The past years have seen increased conflict-related violence in the North Caucasus, which in conjunction with economic instability and social insecurity has endangered the Russian administration of the region. Amid official claims that the insurgents are close to elimination, the Russian government for the first time since the start of the second Chechnya war in 1999 initiated a peace-building project in the region. The project is officially named Peace to Caucasus and aims to bring peace and stability to the volatile region. However, it has so far shown a weak performance and is unlikely to develop into a platform for peace-building.

BACKGROUND: The Peace to Caucasus initiative was launched in October 2009 by a member of the state-run Public Chamber, the pro-Kremlin journalist, Maksim Shevchenko. The project aimed at strengthening civil society in the region, promoting peaceful means for conflict resolution and the inclusion of Caucasians into the Russian social and civil spheres. It envisioned its main activities as discussions, roundtables, social dialogue and the creation of a platform for debates and consensus building. In spite of being run under the aegis of the Russian Federation’s Public Chamber and officially defined as a civil society project, Peace to Caucasus is nevertheless accountable to the state which is to receive the final “product” of its work, i.e., feedback on the condition of civil society and peace opportunities in the region. The project is also aimed at delivering to the state administration grievances and problems of both civil activists and “ordinary” people in the region.

Since its beginning almost two years ago, Peace to Caucasus has organized public debates in almost every North Caucasian republic. Programs and discussions within the project’s framework took place in Dagestan in October 2009, Ingushetia in December 2009, Karachay-Cherkessia in February 2010 and North Ossetia in March 2010. Besides its main emphasis on civil society, Shevchenko’s odyssey in the North Caucasus includes meetings with public figures and representatives of religious and ethnic minority groups. In the course of its meetings, the project has on several occasions emphasized the importance inter-ethnic and inter-confessional dialogue as a means of peace-building in the region, as conflict along ethnic and confessional lines are considered the main causes of violence.

IMPLICATIONS: Undoubtedly, the recent increase in violence in the North Caucasus has not left the Russian authorities unaffected. The Peace to Caucasus project was initiated in spite of the government’s persistent denial that there is an armed conflict in the region. In contrast to a number of previous peace-building initiatives in the North Caucasus, mostly implemented by international civil organizations or IGOs, Peace to Caucasus was designed as a top-down peace-building initiative.

Paradoxically, the work of the project has so far largely failed to alleviate the situation on the ground. The rates of violence remain high, societal security is shaky and human rights violations are continuing unabated. The project has no intention to conduct talks with insurgents in the region, nor does it envision any sort of communication between the conflicting sides, i.e. the armed rebels and state authorities. The main objective of facilitating dialogue between civil society and the state is of limited significance in light of the fact that an independent and vibrant local civil society is almost absent in the region. The majority of participants at roundtable discussions and forums are usually state-sponsored civil groups and movements with no real power or capacity to curb violence. Suspiciously absent from the talks are representatives of religious minorities (for instance Salafis), as well as clan elders and leaders of local communities (jamaats), and non-official clergy.

Most importantly, the Peace to Caucasus project does not distinguish between separatism, political dissent and terrorism, which in addition to the project’s backing from the Kremlin, seriously hampers its potential as a forum where diverse opinions may be voiced. Apart from its lack of neutrality, Peace to Caucasus seemingly lacks credibility since it is an odd mix between a state and civil society initiative. Being clearly sponsored and supported by the Kremlin, the project can hardly be used as a third party peace-builder or mediator. Regardless of its focus on the roots of violence, Shevchenko’s project avoids discussions on the issues of political, cultural or economic autonomy for the North Caucasian republics and reduced involvement of the federal government in their internal affairs. On the contrary, according to Shevchenko, the project’s objective is to reduce the gap between Moscow and the North Caucasus, which in the government’s interpretation often means expanding and tightening its control over both civil society and the public in the region.

Furthermore, it does not seem that Shevchenko’s reports on the progress of his project to the Russian government or Public Chamber have had any effect on official government policy towards the conflict in the North Caucasus. The first months of 2011 have so far neither seen any official efforts to work on peace-building in the region, nor any significant progress in the development of independent civil society in the North Caucasus.

On a positive note, the project has opened opportunities for civil society to express its opinion and make its voice heard to the state. Peace to Caucasus is also so far the only attempt made by the state to address the conflict in the North Caucasus by non-violent means.

CONCLUSIONS: Two years after its initiation, the Peace to Caucasus project resembles a failure more than a success. The current lull in the levels of violence in Ingushetia and Chechnya can largely be attributed to the military success of federal forces in these republics, and the increase of insurgent activities in Kabardino-Balkaria and Dagestan is further evidence of the lack of real peace-building efforts. It is currently unclear how Peace to Caucasus plans to contribute to long-term peace-building in the region without translating its discussions into concrete action.

In spite of its design as a discussion platform, Peace to Caucasus has clearly failed to bring all stakeholders in the conflict to the discussion table and to address issues of significant importance to peace-building, i.e. disappearances of civilians, torture, extrajudicial executions, as well as the lack of cultural, social and religious freedom in the North Caucasus.  

The project’s implications for the future are vague. Unless followed by a project with a broader mandate and mission, Peace to Caucasus risks simply vanishing without leaving feasible achievements on the ground. Evidently, Peace to Caucasus was not meant to bring groundbreaking changes to the region, let alone to succeed in peace-building. The project should rather be regarded as the Kremlin’s tool to befriend the public in the North Caucasus by attempting to breach the gaps between federal and local perceptions and to emphasize its presence in the region. A brief analysis of the project’s accomplishments to date appears to indicate that Peace to Caucasus achieved almost no success in bridging the social, cultural and perceptional abyss between the North Caucasus and the rest of Russia, although it has certainly made the Kremlin’s presence more visible in the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Huseyn Aliyev is an independent analyst, working on civil society and peace-building issues in the Caucasus. He holds a master’s degree in International Politics from Kyung Hee University, South Korea and has a degree in International Humanitarian Action from Ruhr-Universität, Bochum, Germany and Uppsala University, Sweden.