A visible increase has taken place in contacts between members of the North Caucasian elite and Israel. Ramzan Kadyrov’s recent overtures to Israel, in which he acted as an independent ruler, rather than as a governor of the Russian Federation, should demonstrate that Moscow has little power over his actions. By closing its eyes to such activities on part of the North Caucasian elite, or even possibly encouraging them, the Kremlin wants to increase its contacts with Israel. An even more important reason is the persistent instability in North Caucasus, where Moscow is still unable to find any alternative to Kadyrov.

BACKGROUND: Recently, several members of the North Caucasian elite, all Muslims, visited Israel or expressed their positive attitude toward the country in other ways. The visit of Kabardino-Balkarian president Arsen Kanokov on March 6, 2010, was certainly not the first time a member of the North Caucasian elite visited Israel without prior announcement. On March 16, Nursolta Adaev, chief of Chechnya’s Trade-Industrial Chamber arrived in Israel. Adaev is viewed as a close associate of Kadyrov, and met with Israeli businessman and politician Valerii Migirov, who originates in the North Caucasus. Ramzan Kadyrov himself has expressed his warm feelings for Israel. While Israeli newspapers that assessed his views came to the conclusion that Kadyrov is hardly different from a member of the Taliban or any other jihadist, Kadyrov himself emphasized that he was a dedicated Muslim but that this did not stop him from demonstrating his fascination with Israel and the Israelis. He seemed especially fond of Israeli soccer players and decided to hire one for almost half a million US$. Approximately the same amount was transferred to the club to which the soccer player belonged. The player later stated “I met him (Kadyrov) during my first training exercise. He approached me warmly, embraced me. It was quite a warm encounter”. Israeli businessmen have also been active in forging commercial and personal ties in the area including with the increasingly radicalized Dagestan. 

One of the reasons for Kadyrov’s flirtation with Israel and his way of spending money in a royal-type fashion is Kadyrov’s increasing tendency to behave as an independent ruler. Installed in 2004 by the Kremlin in the wake of the terrorist attacks in Beslan, Kadyrov was entrusted with the task to Chechenize of the conflict, relieving the Kremlin of its engagement in a bloody open-ended conflict. In exchange for fighting the war and an outward manifestation of loyalty, Kadyrov had received not only large subsidies but also a considerable level of autonomy. Kadyrov eagerly took on the role and demonstrated his skills as not just a dashing semi-criminal warlord but also a skillful Machiavellian politician who set as his goal complete independence from Moscow, if not de jure then at least de facto.

He engaged in the elimination of those Chechen forces that were not directly controlled by him. He also sought to limit the presence of Russian forces directly controlled by Moscow. He recently proclaimed that Moscow should remove from Chechnya various police and paramilitary units brought there from Russia. While Moscow argued that these forces are needed to ensure an efficient fight against the jihadists, Kadyrov stated that the presence of these forces is not needed, that they induced enormous costs to the Federal treasury, and that the funds would be better spent on people living in abysmal conditions. He does not seem to have changed his mind in this respect, even after the recent spectacular terrorist attacks, which demonstrated that the resistance is largely alive and well.

Of course, the detachments from the Russian heartland are deployed less for fighting the jihadists than for keeping an eye on Kadyrov; which is largely the reason why Kadyrov wanted them out of Chechnya. Feeling that Moscow could exercise little control over him, he has increasingly embarked on foreign trips and other gestures, not as the governor a Russian province but more as the ruler of an independent state. His overtures to Israel and his spending of a considerable amount of money on Israeli soccer players should be considered in this context. Moscow is clearly displeased, and one Russian official rebuked Kadyrov that during his visit to Saudi Arabia he behaved as if the Russian foreign ministry does not exist. Moscow demonstrated its frustration by allowing Geidar Dzhemal, who is known for his radical views, to proclaim on TV that Kadyrov could well become an American puppet. 

IMPLICATIONS: A variety of reasons exist for the increasing contacts between Kadyrov and Israel, as well as for Moscow’s tolerance toward Kadyrov’s independent behavior during foreign trips.

While the Kremlin is rather happy about Kadyrov’s promotion of contacts between Russia and Israel, the most important reason is that the situation in the North Caucasus shows few signs of improvement. The region continues to simmer and jihadism risks spreading to the Russian heartland. A telling example is the case of Said Buriatsky, a young man of mixed origin. One of his parents was Russian, the other Buryat. Neither was Muslim and Buriatsky was originally a Buddhist; however, he later in his life converted to Islam and became a dedicated jihadist. Buriatsky was recently killed together with Amir Seifullakh, another jihadist luminary. Still, hundreds of militants continue to roam the mountains and the Kremlin is aware that the elimination of key targets does not change the situation much. Moreover, the death of some jihadists such as Buriatsky, whose dead body and farewell conversation with fellow jihadists before the final stand with the Russian forces were presented on a jihadist web site, made him a martyr whose death might bring new recruits to the jihadists. The recent splash of terrorist attacks in Russia, including in Moscow, along with Doku Umarov’s promise to launch new attacks in the heartland, clearly indicate that the war in the Caucasus is far from over.

All these factors affect Moscow’s policy toward Kadyrov. On one hand, it closes its eyes on Kadyrov’s continuous desire to clean Chechnya of any forces not directly controlled by him. On the other hand, Moscow seeks to gain benefits from some of Kadyrov’s foreign adventures, which they could not prevent anyway.

And how does Israel fit into this design? The major reason why these players engage in mutual flirtation and tolerate each other within certain limits is not only linked to common interests such as the fear of jihadism. Still such considerations play an increasingly important role not only for Moscow, but also for Israel. The ideological and universalistic anti-Semitism of the jihadists has inspired anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish actions and feelings in new locations, such as the Northern Caucasus, Central Asia and Pakistan. These anti-Israeli forces have also become the enemies of Kadyrov and the Kremlin, which is the main reason for the increasing interaction between these actors, in spite of the ever increasing discord between Kadyrov and Moscow.

CONCLUSIONS: Kadyrov had demonstrated an exceptional friendliness toward Israel and behaves not as Russian governor but increasingly as an independent ruler in these contacts. Moscow seems to have accepted this behavior, for several reasons. One such reason is that the Kremlin feels that the relationship between the U.S. and Israel has soured. The Kremlin is also aware of the large number of Russian Jews in Israel who often harbor quite positive views of Russia. Such factors certainly stimulate the Kremlin to use the North Caucasian elite for establishing additional contacts. However, Moscow is also concerned over the continuous existence and even spread of jihadism and assumes that while Kadyrov’s rule is of little help in resolving the jihadist problem, it at least serves to maintain stability in Chechnya. Thus, on the one hand, the Kremlin closes its eyes to Kadyrov’s continuous desire to clean Chechnya from any forces not directly controlled by him. On the other hand, it hopes to benefit from Kadyrov’s foreign adventures, which it could not have prevented anyway.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dmitry Shlapentokh is Associate Professor of History, Indiana University at South Bend.