrations – a police crackdown led to the arrest of over a hundred demonstrators. At least two people, including one policeman, were killed by speeding cars belonging to the protest leaders, and human rights groups and foreign diplomats have alleged that excessive force was used by the police to break up the protests.

IMPLICATIONS: The standoff between the government and the opposition remained under control in 2009 because the demonstrations were jointly organized by the radical as well as moderate groups of the Georgian opposition. As such, the more level-headed leaders of the opposition were able to influence the course of events to avoid provocations. For example, at one stage in the 2009 protests, radical leaders planned to cut the main transportation artery connecting Western and Eastern Georgia, something that would surely have generated a crackdown; but moderate forces prevented that from happening.

Since 2009, however, the radical and moderate forces in Georgia’s opposition have parted ways. Moderate forces including the Free Democrats led by Irakli Alasania and the Republican Party led by Davit Usupashvili have formed a “Group of Eight” parties seeking to achieve power through elections, and have engaged in negotiations with the government on electoral reform. These groups have distanced themselves from street politics, hitherto a favorite tactic of Georgian politicians, in favor of normal political dialogue and debate.

This decision has been entirely pragmatic. To begin with, the pro-Western forces that dominate in the “Group of Eight” have realized that street politics will not provide the opposition with legitimacy in Western circles. Quite to the contrary, their western interlocutors keep stressing the importance of working within the system. Much more importantly, Georgia’s moderate opposition – as well as the government – have come to realize that the Georgian population no longer either supports or rewards radicalism.

The art of opinion polling is developing rapidly in Georgia, thanks mainly to the support of Western donors. And the polls, produced by organization such as the Caucasus Research Resource Centers, the International Republican Institute, and the National Democratic Institute, all concur in their conclusions: Georgians, overall, want their politicians to work together to solve the country’s problems. Thus, government officials perceived to perform well are rising in the polls: aside from Saakashvili, whose approval ratings are over 60 percent, Tbilisi Mayor Gigi Ugulava and Interior Minister Vano Merabishvili are increasingly popular.

Likewise, the moderate opposition has been rising in the polls, while the radicals have rapidly lost legitimacy. The Christian Democratic movement, led by George Targamadze, was the first to identify this trend in the electorate already ahead of the 2008 parliamentary elections. The CDM is represented in parliament, never supported the 2009 protests, and has as a result established itself as the most popular opposition force. Similarly, Alasania’s Free Democrats are the second most popular opposition party. Targamadze and Alasania regularly receive the highest approval ratings among opposition leaders, being seen positively by between 40 and 60 percent of the electorate.

By contrast , the radicals have continued to exhibit exactly the characteristics identified by Nodia in 1995, and thus, radical parties and leaders poll in the low single digits. Burjanadze’s grouping has argued that only a “revolutionary scenario” can lead to regime change in Georgia. Misreading polls that suggest most Georgians want an improved relationship with Russia, Burjanadze has been a frequent traveler to Moscow, where she has appeared with Vladimir Putin and other Russian leaders. Her approval ratings in Georgia have collapsed as a result, because few Georgians support a sellout to Moscow. Similarly, Noghaideli practically moved into the error margin in polling after his party struck a deal with Russia’s ruling party, United Russia.

Audio and video recordings of conversations between Burjanadze’s associates, released by the Georgian Interior Ministry and whose authenticity has not been denied by Burjanadze, similarly suggest the extent to which the radical opposition is out of touch with today’s Georgia. Burjanadze and her son discuss how the sacrifice of a few hundred lives would be acceptable for an “Egypt-style scenario” in Georgia, and how Russian GRU special forces may come to their assistance. Similarly, Burjanadze’s husband and his friends discuss over dinner how a paramilitary band could be mobilized and how it would be unstoppable with “mass support” even in the face of riot police.

Thus, in the recent demonstrations, Burjanadze and her associates purposefully sought a violent confrontation with the authorities. They nevertheless maneuvered themselves into a position where not even the other radical forces supported their tactics, and where participants dwindled into the hundreds. It remains unclear whether the organizers, most notably Burjanadze husband Badri Bitsadze, actually believed they would be able to overthrow Saakashvili – or if their aim was simply to sow instability and damage Georgia’s international image. The latter case would rhyme very well with Moscow’s agenda; Burjanadze ties with Russia certainly do raise the possibility that the protests were planned in conjunction with Moscow. Moreover, the events coincide with repeated acts of sabotage and bombings across Georgia that both Georgian and western investigators have concluded to be traceable to Russian special services, which might not be a coincidence.

In either case, the May violence most likely amounted to Burjanadze’s political suicide. Having long lost legitimacy in Georgia, she nevertheless maintained a level of  international credibility as a result of her earlier position in government and the network she built during that time. Now, her movement and tactics are likely to be entirely marginalized.

Could this also mean that the “radical ethos” in Georgian politics is in its death spasms? It may be too early to draw this conclusion, given the propensity for radicalism on behalf of other Georgian opposition leaders such Levan Gachechiladze, the runner-up in the 2008 presidential elections; Shalva Natelashvili, the Labor Party leader; as well as the afore-mentioned Okruashvili and Noghaideli. But the conclusion is inescapable that Georgia is, in spite of appearances, developing a more normal political climate, and that radicals are being increasingly marginalized.

CONCLUSIONS: For that process to continue, and Georgia to become a normal European democracy, much maturity and goodwill will be required from both the government and the opposition. Opposition forces must continue to focus on real concerns and make demands that are realistic; similarly, the government must do its part. To being with, an inquiry into allegations of excessive force in the May 26 crackdown would go a long way in upholding the government’s democratic credentials both at home and abroad. Crucially, the government must work harder to ensure that the incentive structure for the Georgian opposition continues to favor engagement and moderation rather than theatrics and radicalism. The best way to do this would be twofold: first, to address some of the opposition’s legitimate concerns, such as the issue of property rights violations; and second, to restart in good faith the negotiations with the Group of Eight on reforms to the electoral code ahead of the 2012 parliamentary elections, which will be decisive for Georgia’s democratic evolution, but also for the historical legacy of the Rose Revolution.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Svante E. Cornell is Research Director of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center, and Editor of the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst.